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Chapter One
Part One: Introduction

Aim of the project:
The present thesis examines the question of how political tensions affect refugees’
rights through analyzing the course of Egyptian-Palestinian relations spanning the
different Egyptian regimes. Political tensions here refer to instances when Palestinian
factions either grew directly at odds with the Egyptian regime, or entangled within the
web of regional struggle for power. This thesis examines how shifting political discourses
and interests affected the civil rights of stateless refugees in a host country. The project
addresses the securitization of the Palestinians with special emphasis on refugee status
and regime stability. By researching official political narratives, this research interrogates
the deployment of “national security” discourse and its impact on refugees’ basic civil
rights, or denial thereof. This project explores if and how the Camp David Accords of
1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 changed the official Egyptian attitude
towards the Palestinian refugees in Egypt. Other questions will include; how has Egypt’s
status as a signatory to international and regional treaties related to the protection of the
refugees affected the state’s policies regarding the Palestinian community? In this respect
it is worth noting that Egypt ratified without reservations the Casablanca Accords of 1965
which stipulated that the Palestinian refugees in signatory Arab host countries should be
treated as equals to nationals.1 Additionally, despite some reservations Egypt and Tunisia
were the only Arab countries to ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
1. http://www.unchr.org/refworld/docid/460a2b252.html [accessed on 16 September 2011]
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Refugees issued by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on
22 May 1981.2 Egypt formulated reservations to articles 12 (paragraph 1), 20 and 22
(paragraph 1), and articles 23 and 24. Egypt expressed a reservation to article 12
(paragraph 1) because it contradicts the Egyptian internal laws. The original article
provided that the personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country
of his domicile or, failing this, of his residence. This formula, however, contradicts with
article 25 of the Egyptian civil code which stipulates that: “in the case of persons without
nationality or with more than one nationality at the same time. In the case of persons
where there is a proof, in accordance with Egypt, of Egyptian nationality, and at the same
time in accordance with one or more foreign country, of nationality of that country, the
Egyptian law must be applied.”3 Concerning articles 20, 22 (paragraph 1), 23 and 24,
Egypt expressed reservations because those articles considered refugees as equal to
nationals in terms of accessing primary education and welfare services. The Egyptian
authorities argued that it is more convenient to the competent authorities to approach the
topic of the refugees on a case-by-case basis.4 It is also of importance to take into account
that Egypt’s Palestinians fall under the terms of article 1D (paragraph 2) of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees issued by UNHCR.5
This convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from
organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations Higher
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such protection or
assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being
definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the

2. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, 137
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4add77d42.pdf
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General Assembly of the United Nations, the persons shall ipso facto be entitled
to the benefits of this Convention.6
This case applies to the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, who unlike their
counterparts in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, do not fall
under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),
established in 1949 to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians displaced in 1948.
However, the fact that the 1951 Convention failed to define dispersed Palestinians as
refugees rendered them vulnerable vis-à-vis the host countries. The rationale behind this
exclusion was based on the fact that Palestinian refugees were already receiving
assistance from another UN organ; UNRWA in this case. But UNRWA offers only
humanitarian assistance and not legal protection for refugees and it does not operate in all
Arab countries hosting Palestinian refugees. Further, during the drafting of the
Convention, Arab states opposed including Palestinians under the mandate of UNHCR,
arguing that such inclusion will weaken the prospect of their right of return. By excluding
Palestinian refugees from its wide definition, the Convention left the refugees in limbo
with no concrete international legal protection enforcing the implementation of its articles
by signatory states.7
The project will also address the role of the press in shaping public opinion and
narratives on issues such as national security. The project will also explore the role of the
press in pushing certain topics to the forefront while pulling others to the background. It
will also address the question of how the Egyptian press constructs the image of the
Palestinians with special emphasis on moments of political tensions between Egypt and

6. Ibid.
7. Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, (Oxford University Press,
1998), 65-67
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the Palestinian factions (i.e. singing the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty,
tensions rising between Egypt and Hamas across the Gaza Strip boarders).
The research addresses the political shifts in Egypt for over six decades. It begins
with an analysis of Nasser’s pan-Arabism. It then moves to Sadat’s nationalist oriented
(Egypt First) discourse and his close ties with the West generally and the United States
specifically. The thesis will then explore the Mubarak era, which is largely a continuation
of Sadat’s legacy. This project contributes to the existing scholarship investigating
protection gaps in refugees’ studies, since it examines how shifting political discourses or
conflicting interests would affect enacting refugees’ civil rights in host countries. The
research investigates the extent of the integration and implementation of the terms of
regional and international treaties within the Egyptian domestic legal apparatus. It is
worth mentioning that whenever Egypt signs a treaty whether regional or international it
automatically becomes integrated into the Egyptian legal system the day following its
publication in the official gazette. Thus, it is important to examine whether or not such
treaties are effectively enacted and what are the obstacles hindering their implementation.
In other words, the project examines the gap between refugees’ realities and theoretical
protection mechanisms.
Literature Review:
There are limited sources that directly address the status of the Palestinian
refugees in Egypt. The lack of official records or statistics revealing their exact number,
locations, and activities further complicates this project. However, the fieldwork
conducted between years 2003 and 2005 by Oroub El-Abed provides useful insights
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regarding the livelihood of the Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. 8 Additionally, studies by
Abbas Shiblak, Maher Bitar, and Laurie A. Brand, provide a useful theoretical framework
on the legal status of the stateless Palestinians in Arab host countries. 9 These sources also
pay special attention to the ways in which internal Arab politics and fluctuations in the
relations between the Arab regimes and the Palestinian factions define and affect the
status of the Palestinian refugees.
Further works essential to the project will include studies in international refugee
law, providing a theoretical legal framework situating the Palestinian refugees in Egypt in
a wider global socio-legal context. In this respect the seminal study by Lex Takkenberg
provides an in-depth analysis aiming at defining Palestinian refugee status within the
paradigms of international protection laws along with addressing their status in the Arab
world from a legal perspective.10 Furthermore, a set of independent reports provides a
comprehensive approach to examine the status of Egypt as a host country including those
of Sherifa Shafie, Asem Khalil, and Katarzyna Grabska.11 Such studies analyze the status
of Egypt as a refugee receiving country over different decades; those reports also address
the different types of refugees residing in Egypt and their respective socio-economic and
legal status.

8. Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 2009
9. “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Journal of Palestine
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1996), 36-45
“Unprotected Among Bothers: Palestinians in the Arab World,” University of Oxford, Refugee Studies
Center, Working Paper Series, Jan. 2008, RSC Working Paper No. 44
Palestinians in the Arab World. Columbia University Press, 1988
10. The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 1998
11. “Palestinian Refugees in Arab States: A Rights – Based Approach,” CARIM Research Reports 2009/08
“Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt,” Forced Migration and
Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, Egypt, July 2006
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For examining the press’ role in shaping public opinion, Ghada Hashem Talhami’s
comparative study on the process of constructing the image of the Palestinians through
the lens of both the official and independent Egyptian press across the past six decades is
very useful.12 Additional sources include studies by Mustapha K. El-Sayed and Karem
Yehia; both examine how the Egyptian press portrayed Palestinians during the late 1970s
and early 1980s a crucial era when Egyptian-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly
following the signing of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty of 1979.13
Furthermore, examining the various shifts within the official Egyptian political
discourse and the ways in which such shifts affect and define the Palestinians in Egypt is
an integral component to this project. To this end such studies by Ghada Hashem
Talhami, Maha Ahmed Dajani, and Muhammad Sa’id Hamdan examine the ways in
which Egypt both defined and situated its political and regional identity through the lens
of the Palestine question.14 Additionally, the present thesis aims at exploring the
historical background addressing both the historical ties between Egypt and Palestine and
the rise of the Palestinian refugee problem. In this respect Ilana Feldman’s study provides
a comprehensive historical analysis examining the historical socio-political relations
between Egypt and Palestine through the lens of Gaza which holds a special status as the

12. Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 2007
13. “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18,
No. 4 (Summer, 1989), 37-51
“The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-1985,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter,
1987), 45-63
14. Palestine and Egyptian National Identity, 1992
The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, 1986
Siyasat Misr Tijah Al-Qadiyah Al-Filastiniyah 1946-1956 [ Egyptian Politics toward the Palestinian Cause
1946-1956], 2006
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eastern gate to Egypt.15 As for analyzing the history of the Palestinian refugee problem,
Benny Morris’s study although relying heavily on Israeli archives, remains the most
detailed account exploring the question of the Palestinian refugees. 16 Moreover, the case
of the Palestinian refugees cannot be properly addressed without examining the causes
leading to the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948 in what is referred to as the nakba. The
Palestine war led to the expulsion of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their homeland
representing the first official wave of Palestinian refugees. In this respect studies by Avi
Shlaim and Eugene L. Rogan utilize the various recently declassified Israeli and British
archives to shed new light on the events leading to the creation of the state of Israel on 15
May 1948, the subsequent intervention of the Arab armies and their ultimate defeat.17
This new reading into the history of the 1948 war aims to deconstruct long established
facts regarding the creation of Israel and the outcome of the war. Israeli scholars like Avi,
Shlaim, Benny Morris, and Ilan Pappe, attempt to utilize the available archives in order to
reexamine the unchallenged Zionist version historicizing the 1948 war.18
Methodologies:
This project will use a combination of both primary and secondary sources. The
primary sources will include analyzing presidential speeches and interviews, and
reviewing press editorials published the Egyptian newspaper both official and
independent depending on availability. Other primary sources will include various
Egyptian laws, which were issued during the decades under study and had a direct impact
15. Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1947, 2008
16. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2004
17. “The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug. 1995),
287-304
The War for Palestine, Second Edition, 2007
18. Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” 288
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on the Palestinian refugees in Egypt as well as international treaties to which Egypt is a
signatory.
Chapter Outline
Chapter One
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the aim of the
project, brief literature review, and methodologies. The second part traces the origins of
the Palestinian refugee problem and early Egyptian-Palestinian relations. This part also
examines the Egyptian government reaction toward the early waves of Palestinian
refugees on the eve of the nakba.
Chapter Two
This chapter focuses on the Nasser era, 1954-1970. It examines the place of the
Palestine cause within Nasser’s pan-Arabism. It will also investigate the ways in which
Palestinian nationalism was utilized to promote Nasser’s vision of pan-Arabism. The
chapter also attempts to analyze the era’s press and laws relating to Palestinians with
special emphasis on moments of political crisis.
Chapter Three
This chapter examines Sadat’s era, 1970-1981. This era represented a significant
breach with Nasserism especially during the second half of the 1970s which witnessed
the shift from pan-Arabism to Egyptian nationalism. The assassination of Egyptian
Minister of Culture Youssef al-Sibai in February, 1978, the signing of the Camp David
Accords of 1978, and the Peace Treaty of 1979 led to a rapid deterioration in Egyptian11

Palestinian relations. The chapter in this sense attempts to examine how political conflicts
affect refugees’ social and legal rights as Egypt’s Palestinian refugees were the direct
victims of the Egyptian-Palestinian clash.
Chapter Four
This chapter examines the Mubarak years, 1981-2011. This era is mainly
characterized by being a continuation of Sadat’s political and economic discourse.
Mubarak maintained a close dependency on the United States and posed as a peace
mediator between the Arabs and Israel. Palestinian refugees’ status did not witness
significant improvements as all Sadat’s regulations remained intact. The only noteworthy
improvement occurred with the issuing of Law 154 0f 2004. This law gave Egyptian
women married to foreigners the right to pass their citizenship to their children.
Palestinian children however, remained excluded from the application of this law until
May, 2011. Egyptian-Palestinian relations remained stable throughout the Mubarak era
until the Fatah-Hamas split in 2007. The Egyptian regime sided with Fatah and attempted
to isolate Hamas by sealing the Rafah cross border, thus, intensifying the Israeli blockade
suffocating the Gaza Strip. The Mubarak era ended with his resignation on 11 February
2011 following an eighteen-day mass revolution against his regime.
Conclusion
This part briefly examines the Egyptian political arena following the 25 January
2011 revolution, and the extent to which the post-Mubarak era affected the course of
Egyptian-Palestinian relations and the status of Egypt’s Palestinian refugees.
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Part Two: The Rise of the Palestinian Refugee Problem

What led to the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem? And what are the
historiographical debates on the 1948 war? I will address these questions and examine the
evolution of Egypt’s official response to the developments in Palestine during the 1920s
and until the 1948 war. This section ends with assessing the Egyptian government official
response to the early waves of Palestinians seeking refuge in Egypt.
The Palestinian refugee problem resulted from the defeat of the Arab armies in
the 1948 war, which became known in Palestinian historiography and narratives as alnakba (catastrophe). The Arab states rejected the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) Partition Plan approved on 29 November 1947.19 Accordingly, the Arab League
(AL) decided to send Arab armies (from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq) into Palestine
despite lacking adequate military preparation and unified strategies. During the war,
Palestinians suffered from brutal attacks carried by the Haganah (a Jewish paramilitary
group). The attacks followed the pattern outlined in Plan Dalet (Plan D), which aimed at
expelling as many Palestinians as possible to include their villages into the proposed
Jewish state.20 In the wake of the defeat and the signing of the armistice between the
Arabs and Israel on Rhodes Island between January and July 1949 more than 750,000
Palestinians became stateless refugees. During the war Israeli forces pushed hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians toward the neighboring Arab states. On the eve of the war the
19. Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, (Boston New
York: Bedford / ST. Martin’s Seventh Edition, 2010), 212-214, Document No. 4.2 “UNSCOP’s Plan of
Partition with Economic Union.” The plan proposed the partition of Palestine into seven sections: three
parts controlled by the Arabs, the other three by the Jews, while keeping Jerusalem and Bethlehem under
the administration of the UN.
20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Dalet, Plan D is argued to be at the core of the Zionist project and
served as a guide to the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians during the 1948 war.
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coastal Palestinian cities, later called Israel, held an Arab population of about 860,000.
By the end of the war, the population decreased dramatically to reach 133,000. This
means that over 700,000 Palestinians became refugees dispersed in camps in Jordan,
Lebanon, the Gaza Strip (under Egyptian rule), Syria, and lesser numbers in Iraq.21
The outcome of the defeat was tremendous. Thousands of forcibly dispossessed
Palestinians lost their homeland, their relatives, and their means of livelihood “in one of
the biggest ethnic cleansing operations in modern times.”22 The psychological trauma
resulting from the horrors of the war and the sense of dispossession was immeasurable.
The unfolding of the nakba narrates not only Arab political failure, but challenges the
myths surrounding the creation of the state of Israel.
Al-nakba between Myth and Reality
The state of Israel was officially created on 15 May 1948. 23 Israeli historians
portrayed its creation in biblical terminology as a miracle where a small Jewish
population (small Jewish David) managed against all odds to score a decisive victory
over a coalition of Arab armies (Goliath) aiming at destroying the newly-born state.24 The
narrative also claimed that the Palestinian refugee problem is not an Israeli creation.
Instead the problem came into existence because the Arab states called on the
Palestinians to leave their cities until the expulsion of Israeli settlers. This portrayal,
however, ignored the fragmented Arab front, the role of the British mandate (1922-1948)
21. Ibid. 203 also see Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books), 1992, 1415
22. Mahmoud Issa, “The Nakba, Oral History and the Palestinian Peasantry: The Case of Lubya,” in Nur
Masalha, ed. Catastrophe Remembered: Palestine, Israel and the Internal Refugees, (London New York:
Zed Books, 2005), 181
23. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. Document No. 4.5,
“Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948,” 218-220
24. Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3
(Aug. 1995), 287-304, 294
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in facilitating the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and more importantly the
settler colonial nature of the Zionist project. In this sense, Israeli version of history was
utilized to build a specific national consciousness. It is a form of official nationalism as
Benedict Anderson puts it: “a conscious, self-protective policy, intimately linked to the
preservation of imperial-dynastic interests…The one persistent feature of this style of
nationalism was, and is, that it is official – i.e. something emanating from the state, and
serving the interests of the state first and foremost.”25
From its premise, the Zionist project adopted Israel Zangwill’s slogan: a land
without people, for a people without land.26 The language used in the Balfour Declaration
of November 1917 carried a resemblance to this theme through explicitly ignoring the
actual presence of an indigenous population entitled to the right of self-determination.
The Declaration states:
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing nonJewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews
in any other country.27
By referring to the Palestinians as non-Jewish communities, the Balfour Declaration
aimed at denying Palestinians their political and national rights by virtually denying their
existence as nationals entitled to the right of self-determination. This explains the policies
adopted by the British mandate, which focused on hindering any attempts to create any
semi-official Palestinian governing body with a minimum level of authority. By denying
the establishment of a quasi-official Palestinian authority the British aimed at controlling
25. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London New York: Verso, 2006), 159
26. Said, The Question of Palestine, 9
27. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Document No. 2.2, 96-97
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all the Palestinian affairs in a manner that would not empower Palestinian Arabs with any
level of self-rule otherwise prevailing in the other Arab states during that time period.28
Edward Said argues that the structure of the Declaration shows the extent to
which Zionism is yet another manifestation of imperialism. Said explains that the
Declaration was in fact made by a foreign power (Great Britain) regarding a foreign
territory with the promise of establishing a national homeland for a foreign community
regardless of the presence and wishes of the existing indigenous population.29
Accordingly, like most colonial projects, Zionism was rationalized as a higher mission to
fulfill God’s promise to the Jewish people and to end anti-Semitism in Europe. Similar to
the discourse of colonialism, European Zionists argued that their project is the by-product
of Western culture that would bring civilization to the backward land of the inferior
orient.30 This argument assumed that the land of Palestine is the rightful Jewish homeland
regardless of the presence of an indigenous population, which was Arab (Muslims and
Christians). In fact the British Census of Palestine conducted in 1922 shows that Palestine
held a population of 689,272 persons of whom only 60,000 were Jews. The demographic
statistics thus reveal that seventy-eight of the population was Muslim, about ten percent

28. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” in Eugene L. Rogan
and Avi Shlaim, eds. The War for Palestine, (New York: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition,
2007), 19
29. Said, The Question of Palestine, 15-16
30. Ibid. 23-25, in his book Orientalism, Said also argues that by denying the nakba, Israeli historians
perceive the land of Palestine and its Arab-Islamic heritage as a vintage site to evoke a sense of authenticity
albeit devoid of its indigenous population. Said refers to this form of narrative as “Israeli Orientalism,” in
which Israeli historians like Western orientalists construct an imaginary version of the timeless authentic
“Orient” regardless of the present realities of the place and its inhabitants. In Edward W. Said, Orientalism,
(New York: Penguin Book), 2003, 79-85
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Christians (mostly Arabs and few foreigners), and eleven percent were Jews (the majority
of whom were not Palestinian but European immigrants).31
Further, Israeli historians argue that during the war Israel faced a monolithic
coalition of Arab armies sharing common goals and strategies. They also argue that
Israeli forces practiced self-restraint and did not adopt systematic expulsion tactics.32
However, recent declassified Israeli and British documents related to the 1948 war
provide a counter-argument to traditional Israeli historiography. Israeli historians (known
as revisionists) like Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, and Ilan Pape embarked on a process of
deconstructing the Israeli narrative chronicling the events of the 1948 war and the
creation of the state of Israel.33 Despite gaining a wider recognition within Western
scholarship, the Israeli revisionists’ discourse is not entirely a pioneering one. Oral
Palestinian historiography documenting the events of the war and the demolition of
Palestinian villages provide a body of first-hand testimonies. Several Palestinian
intellectuals like Arif al-Arif, Walid Khalidi, and Edward Said voiced similar narratives
albeit receiving less scholarly circulation.34 Joel Beinin argues that the historical account
presented by Israeli revisionists is not in fact entirely new. He explains that in addition to
oral Palestinian historiographies, the circumstances leading to the nakba were known to
Zionist political and military elites, soldiers, and kibbutz members who “actively

31. Ibid. 17, for a detailed account of all Palestinian villages and their demographic details prior to 1948 see
Walid Khalidi, All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948,
(Washington D.C. : Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992)
32. Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” 288
33. Ibid. 287-288
34. Joel Beinin, “Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History,” Journal of Palestine
Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (Winter 2005), 6-23, 8
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expelled Palestinians, expropriated their lands, and destroyed their homes—knew very
well what happened to the Palestinian Arabs in 1948.”35
Traditional Israeli accounts of the 1948 war claim that Israel faced a unified Arab
front sharing common strategies. However, analyzing the Arab political scene on the eve
of the war opposes the Israeli narrative. On one hand, Rashid Khalidi attempts to study
the reasons behind the defeat in the 1948 war from a Palestinian perspective. He argues
that Palestine represented a unique case in the sense that unlike other Arab states during
the inter-war period Palestine did not have a clear unified political context representing
its national cause on the international level. In other words, Palestine under the British
mandate, 1922-1948 did not enjoy any form of a para-state or a minimum of political and
legislative autonomy like the cases of other Arab states including the likes of Egypt, Iraq,
Syria, and Transjordan. Although the former states did not enjoy complete independence,
yet several indigenous figures maintained some form of rule over several national
affairs.36
In glaring contrast to their policies toward the Palestinians the British aimed at
empowering the Jewish agencies in Palestine with enough independence to create a semiofficial apparatus in Palestine. The British in this respect facilitated the Jewish
community’s attainment of international recognition as a future state. The British
mandate purposefully overlooked the growing number of Jewish migration into Palestine;
the British also provided great assistance into the establishment of the Jewish Agency.
The mandate empowered the Agency with enough support and elevated it to an official

35. Ibid. 9
36. Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” 18
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status while at the same time denying the Palestinians any chance at creating any form of
self-governing structures.37
Khalidi also argues that the lack of a unified Palestinian national leadership led to
the fragmentation of the Palestinian society. This consequently undermined their struggle
for statehood as they lacked a unified political front representing the Palestine question
on the international level. This political fragmentation was largely the byproduct of the
failure of what Albert Hourani referred to as the politics of notables in Palestine.38 For
several decades the elites dominated the Palestinian political scene as the representatives
of the Palestinian people. However, the notables failed because of their apparent inability
to overcome their personal and ideological differences. The intense clash between Hajj
Amin al-Husayni the grand mufti of Jerusalem and Raghib al-Nashashibi the former
mayor of Jerusalem is a prime example of a bitter conflict that polarized the Palestinians
and divided them into rival factions.39 Such bitter rivalries weakened the Palestinian
national struggle, thus, depriving it from having a unified leadership and a clear national
strategy.
Khalidi adds that the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 provides another
manifestation of the failed politics of the notables. Instead of seizing the opportunity of
the revolt to create a unified national front, these elites created more divisions and
polarization into an already fragmented social fabric. This also explains the fact that the
base of the revolt consisted of the frustrated subaltern classes who saw in the martyrdom
of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam in 1935 a catalyst to galvanize national sentiments.
37. Ibid. 19-20
38. Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of the Notables,” in W. Polk and R. Chambers, eds.
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago, IL: 1968), 41-68
39. Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: the Underlying Causes of Failure,” 22-23
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Shaykh al-Qassam a preacher based in Haifa succeeded in reaching out to the
population’s sentiments more than any of the competing notables. His death in
confrontation with the British forces in 1935 became glorified as a demonstration of
martyrdom for the national cause thus, sowing in the Palestinian national consciousness
the seeds for the Great Arab Revolt.40 However, the revolt’s base failed to compose a
coherent strategy. The revolutionaries suffered from internal divisions among themselves
between urbanite, subaltern, and the peasantry classes. They also lacked a common
leadership. Elites’ rivalries intensified during the course of the revolt and created more
divisions than cohesion.41 In this respect Khalidi argues that the outcome of the 1948 war
could be seen as being predictable given the fact that the Palestinian front never
recovered from the defeat of the 1936-1939 revolt and the growing fragmentation of the
Palestinian social fabric.
the Palestinians in 1947-49 seem to have been even less organized and even less
centralized, and to have had even less of a national focus…Given the course of
Palestinian history until 1948, the underlying causes of what happened in
Palestine in that year should be perfectly comprehensible, and the final outcome
should not have been unexpected, shocked and surprised though many
Palestinians clearly were by it.42
On the other hand, contrary to the Israeli account, Zionists during 1948 did not
face a unified Arab front. In fact, although the Arab states declared a state of war with the
intension of restoring Palestine to its inhabitants, they lacked common strategies and
secretly aspired to secure hidden regional interests. Eugene L. Rogan argues that the case
of Jordan is integral to understand the mechanisms directing the politics of the Arab
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states on the eve of the war.43 Relations between King Abdullah and the Zionists date
back to the early years of his reign where he aimed at securing financial support for his
kingdom, which suffered from limited resources. Rogan explains at the outset of the war
Abdullah signed a deal with the Jewish Agency; the mutual agreement between the two
parties proposed to divide the land of Palestine between the Jewish Agency and
Transjordan. Based on the Partition Plan of 1947, Abdullah hoped to expand the
territories of Trans-Jordan through occupying that part of Palestinian land adjacent to his
frontier. Abdullah envisioned that the proposed plan would provide him with necessary
territorial expansion and abort the creation of a Palestinian state headed by his rival the
mufti of Jerusalem, Hajji Amin al-Husayni.44 Therefore, it could be argued that
Abdullah’s decision to enter the Palestine war served as a pretext to facilitate his plan for
territorial expansion into Palestine. In other words, in the case of Jordan narrow national
interests and regional competition gained priority over Arab and Palestinian
nationalism.45
For Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, participating in the war was the only
convenient pretext to preserve a regional balance of power and contain Abdullah’s
ambitions.46 In the case of Egypt, King Farouk came under massive public pressures
demanding the dispatching of the Egyptian army into Palestine. In a futile attempt to
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deflate the opposition, curtail freedoms, enact emergency laws, and regain the support of
the masses Farouk decided to dispatch the army into Palestine. On the regional level, he
envisioned building an Arab leadership for himself as the liberator of Palestine. He also
like the rest of the Arab leaders, decided to enter the war to block Abdullah from
establishing his envisioned kingdom of Greater Syria.47 Farouk, however, ignored the fact
that for a long time the army’s role became confined to maintaining internal security.
British policies in Egypt aimed at limiting the Egyptian army’s capabilities to justify the
presence of its troops in Suez under the pretext of defending the Canal Zone.
Consequently, the army lacked essential training, equipment, and preparation combined
with the presence of unqualified chiefs in leading positions.48
The previous analysis aimed at disputing the Israeli claim that during the 1948 war
Israel faced the formidable Arab Goliath. The British archives reveal that the Arab states
were unprepared and waged a miscalculated war where mistrust combined with narrow
political and territorial ambitions surpassed the ostensible aim of liberating Palestine.49
The Palestinian Refugees and the Myth of self-defense
One of the most recurrent themes in Israeli historiography is the claim that the
Israeli army always reacts in self-defense and does not intentionally target unarmed
civilians. Israeli historians also claim that the Zionists did not intend to expel the
Palestinians adding that the Arab states were the ones who called upon the Palestinians to
flee their lands to make way to the Arab armies. However, contrary to the prevailing
47. Laurie A. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 41-43
48. Fawaz A. Gerges, “Egypt and the 1948 War: Internal Conflict and Regional Ambition,” in Rogan and
Shlaim, eds. The War for Palestine, 152-175
49. Ibid. 156
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Israeli version of history Morris asserts that “Regarding April-May and the start of the
main stage of the exodus, I have found no evidence to show that the AHC or the Arab
leaders outside Palestine issued blanket instructions, by radio or otherwise, to the
inhabitants to flee.”50
Morris’s thesis is the most detailed account utilizing both Israeli and British
archives to dispel the myth claiming that the Zionists never called on the Palestinians to
flee and that they left because the Arab leaders told them to do so through radio
broadcasts. However, despite its importance, his argument addressing the rise of the
Palestinian refugee problem raises several critical observations. For instance, the book
relies heavily on Israeli sources; he treats them uncritically although he admits that much
of such documents were subjected to political censorship and partial distortion.51 Morris
based his entire argument on the assumption that the Palestinian refugee problem was
born of war not by design.52 In other words, the refugee problem resulted mainly from the
growing hostilities before and throughout the 1948 war. Thus, he concludes that expelling
the Palestinian population was a military byproduct and not a pre-calculated systematical
political strategy. Morris stressed that prior to the war Zionist leaders “did not enter the
war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war ‘transfer’ thinking ever
translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion.”53 He
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also explains that during the war’s early months there were no reports regarding mass
expulsion or leveling of villages.
This however contradicts his conclusion that the exodus resulted from both the
brutal Haganah attacks such as the massacres of Deir Yassin and Lydda, along with the
use of psychological warfare mechanisms that instilled fear which led to mass flight.
Morris also argues that in the months preceding the war the Haganah and the Israeli army
acted on the grounds of self-defense and retaliation against Arab attacks and not
according to systematic expulsion policies. This argument however fails short from
explaining that in many cases the fine line between self-defense and violence grew
increasingly blurry as with cases of collective punishment for entire villages or mass
executions. Additionally, Morris places an emphasis on denying the presence of a
predetermined expulsion policy, although he explains that Plan Dalet (Plan D) proved
useful in providing a pretext for mass evacuations. He argues that Israeli military
commanders utilized the provisions of Plan D to justify expelling hundreds of
Palestinians allegedly for protecting the wellbeing of the Yishuv.54
Contrary to Morris’s argument regarding Plan D, Ilan Pappe argues that the
ultimate goal of Zionism focused on the creation of a purely Jewish state in Palestine
with a Jewish majority. In this respect Pappe asserts that Plan D “was a master plan for
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine” where “the main objective was clear from the
beginning – the de-Arabisation of Palestine.”55 He adds that despite the use of the
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defensive pretexts to justify armed attacks the integral goal of acquiring as much
territories as possible remained in the forefront.56
To conclude, this section presented the historical background explaining the
emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem which resulted from the defeat of the Arab
armies in the 1948 war. It traced the political and military reasons behind the defeat,
along with attempting to dispute several widespread myths surrounding the birth of the
state of Israel. This part aimed at utilizing the new scholarship analyzing the reasons
behind the nakba in order to further problematize the defeat as the result of both political
and military failure and disintegration. Additionally, the arguments presented here
deconstruct some of the prevailing historical accounts addressing the 1948 war. They also
serve as a general historical prelude situating the problem of the Palestinian refugees in a
wider historical framework. The next part will examine the evolution of Egyptian official
response to the Palestine problem beginning in the 1920s through the 1940s.
Egyptian Official Response to the Palestine Cause during the Monarchal Era
Egyptian official response to the Palestine cause developed gradually between the
1920s and 1940s. During the 1920s, Egyptian nationalism shaped itself in new ways.
Also, Egypt officially gained its independence with the end of the unilateral ending of the
British protectorate on 28 February 1922.57 In 1923 Egypt held its first free parliamentary
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elections with the Wafd Party winning the majority of the seats. During the 1920s and
1930s, Egyptian politicians focused their efforts on domestic political issues, the struggle
to end all British presence in Egypt, as well as promoting a sense of nationalism largely
confined in Egyptian cultural and historical heritage.58
During the 1920s, Egyptian intellectuals utilized themes and motifs evoking
Egypt’s “Pharaonic” heritage. Egyptian writers and artists stressed the importance of
creating artistic and literary works based entirely on ancient Egyptian motifs to evoke a
sense of continuation between modern Egypt and its ancient history. 59 It was a process of
creating “territorial Egyptian nationness…[t]he crux of this discourse’s impact is what
might be called the “Misrification” [tamsir in Arabic] of space and subject.”60 Therefore,
Egypt during that era developed an essentially inward sense of nationalism that was
largely detached from Arab affiliation.61 Nonetheless, Egypt during the 1920s was the
region’s intellectual capital with the recognition and expansion of Cairo University, as
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well as a remarkable surge in the numbers of newspapers, magazines, publishing houses,
radio stations, film and recording industry.62
Egyptian politicians showed very little attention to developments occurring in
neighboring Palestine. During the 1920s, several Palestinian delegations visited with the
aim of promoting the Palestine cause. Also, Palestinians residing in Egypt sponsored
committees to spread awareness on events in Palestine and appeal to Egyptian official
support. However, such activities generated very little official response, which did not go
beyond sponsoring some fundraisings to restore al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The state,
for its part, “did not involve itself in the Palestine problem in an official way in the
1920s.”63
This attitude however, gradually changed in the wake of the Wailing Wall
disturbances of 1929. The disturbances occurred in August 1929 over a dispute between
Arabs and Jews concerning the rights of access and worship in the Wailing Wall – Dome
of the Rock area. The situation escalated and turned into violent confrontations between
the Muslim and Jewish communities.64 The rising violence in Jerusalem generated the
first significant Egyptian response toward developments in Palestine during the interwar
period. However, it is important to differentiate between Egyptian official and nonofficial
responses. Several independent associations issued statements defending the rights of
Palestinian Arabs while criticizing both Jewish and British policies in Palestine. Further
activities included raising funds and sending medical aid. Most of the organizations
involved in such activities fell under two categories: first, Islamic associations like the
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Young Men’s Muslim Association (YMMA), the Society of the Islamic Banner, and the
Islamic Guidance Society. The second category consisted of Syrian and Palestinian
groups like for instance, the Syro-Palestinian Conference in Egypt and gatherings of
Palestinians living in Egypt.65 By contrast, the Egyptian government along with the
secular political parties seemed “to have done nothing in relation to the Wailing Wall
disturbances; no protests, no meetings, no appeals for assistance.”66 Islamic organizations
in this respect perceived the violence from a religious rather than a political perspective.
During that era the political dimension of Zionism had not been fully materialized.
Islamic circles argued that the whole dispute stemmed from Jewish rather than Zionist
encroachments. They argued that the issue could be resolved if the British government
interfered and officially recognized that as a majority, the Muslims had religious
privileges in the disputed area. Liberal politicians like Prime Ministers Adli Yakan,
Muhammad Mahmoud, and Moustafa al-Nahhas did not issue any statements regarding
the violence in Jerusalem. There were not any mass protests, and King Fu‘ad declared
that the entire incident was a matter of the British government.67
The 1930s witnessed a gradual growth in Egyptian concerns with the Palestine
problem. This shift stemmed from both domestic and regional factors. Regionally, the
rising numbers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine raised fears that the British government
was moving forward with its plan to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine.
Indeed, the first half of the 1930s witnessed an influx in European Jewish immigrants
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escaping anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany.68 Driven by depression and high rates of
unemployment, European states and the United States put several restrictions on
immigration. This left Palestine an easy destination for European Jews escaping Hitler’s
repression. Records show that numbers of Jewish immigrants showed steady increase
from 30,327 persons in 1933 to 42,359 in 1934, while peaked at 61,854 persons in
1935.69 By mid-1930s the Jewish population in Palestine reached a total of 400,000
people.70 Palestinian-Jewish tensions escalated culminating with the eruption of the Great
Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The revolt started as a general strike protesting British
policies in Palestine and the influx of Jewish immigrants. It soon transformed into a
large-scale rebellion considered to be “the longest anticolonial rebellion in the east during
the interwar period.”71 The rapid developments in Palestine gradually gained visibility in
Egyptian official and public opinions.
During the 1930s Egypt witnessed an intellectual shift from a liberal-westernized
approach to the emergence of a pan-Arab pan-Islamic attitude. This shift from an
Egyptian-centric orientation to a larger Arab-Islamic framework resulted from several
domestic factors. Egyptian society during the 1930s opted for embracing Islamic trends
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in response to the rising activities of the YMMA and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as
the failure of the liberal experiment in fulfilling national aspirations. The liberal
parliamentary experiment fell short from achieving full Egyptian independence from
British dominance. It also failed in bridging social and economic gaps as “[a] few
landowning families held vast amounts of land, while the mass of the population eked out
a living on small estates or as landless laborers. The largest landholders by far were
members of the royal family, reputed to own no fewer than 180,000 acres.” 72 The
parliament largely dominated by wealthy classes voted against social and land reform
laws to preserve the existing status-quo and protect their economic interests. Against such
failures and glaring inequalities, Hassan al-Banna, the leader of the Brotherhood, called
for a return to authentic Islamic practices and traditions as a solution to current social and
political problems. Al-Banna further argued that “parliamentary governance was a sham
imposed by the wealthy and powerful on the poor to keep them in their place.” 73 AlBanna’s argument combined with persisting political and economic grievances appealed
to the masses and nurtured their religious sentiments. Aside from the westernized elites
and members of the royal family, Islam remained an integral component of ordinary
Egyptians’ everyday lives. King Farouk would also encourage nourishing religious
rhetoric in an attempt to bridge the cultural gap between the ruling elites and the masses,
he stressed that Qur’an “is the key of happiness; it is the key of life.”74 The 1930s
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witnessed a significant rise in religious writings discussing the life of Prophet
Muhammad and early Islamic history and civilization.75
This era also witnessed the emergence of pan-Arab ideas in Egyptian political
thought as a means of identifying Egypt with a larger entity.76 In fact cultivating the seeds
of Arab nationalism within Egyptian identity had more popular appeal than integral
Egyptian nationalism of the 1920s. It formulated a supra-Egyptian nationalism through a
unique mixture of “elements of both Islamicism and integralism as well as of earlier
territorial nationalism, but reshaped to fit its particularly Arab perspective.”77 The rise of
Islamic sentiments during the 1930s introduced the Egyptian public to the many
“cultural, religious, and political ties that bound Egypt to the other Arab states, thus
“increas[ing] awareness of the Arab and Islamic components of Egyptian national
identity.”78 The revival of Arab and Islamic orientation brought into the public’s
conscious a new perception of the Palestine question. The public got to know that fellow
Arab and Muslim Palestinians struggle against alien occupation. The Great Revolt of
1936 increased the public’s awareness and interest in the Palestine problem. The public
identified with the revolt politically and religiously, since Palestinians were fellow Arabs
and Muslims fighting against colonial oppression.79
The rise of pan-Arab sentiments during the 1930s gained the encouragement of
both King Farouk and Egyptian politicians as political vehicles to score popularity among
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the masses. Both the king and his rival the Wafdist leader Mustafa al-Nahhas used panArabism and the Palestine issue “as useful propaganda tools…to enhance their own
reputations.”80 After signing the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Egypt hoped to engage
in the diplomatic efforts regarding the Palestine question.81 However, the Egyptian
official interest in the Palestine question did not stem solely from sentiments, but largely
from national and political considerations. Egyptian politicians hoped that adopting the
Palestine problem would enhance Egypt’s political prestige as an Arab leader, score
political leverage against Britain, and deflate the opposition to the 1936 treaty. 82 During
the 1936 revolt Egyptian diplomacy offered very little other than rhetoric. In deed
journalist Abdel Qadir al-Mazini criticized the government’s stance where “ministers
“talk” about Palestine, yet the government of Egypt is not participating in any other way
[than talk] to stop the bloodshed and to achieve justice.”83
The release of the Peel Commission’s report of 1937 recommending the partition
of Palestine between Arabs and Jews raised much attention and concern in Egypt.
Various Egyptian organizations such as the YMMA, the Muslim Brotherhood, Young
Egypt, and the Egyptian Women’s Union as well as youth and university students’ groups
80. Ibid. 58
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protested the report.84 They released reports denouncing the partition plan, arguing that
Palestine is an Arab land and belongs to the Arabs. Religious arguments voiced through
al-Azhar argued that the partition of Palestine meant the loss of the Holy Places and that
it is the duty of every Muslim to defend Palestine.85 Secular arguments stressed that the
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would lead to Arab Jewish hostilities which would
eventually facilitate European intervention under the pretext of preserving regional peace.
Further arguments explained that the proposed Jewish state would act as a barrier
destroying Egypt’s hopes of leading the Arab world, since Egypt would be culturally and
economically isolated from the Arab east. The proposed Jewish state would thus become
the region’s financial center and transform the region into its “economic colony.”86
Politicians warned that the creation of a Jewish state would end all hopes for the unity of
the Arab east. They also warned that such state would have an expansionist goal, which
would soon go beyond Palestine and lay claims to other neighboring Arab lands.87
Wafdist Prime Minister Moustafa al-Nahhas represented Egypt’s official response
to the Peel report. During a parliamentary hearing on 20 July 1937, he stressed that the
Egyptian government was keen on defending Palestinians’ national rights. Nahhas voiced
his rejection of the partition plan to the British ambassador to Egypt Sir Miles Lampson.
He protested the fact that Palestinians were being “plucked up by the roots to make way
for strangers in their native land,” he further added “what was to prevent the Jews from
eventually maintaining a right to Sinai in the future? Or provoke trouble with [the] Jewish
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community in Egypt itself?”88 Nonetheless, Nahhas did not encourage Egyptian-Arab
collaboration regarding the Palestine issue. He declined to send official representatives to
the inter-Arab conference on Palestine, which was held in Syria in September 1937. The
Egyptian delegation to the conference participated on a non-official basis and had very
little to offer other than clichéd rhetoric.89
The year 1937 saw a limited Egyptian involvement in the Palestine question.
There were two cases where the Egyptian government expressed solidarity and concern
toward Palestine. The first occurred on 18 September 1937 when the Egyptian Foreign
Minister addressed the League of Nations and stressed Egypt’s rejection to the partition
option and its firm belief that “Palestine remain for the Palestinians.”90 The second
occasion came in the form of a petition to the British embassy drafted by members of the
Egyptian parliament. They stressed the historical and religious ties binding Egyptians and
Palestinians, and denounced the partition plan and British repressive policies in
Palestine.91 The limited Egyptian diplomatic involvement in the Palestine issue in 1937
resulted mainly from Egypt’s internal political crisis. The Wafd party had to deal with
several domestic challenges. On the one hand, the rivalry between King Farouk and alNahhas crippled the political scene. On the other hand, the Wafd party, long known for
its mass popularity, faced a rising challenge from a new generation of educated youth
who questioned the credibility of the existing political order.92
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In 1938 and 1939, Prime Minister Mohammad Mahmoud adopted a more active
policy toward the Palestine issue. It is however important to note that the rising public
support of Palestine highly influenced the premier’s stance. He delivered several public
speeches on Palestine before the World Parliamentary Congress in October 1938 and
before the joint meeting of representatives of Arab governments held in Cairo in January
1939. Mahmoud also sent an official Egyptian delegation to the St. James Conference on
Palestine in February-March 1939.93 When such meetings failed to resolve Arab-Jewish
disputes, Mahmoud proposed negotiating with both the British and the World Zionist
Organization. In April 1939 the governments of Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia formally
rejected the resolutions of the White Paper of 17 May 1939. Following several
unsuccessful negotiations with Palestinian representatives, Mahmoud delivered a public
statement explaining that the proposed plan failed to serve as a base to solve the Palestine
question.94
The 1940s witnessed an increasing Egyptian involvement in the Palestine issue
coinciding with the establishment of the Arab League (AL) in Cairo on 22 March 1945.95
The AL Secretary General Abdel-Rahman Azzam stressed Egypt’s commitment to
Palestine, and explained that Zionism was an imperialistic project in Arab land supported
and financed by both Britain and the United States. He also warned that Egypt would
resist any attempt to enforce the partition of Palestine.96 Egypt based its official stance on
Palestine during the 1940s on three foundations explained in the Palestine Conference
held in London in 1946: first, Egypt’s firm rejection to both partition and the
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establishment of a Jewish state in the Arab region. Second, Egypt would not remain
passive in face of the mounting Zionist threat. Third, stressing Egypt’s rejection to the
proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of 1946.97
However, the diplomatic efforts remained confined to repetitive rhetoric. In the
year 1947, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formed the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which released its report recommending the
partition of Palestine into two states.98 On 29 November 1947 the UNGA adopted this
recommendation and issued its partition resolution.99 Passing the partition resolution
agitated the Egyptian public. Mass protests erupted demanding immediate military
intervention on behalf of Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt were at
the forefront of such protests stressing that defending Palestine is a religious duty on
every Muslim. As of late 1947 and early 1948, the Brotherhood started training and
sending independent fighters into Palestine to fight the Zionists.100
By the late 1940s, the Egyptian government suffered from mounting domestic
turmoil. Negotiations with the British government dragged, the economic situation
worsened, along with an influx in social disturbances and mass protests. Against this
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troubled backdrop, King Farouk decided to send the Egyptian army into Palestine. Prime
Minister Mahmoud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi had previously advised against formal military
intervention in Palestine. He argued that the Egyptian army lacked essential training and
necessary armament. He also added that he cannot declare a state of war while the British
army is stationed on the banks of the Suez Canal right behind the lines of the Egyptian
army. He proposed that instead of sending the formal army the government could support
the Palestinians through supplying financial aid, arms, and volunteers.101 However,
without informing either the Prime Minister or parliament King Farouk decided to
dispatch the Egyptian army into Palestine on 15 May 1948. He decided to enter the
Palestine war as a means to achieve narrow national interests. He hoped the move would
restore his shattered popularity; delegitimize the rising wave of nationalist opposition,
that is, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood; and to divert the public’s attention away from
deteriorating national conditions. The war could also be used as a pretext to curtail
freedoms and enact emergency laws. On the regional level, King Farouk envisioned
building an Arab leadership for himself as the liberator of Palestine. More importantly his
decision to enter the war like the rest of the Arab leaders came as a means to block
Abdullah of Jordan from establishing his envisioned kingdom of Greater Syria.102
The war ended with a disastrous defeat for the Arab armies, since their
miscalculated intervention lacked strategic co-ordination and underestimated the
Zionists’ strength. More importantly the war for the Arab leaders became by and large a
competition for territorial and regional power. On 24 February 1949 Egypt signed the
Rhodes Armistice with Israel to pull out its besieged army in al-Falujah pocket; it also
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granted Egypt the administration of Gaza.103 The Egyptian rule over Gaza lasted from
1949 until 1967 when it fell to Israeli occupation as a result of the war. Until then, the
Egyptian governor-general in Gaza retained all the powers exercised by the former
British High Commissioner in Palestine. Also, the name of the area changed to the Gaza
Strip with the issuing of Law 255 of 1955, which legalized the general-governor’s
powers.104 On 23 April 1950 the Egyptian government replaced the Palestine currency
with the Egyptian one. The Strip from 1949 until 1962 was under emergency law and
military rule. The situation changed in 1962 when President Nasser issued an official
proclamation ending the military status of the area.105 The Egyptian government stressed
at this time that had no intention of annexing Gaza. Its temporary rule, the official
narrative insisted, was a means of preserving a part of Arab Palestine in preparation for
the liberation of the whole of Palestine.106
The previous section examined the evolution of the Egyptian official response to
the Palestine problem beginning with the 1920s till the war of Palestine in 1948. This
response shifted gradually from an Egypt-centric nationalism in the 1920s to a more Arab
and Islamic orientation throughout the 1930s and the 1940s. The following section will
examine samples from the Egyptian press during the interwar period and how the image
of Palestine evolved during that era.
Palestine in the Egyptian Press during the Interwar Period
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During the 1920s the Egyptian press focused largely on domestic issues and
mainly the struggle for independence from the British occupation. Covering
developments in Palestine occurred on occasional intervals and Palestine “was accorded
no more attention than that given to other foreign areas of the world.”107 During the
1920s many articles showed sympathy toward the Jewish national home project arguing
that it will benefit Palestinians.108 The press however, provided daily coverage on the
Wailing Wall disturbances of August 1929. Nonetheless, the press coverage seemed
largely detached. For instance, both al-Muqattam and al-Siyasa al-Usbu‘iyya questioned
the credibility of the Palestinian account on the disturbances and criticizing the
Palestinian Arab leadership for resorting to violence.109 Another trend of coverage used
the disturbances to warn against religious strife and sectarianism. Papers like alMuqattam, al-Ahram, and the Wafdist paper al-Balagh “used events in Palestine to
caution [their] readers about the dangers of “religious controversy” in “Eastern” nations,
advising that sectarian discord could only serve to weaken national causes.”110 Unlike the
reaction of the Islamic circles, which sided with Palestinians against Jewish
transgressions, the liberal and secular press used the events in Palestine as a negative
example to warn against the ramifications of religious intolerance.111
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The 1930s and 1940s witnessed a shift toward Arab and Islamic concepts which
in return lead to more interest in the Palestine issue. The eruption of the Great Revolt of
1936 captured the Egyptian public and revealed the depth of the Arab-Zionist conflict in
Palestine. Through the revolt, ordinary Egyptians felt more related to their fellow
Palestinians who fought both a national and religious battle against British and Zionist
colonialism. Several writers praised the Palestinians’ heroism and determination,
explaining that their courage had inspired every Arab and Muslim.112 Writers reacted
more vigorously to the Peel Report of 1937, which recommended the partition of
Palestine. Several editorials by the likes of Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, Hafez Mahmoud, and
Muhammad Husayn Haykal warned that the partition would erase Arab Palestine from
the map, push Arab Palestinians outside their home land, and end any prospects of ever
achieving Arab unity.113
The second half of the 1940s witnessed a surge in Palestine coverage coinciding
with the impending UN-General Assembly partition resolution of 1947. Al-Masri (the
Egyptian) newspaper reported extensively on Palestine during the year 1947. The paper
attacked the passivity of the Egyptian government and stressed the necessity of preparing
the Egyptian army to defend Palestine.114 Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt) ran many
editorials criticizing the passivity of both the Egyptian government and the Arab League.
The paper praised the voluntary brigades and called on the masses to donate money and
arms, and enroll with informal fighters, since the Arab governments and the Arab League
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had failed to provide any meaningful support to defend Palestine.115 Leftist papers like alFagr (the Dawn) and al-Dameer (the Conscience), the mouthpieces of the Workers and
Peasants Organization provided wide coverage on developments in Palestine. The papers
ran several editorials explaining the Zionist project’s hidden goals. The papers again
strongly attacked the Arab League and accused it of collaborating with Western
imperialism against Palestine.116
The previous part examined samples of Egyptian newspapers and their stance on
Palestine during the interwar period. Press coverage on the Palestine issue shifted
gradually from a limited stance during the 1920s to an increasing interest in the 1930s,
culminating with extensive coverage during the 1940s till the eruption of the 1948 war.
The next section will examine the Egyptian government’s response to the early waves of
Palestinian refugees.
The Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, 1948-1952
Before the outbreak of the 1948 war many upper and middle class families
especially from the coastal cities like Jaffa and Haifa fled to Egypt between the end of
1947 and early 1948.117 Numbers of refugees increased as more people fled the
Haganah’s systematic assaults. The first wave of refugees (around 1250) arrived at Port
Said between 25 and 29 April 1948. Before 15 May 1948 Egypt received between 5000-
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6000 Palestinian refugees.118 When the war broke out the number of the refugees fleeing
into Egypt increased, therefore, the government founded the “High Committee for
Palestinian Refugee Affairs’ to organize the arrival of the early waves of Palestinian
refugees to Egypt.”119 Later on the government established another camp in al-Qantarah
Sharq (on the Sinai side of the Suez Canal) to accommodate the growing number of
refugees.120 The Egyptian government also did not seek assistance from the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).121 This policy resulted from the
government’s assumption that the situation with the refugees was temporary. 122 The
government stance on the refugees seemed detached and unwilling to engage actively
with their plight. The Egyptian government understood the refugees as an external
problem outside the state’s mandate. Such a perception still dominates the government’s
policies toward refugee communities until the present day.
Al-Nuqrashi’s government argued that Egypt cannot accommodate the refugees
on a long-term basis. Officials used such domestic problems like inflation, overpopulation, and high rates of unemployment as pretexts to reject sustaining the refugees
on a permanent basis.123 In September 1948 the government moved the refugees housed
in al-Abbasiayyah camp to the one in al-Qantarah; the total number of the Palestinian
refugees was 11,000.124 The government also established a committee to review the status
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of the refugees on a case-by-case basis. The Ministry of Interior issued temporary
residence permits for those who had enough funds and were familiar with an Egyptian
national who would act as a guarantor, but the Egyptian government denied issuing work
permits to the refugees who lacked financial resources. Also, the validity of the residency
permits varied according to each case and the process itself took much time.125
Nuqrashi advised against settling refugees on long-term basis. He perceived the
refugees, especially those associated with the communists or the Muslim Brotherhood, as
a potential national security threat.126 In this respect, the Egyptian government
maintained a clear line separating Egyptian territories and the Gaza Strip. This is
illustrated in adopting the policy of concentrating most of the refugees in Gaza mainly in
the Maghazi camp which received 7,000 residents from the Qantarah camp during
September 1949. The government also encouraged those who had relatives in other
countries to leave Egypt as well as transferring those who lack financial resources to
Gaza.127 By 1950 only a few thousand Palestinians remained where “[b]eginning June 5,
1950, Egypt Air, in a series of flights, transported 516 Palestinians to Jerusalem. And in
August 1950 another group was sent to Gaza.”128 The government’s treatment of early
Palestinian refugees showed a clear sense of detachment and uneasiness. Al-Nuqrashi
adopted the “national security threat” rhetoric as a pretext to justify policies that would
otherwise raise public criticism.
Conclusion
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The first part of this chapter introduced the aim of the project. The second part
examined the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, as well as providing a
deconstructive analysis to the historiography of the 1948 war. This section also examined
the evolution of the official Egyptian response to the Palestine problem during the
interwar period until the 1948 war. This response shifted gradually from a detached
stance during the 1920s to a more active role during the 1930s and 1940s. It also
analyzed how the Egyptian press reacted to developments in Palestine during the period
under investigation. The last section investigated the Egyptian government’s response to
the early waves of Palestinian refugees. During that era, the government adopted a
detached policy; treated the refugees as a temporary problem, and showed unwillingness
to engage actively in settling them in Egypt.
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Chapter Two
The Nasser Era 1954-1970
This chapter focuses on the Nasserist era and the course of the EgyptianPalestinian relations during that period. The chapter in this respect attempts to analyze
Nasser’s political project and how the Palestine question fitted within its parameters. It
will also attempt to examine the social and legal status of Egypt’s Palestinian refugees
during the era under investigation and the extent to which political tensions affected their
rights.
Historical background
On 23 July 1952 the Free Officers Movement declared a military coup d’état which
dethroned King Farouk and declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). The movement under the leadership of General Mohammed Naguib and
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser delivered its first statement stating that the decision to
dethrone the king resulted from “the persistence of the British occupation since 1882, the
corruption and inefficiency of the political order leading to the defeat in the Palestine war
of 1948, and the glaring social inequalities.”129 However, the question is: to what extent
did the defeat in the Palestine war contribute to triggering the coup? To answer this
question, it is useful to briefly examine the socio-political scene prevailing in Egypt on
the eve of the 1948 war. Prior to the Palestine war political and social frustrations
surfaced against the ailing monarchy. King Farouk lost his initial popularity among the
population due to his inability to end the British occupation that had persisted since 1882
along with the spread of poverty and rural landlessness. In fact one of Farouk’s
129. The first revolutionary announcement, http://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/1952, [Arabic source]
(Translations mine).

45

motivations behind participating in the war resulted from his desire to regain his lost
popularity among the population and score a victory against the rising national
opposition. He took this decision while ignoring the fact that the army lacked essential
training and preparation combined with the presence of unqualified chiefs in the
leadership.130 Additionally, the political parties including the liberal Wafd failed to
provide substantial alternatives to break the deadlock and achieve complete
independence. In fact the first Wafdist government under the leadership of Saad Pasha
Zaghlul hoped “to make a deal with the British government to reconcile Egyptian
nationalist and British imperialist interests.”131 In the year 1936 the Wafd government
under the leadership of Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936. The treaty would have lasted for twenty years and it stipulated the withdrawal of
the British troops from Egypt except for a number of 10,000 soldiers to protect the Suez
Canal. The treaty also gave the British the exclusive right to train and supply arms to the
Egyptian army and to step in for defense in cases of war.132 However, given the fact that
the Egyptian army at that time lacked sufficient ammunition, vital equipment, training,
and experienced military leaders, the British secured a prolonged military presence in the
Canal Zone along with bases in Cairo and Alexandria.133 By early 1952 al-Nahhas Pasha
unilaterally renounced the 1936 treaty sparking violent clashes between the British troops
and the Egyptian policemen in the Canal Zone resulting in the death of more than fifty
Egyptian policemen on 25 January 1952 (known as Police Day). Following news about
the massacres in Suez, violence erupted culminating with the burning of Cairo where
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thousands of demonstrators set fires in hundreds of foreign banks and hotels across the
city on 26 January 1952.134 The political scene would remain in turmoil until the Free
Officers announced their coup and seized power on 23 July 1952.
The social and economic scene did not fare better. The majority of the population
suffered from poverty, illiteracy and the wide spread of fatal diseases. The social gaps
grew wider between the wealthy landlords and the majority of the poor landless
population.135 Also the fact that the capitalists and Pashas dominated the parliament
hindered any attempts at social reform and improving the living standards for the
masses.136 Frustrated and disillusioned by the liberal-democratic experience, intellectuals
started looking elsewhere for solutions to Egypt’s social, economic, and political
dilemmas. Some groups followed the Marxist communist doctrine. Others expressed a
deep interest in the Italian and German experiences under the leadership of Mussolini and
Hitler. However, the Muslim Brotherhood appealed more to the majority of the
population arguing that restoring authentic Islamic institutions and abandoning “Western
innovations” was the only way to solve Egypt’s problems.137 The Brotherhood argued
that westernization did not benefit the average Egyptians who kept suffering while a tiny
minority associated with the palace and the Europeans accumulated most of the country’s
wealth.138 In this respect it is important to note that King Farouk’s miscalculated decision
to enter the Palestine war stemmed from a futile attempt to regain the support of the
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masses, divert the attention from the crumbling domestic affairs, and deflate the
opposition especially the growing brotherhood.139
Against this turbulent landscape, the defeat in 1948 was the final factor that
discredited the ailing monarchy and, shattered the government’s credibility as well as the
Wafd’s liberal experiment. The defeat put much pressure on a severely frustrated and
humiliated army. The defeat was not the sole trigger for the Free Officers’ coup, but it
constituted a decisive turning point.
In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser reflects on his
experience in 1948 also known as the nakba which he saw as a mirror foreshadowing the
fate of Egypt.140 Nasser explained that the seeds of the coup existed long before the
eruption of the Palestine war and the debacle of the defective weapons. The Free Officers
had begun circulating pamphlets advocating for the liberation of Egypt beginning in the
early 1940s. Nasser narrates that while theses group of soldiers fought in the trenches in
Palestine and were latter under siege in the Faluja pocket, Egypt continued to be their
preoccupation. Their “dreams were in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy…but
our hearts were hovering round our distant Mother Country, which was then a prey to the
wolves that ravaged it.”141 Nasser and his military colleagues felt that the greater battle is
in Egypt, whom a greater Faluja awaits if she remains besieged by the British and the
King.
There is our Mother Country, a far, far bigger Falouja. What is happening in
Palestine is but a miniature picture of what is happening to Egypt. Our Mother
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Country has been likewise besieged by difficulties as well as ravaged by an
enemy. She was cheated and pushed to fight unprepared. Greed, intrigue and
passion have toyed with her and left her under fire unarmed.142
The defeat added a surge to the mounting socio-political frustrations prevailing in
Egypt in the decades prior to the war. In this respect the defeat combined with the
Palestinians’ trauma of dispossession proved that the time has come to overthrow the
ailing political order. Nasser stressed that ousting Farouk became a national duty to
liberate Egypt from corruption, tyranny, British domination, and above all to protect
Egypt from the fate of Palestine.143 The Palestine question would later become a crucial
component in Nasser’s quest to define Egypt’s political identity and build domestic and
regional support for his pan-Arab project. To this end the following section addresses the
relation between Nasserism and the Palestine question.
The Egyptian-Palestinian Political Relations 1954-1970
Nasser’s political ideology did not crystalize until his presidency commenced in
1954 after ousting General Naguib. The year 1955 would have a considerable impact on
shaping the course of Nasser’s policies until the first half of the 1960s. Initially, Nasser
focused on improving Egypt’s social and economic conditions, while simultaneously
negotiating the withdrawal of the remaining British troops. Nasser hoped to maintain
open relations with the West and the United States in order to secure funds to revive the
economic and industrial sectors. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nasser called for
abiding by the United Nations (UN) resolutions and following the path of political
negotiations. He stressed maintaining order across the borders with Gaza in order to
maintain the cease-fire with and deprive Israel of a premise to wage counter-attacks. This
142. Ibid. 13
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required imposing heavy surveillance on Palestinian activists in the Gaza Strip especially
the militant groups in an effort to ensure Egypt’s national security. Additionally, prior to
1955 Nasser expressed openness towards several proposals that aimed to resettle
Palestinian refugees in the host countries. For instance, the Egyptian government
discussed the prospects of the Northern Sinai project proposing the transfer of the Nile
water to Sinai enabling poor Gazan families to cultivate some small plots. Aware that
such plans would dissolve their national rights; Gazans strongly opposed any resettlement
plans and insisted on their right of return. In February 1955 Gazans demonstrated against
this proposal and forced the Egyptian government to drop the project altogether.144
However, an aggressive Israeli raid on Gaza on 28 February 1955, which killed
thirty-nine Egyptian soldiers and injured many, signaled for Nasser a political rather than
a military message.145 The raid occurred at a time when there were no major clashes
across the borders. More than anything it was a moment of Israel’s performance of its
military power. The raid highlighted the increasing vulnerability and ill equipped
condition of Egypt’s eastern borders. Nasser turned first to the United States but their
insistence on defense supervision including dispatching their own inspectors to oversee
arm’s handling and use pushed Nasser to reject the deal.146 He would attain his aims
through a Soviet proposal to supply different arms including modern planes and tanks in
return for Egyptian cotton and rice. On 27 September 1955 Nasser announced the
finalization of the deal, which would be known as the “Czechs Deal.” It marked Nasser’s
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alliance with the Eastern bloc in a glaring challenge to the United States and the Western
bloc in the midst of an increasingly embittered Cold War.147 Thus the raid and Nasser’s
reactions to it fostered his status as a regional leader. He appeared to refuse to surrender
to Western conditions and adopted a hardline stance towards Israel including supporting
Palestinian armed attacks across the borders. Nasser explained that Israel’s reliance on
aggression deems peace unattainable. He added that after the Gaza raid and the
inefficiency of the Security Council to stop Israeli aggression, Egypt had no choice but to
defend itself and would use all its military capabilities to safeguard its national
security.148 Nasser would later recall that the Gaza raid proved that the Israeli threat is
bigger than the occupied territories, in the sense that, since territorial expansionism lies at
the heart of the Zionist project, then it would eventually expand to include more Arab
lands. He added that Israel in reality is the tool of Western imperialism and the focal
point for global Zionism.149
At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser went on to announce Egypt’s
neutralism and support of anti-Western movements across the Arab world and Asia. He
further defied the West by refusing any arm deals that mandated joining anticommunist
alliances. Nasser solidified his relations with the Soviet bloc and condemned any Arab
alliance with the West.150 This is illustrated in the case of the Baghdad Pact of the 1955.
A British sponsored union with the aim of protecting the region, the pact included in its
membership Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. The pact in fact aimed at
containing Soviet influence and to maintain enough power to protect Western interests in
147. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 238-239
148. A press declaration by Nasser to the Political Ahram, 15 December 1955 [Arabic Source]
149. A speech delivered by Nasser during the opening session of the People’s Assembly on 22 July 1957
[Arabic Source]
150. Goldschmidt Jr. and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 305

51

the region. Nasser called Iraq’s membership “a betrayal of Arab nationalist interests.”151
Nasser argued that Western powers are not really interested in protecting the Middle East
from any threat, but rather focused on defending the region against the Soviet Union. For
him, pro-Western alliances were imperialistic tools in disguise; they aimed to destroy
Arab nationalism and subordinate the region.152 Nasser insisted that defending the region
should come from within the Arab nation through a unified defense system independent
of external forces. He explained that by adopting an anti-Soviet stance, the pact was a
distraction from the imminent Israeli threat and an attempt to dissolve the Palestine
question. Citing the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s declaration that the pact
strengthened the West’s influence in the Middle East, Nasser explained that acting
against it to protect Arab nationalism and its borders was a necessity. 153 Nasser’s most
rebellious move came on 26 July 1956 when he nationalized the Suez Canal Company as
an Egyptian Limited Company.154 The move came as an act of retaliation when both
Britain and the United States intentionally withdrew from financing the high dam project
in Aswan in an attempt to humiliate him. Nasser claimed Egyptian sovereignty over the
Canal and insisted that he would not surrender to imperialist schemes aimed at interfering
in Egyptian internal affairs and dictating the course of its policies.155 This bold direction
triggered the Tripartite Aggression of Britain, France and Israel on 5 November 1956.156
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The Anglo-French troops withdrew on 23 December 1956 after a veto by the United
States against the aggression. Israel would withdraw by March 1957 after agreeing to
install the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) to oversee the borders with Gaza
and prevent the infiltrations of Palestinian armed groups.157 The Suez crisis greatly
enhanced Nasser’s image as an Arab hero who defied the West, it proved “Nasser’s
contention that non-alignment and rejection of Western arms agreements were the best
means to retain Arab freedom…and weakened those who argued for continued reliance
on Western pacts.”158
Following the Suez war, Nasser turned his focus to define Egypt’s political identity
and its regional position. As early as 1954 Nasser envisioned a central regional leadership
for Egypt stressing its Arab roots through invoking shared geographical boundaries and
historical heritage. Nasser referred to Egypt as “Arab Egypt.” 159 In The Philosophy of the
Revolution, Nasser asserted that “[t]he era of isolation is now gone” adding “[n]either can
we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part
of us as we are a part of it, that our history has been mixed with it and that its interests are
linked with ours.”160
The Palestine question provided Nasser with a unique foundation for his pan-Arab
project. From a strategic perspective, resolving the Palestine question became essential to
safeguarding Egypt’s borders. Nasser also realized that adopting the Palestine question
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would be a cornerstone to unify the Arab world behind his pan-Arab project. Nasser
envisioned a central role for Egypt within the realm of regional politics, adopting panArabism secured this goal and provided a context to legitimize his policies.
I do not know why I always imagine that in this region in which we live there is a
role wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it. I do not know why this
role, tired of roaming about in this vast region which extends to every place
around us, should at last settle down, weary and worn out, on our frontiers
beckoning us to move, to dress up for it and to perform it since there is nobody
else who can do so.161
The Palestine question provided a unique venue to unify the Arab states behind one
common goal which is to liberate Palestine and defeat imperialism. Pan-Arabism and
Palestine became Nasser’s pillars in establishing a regional role for Egypt. Nasser
stressed that Palestine is the first cause of all the Arabs who share that same fate asserting
that “fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory…It was a duty imposed by
self-defense.”162 Such stances provided him with sweeping support among the Arab
masses generally and Palestinians particularly. Nasser stressed that Israel was the byproduct of the British mandate in Palestine. He added that the idea of establishing a
Jewish state in Palestine would have remained unfeasible without the unlimited political
and financial support it received from the British Empire.163 From a strategic point of
view Nasser realized that adopting the Palestine cause would rally the Arabs behind
Egypt and his pan-Arab project, thus, securing a regional dominance for Egypt. Palestine
and the defeat of imperialism were recurrent themes in Nasser’s speeches during the
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1950s and the 1960s. In Gaza, Nasser stated “conspiracies against Arab nationalism in
Palestine are in fact targeting Arab nationalism in Egypt as well.”164
Further, on the occasion of declaring the new Egyptian constitution in 1956,
Nasser stressed that Egypt is part and parcel of Arab nationalism and would support all
Arabs in their quest for independence and freedom. He also blamed the loss of Palestine
on imperialism and its agencies which isolated Egypt from its Arab roots.165
In this respect, it is important to explain that despite Nasser’s pro-Palestine stance,
this position cannot be explained in isolation from the calculations of political strategies
and national priorities. Egypt’s welfare and stability were at the core of Nasser’s political
project.166 Adopting the Palestine question was a strategic component of Nasser’s project
to define Egypt’s political identity and role in the region. Also, from a military and
national security perspective, solving the Palestine question was integral to protect
Egypt’s eastern borders. Promoting Palestinian nationalism rested on conforming to
Nasser’s vision of pan-Arabism. While projecting the image of Palestine’s liberator,
Nasser kept the Palestinian factions under close check and wanted to avoid any
miscalculated confrontation with Israel. Nasser repeatedly declared that he would not be
dragged into an unprepared confrontation just to appease popular sentiments. He
maintained a preference for a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on
implementing the UN-resolutions. Despite his strong anti-Zionist speeches, Nasser was
aware of the international balance of power and the influence of the Israeli lobby in the
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United States and Europe.167 Nasser’s long time confident Mohammad Hassanain Heikal
recalls the leader’s position that a military option was unreasonable if diplomacy was
possible. Nasser insisted in several public and private meetings that he would declare a
state of war only when it was unavoidable must and in accordance with the political and
strategic considerations of the region, he would never go to war for the sake of war
only.168 Nasser never attempted to wage a miscalculated sentimental war. Subjected to
defeat resulting mainly from poor military strategies, Nasser stressed the importance of
“choosing the right time and the right place to confront Israel’s military might.” 169 He
emphasized that “exhausting all paths of diplomacy would provide enough time to
strengthen the internal front and encourage the international community to support us in
case diplomacy failed and we opted to the military option.”170
Incorporating the Palestinian resistance movements in the Nasserist project was
also a strategy to prevent opponents and competing alliances from absorbing them. For
instance as in the case of the Baghdad Pact, 1955-1979, Nasser opposed any military
pacts with Western countries labeling them as another manifestation of imperialism
aiming at destroying Arab nationalism and dissolving the Palestine question. He stressed
that military co-operation should be done within the frame of the Arab League (AL) only
without any foreign interference.171 After the demise of the United Arab Republic (UAR),
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1958-1961, the Baathists in Syria would become another challenge to Nasser. The list
would also include the Marxists and the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. Following the
Gaza raid Nasser supported the fedayeen’s operations against Israel to prevent the
Brotherhood from advocating jihad (holy war) against Israel. However, this support had
strings attached where Nasser made it clear that such operations should be carried out
according to Egypt’s guidance and approval, those who failed to conform to this
condition would face detention and imprisonment.172 The idea behind keeping the
fedayeen under surveillance stems on the one hand, from Nasser’s intolerance against
miscalculated operations which could trigger Israeli counter-attacks. On the other hand,
supporting fedayeen fits Nasser’s rhetoric supporting Palestinians and liberation
movements. This support relayed a political message to the United States and the
Western powers invoking the presence of a regional military leverage that could counter
Israel’s military might. Finally, containing the fedayeen was a preemptive strategy to
deprive anti-Nasserism from taking the upper hand especially the Brotherhood, which
had been active in the Strip since 1948. In this respect, Nasser aimed at supporting albeit
containing Palestinian nationalism in accordance with his pan-Arab vision.
During the Egyptian rule over Gaza 1949-1967 and especially following the 1955
raid, the Egyptian administration focused monitoring the Strip. Aside from sustaining the
everyday needs, extending free university education and providing jobs for all university
graduates, the administration had to maintain enough power to control any political

172. Rouleau, “Abd al-Nasser and the Palestinian National Movement: Chronicle of a Stormy Affair,” in
Mansour and Fawaz, eds. Transformed Landscapes: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East in Honor of
Walid Khalidi, 181

57

activities that might be perceived as a security threat.173 In other words, the
administration opted to adopt what Ilana Feldman refers to as “tactical government”, a
term referring to the containment of potential social unrest through providing essential
services including education, housing projects, and employment.174 The logic behind this
approach aimed to enhance the legitimacy of the administration and to shape the Strip in
accordance with the Nasserist political project. The administration in this respect focused
on monitoring the religious and educational institutions so as to control their output. The
Egyptian administration promoted a religious education, which “sought to promote a kind
of civic morality that would not threaten government power and could participate in its
project of promoting a well-ordered public life.”175 Through controlling both religious
institutions and education the administration intended to eliminate the threat of political
activism on religious basis a model promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood the main
opponents to Nasser’s regime. Following a failed attempt by the brotherhood on Nasser’s
life in 1954, the government heavily monitored any Palestinian activists linked to the
Brotherhood; many would face detention and arrest based on mere suspicion of being
collaborating with them.176 This historical experience proves the extent to which refugees
are vulnerable to domestic and regional political tensions. The administration sought to
maintain an active but contained Palestinian nationalism. Egyptian education promoted
non-political activism were “[t]he duties of the nationalist as described in schools were
not immediately political ones, but cultural and moral ones, including care for others,
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cooperation, and respect.”177 Furthermore, the attempt to direct Palestinian nationalism
was not limited to the historical period of Egyptian rule in Gaza; it ultimately affected the
course of Egyptian political relations with Palestinian movements. This is evident in the
formation of Fatah in 1959 and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 as
well as the ebbs and flows of Egyptian-Palestinian relations under Nasser.
Formed in Kuwait in 1959, the Palestine National Liberation Movement “Fatah”
became the most prominent national organization. The leaders of Fatah descended from
the middle classes and the 1948 refugees who took refuge in the Gaza Strip. 178 The key
leaders of Fatah were Yasser Arafat and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Arafat settled in
Kuwait as of 1957 after being frustrated by Nasser’s repressive policies against
Palestinian armed struggle. Arafat an Egyptian by birth, and education (he had a degree
in engineering from Cairo University in 1956) became the president of the Palestinian
Student Union (PSU) in 1952, and served with the Egyptian army during the Suez war in
1956. He fully supported the Free Officers’ coup and subscribed to their discourse which
blamed the loss of Palestine on the corruption of the Arab monarchies and the imperial
conspiracies against Arab nationalism.179 However, his enthusiasm gradually faded due to
Nasser’s strict surveillance on Palestinian activists. Arafat along with other Palestinians
came to the conclusion that “the new regime had turned out to be scarcely better than the
other Arab regimes, all seen as unfriendly and deeply untrusted.”180 Fatah did not
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subscribe to any specific political ideology, rather, their motive and goal focused on
liberating Palestine as a whole. Unlike, pan-Arabism which preached Arab unity as the
means to liberate Palestine, Fatah leaders argued that liberating Palestine would lead to
Arab unity.181 Additionally, they believed that military action should precede political
initiatives.182 This approach drew its inspiration from the success of the Algerian war of
independence. For instance, Abu Iyad credited the writings of Frantz Fanon as the main
source of his philosophy.183 Fatah’s founders insisted on the autonomy of their decisions
and claimed that they would not interfere in Arab regimes’ internal affairs nor take sides
in regional conflicts. However, one of their undeclared goals focused on slowly preparing
the region for a military confrontation with Israel.
[T]hey pledged to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab states
and from taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts. Fatah’s undeclared agenda was to
be the spearhead of the liberation of Palestine by organizing an armed struggle
that would lead to a conflict between Israel and its neighbors – a conflict that they
fully believed would end in an Arab victory.184
By October 1959 Fatah started publishing a monthly journal entitled Filastinuna
(Our Palestine) which would last until the year 1964.185

Published in Beirut and

distributed in some Arab countries it started publishing anonymous articles explaining the
organization’s ideologies. The journal’s articles reaffirmed the movement’s political
neutrality toward Arab regimes while stressing the necessity of armed struggle to liberate
Palestine.186 Fatah’s project did not gain immediate popularity; its establishment came at
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a time when Nasserism had reached its zenith. On 1 February 1958 Egypt and Syria
united forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) “thought to be the nucleus of a wider
Arab union that, in the words of Abu Iyad, ‘would submerge the State of Israel.”187
Further, the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq a major British ally strengthened Nasser’s
position against the United States and Britain. From this vantage, it appeared that the
achievement of Arab unity was merely a matter of time. A turn of events in 1961 pushed
Fatah again to the forefront. On 28 September 1961 the UAR collapsed with Syria’s
withdrawal due to mounting dissatisfaction with the Egyptian rule especially political and
military hegemony and Nasser’s attempt to nationalize the economy. 188 Disillusioned by
the UAR’s collapse many Palestinians expressed their frustration with traditional political
parties and opted to join the ranks of Fatah. Further, various Arab states including Iraq,
Algeria, Syria and Saudi Arabia aspiring to rival Nasser or contain his growing
hegemony provided various forms of financial and logistical aid to Fatah.189 As of 1964
Syria would openly sponsor Fatah with the aim of reviving its role as a key regional
power and to discredit Nasser’s role. In this sense, Syria’s pro-Fatah stance stemmed
from strategic national considerations camouflaged under the rubric of supporting armed
struggle against Zionism. To this end Syria would supply Fatah with logistical support
facilitating its commando operations in Israel albeit from non-Syrian territories.190
Sensing the threat of a surge in uncontrolled military attacks that would lead to
war, Nasser decided to establish a Palestinian organization that would unify the various
Palestinian factions. This came in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organization
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(PLO), established in May 1964 under the patronage of the Arab League and the
leadership of Ahmed Shuqayri. This also led to the establishment of the organization’s
military wing known as the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) “with units to be stationed
in Arab host countries and under their command.”191 Undeterred by this move and under
Syria’s patronage, Fatah secret military wing al-Asifa (the Storm) would carry several
attacks on Israel. In retaliation Fatah members in Gaza faced detention and torture.
Nasser also “called on all the countries bordering Israel to crack down on the perpetrators
of the raids. He had already asked various Arab states to ban the distribution of
Filastinuna, by then identified as Fatah’s mouthpiece.”192 In the meantime Syria initiated
a propaganda war accusing Nasser of relinquishing the Palestine cause and dismissing
Shuqayri as a Nasserist agent. Nasser responded that Arab regimes are using the Palestine
cause as a strategy card to score narrow national interests. He added that the problem
with Syria is less about military competition and more about political distrust, explaining
that conferences and the war of words are not the means to liberate Palestine. He also
defended the creation of the PLO while dismissing claims labeling the organization as
powerless. Nasser stressed that the PLO served as a unifying Palestinian entity resisting
Israeli attempts to dissolve the Palestine question. Nasser would repeat that declaring war
was a difficult decision, not a sentimental one.193 Prior to the 1967 war, Nasser feared
that the race for regional power and the unconditional support of Palestinian militants
would create the pretext Israel needed to wage a preemptive war.
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It was thus that fedayeen action, encouraged by Syria for its own ends, set in
motion the chain of events that ultimately proved Nasser’s worst fears about the
consequences of ill-advised armed struggle. The debacle of the June 1967 war
radically changed the balance of power in the region, including that between the
Palestinian resistance and Nasser’s Egypt.194
The Six Day War of 5-10 June 1967 changed the dynamics of the region
dramatically in favor of Israel, which emerged as a rising military power. The 1967
debacle and its consequences became the second massive defeat to befall the Arabs since
1948. The defeat in 1967 led to the loss of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Jerusalem, the West
Bank, and the Golan Heights. Further, it is estimated that more than 350,000 Palestinians
became refugees who faced forced evictions from their villages, thus, intensifying the
Palestinian refugee problem already persisting since 1948.195 The scale of mass evictions
and the permanent destruction of villages endangered the prospect of a return to the Arab
Palestinians and discredited Israeli prewar claims “that it would not expand its
borders.”196 In this respect it is important to briefly explain the political circumstances
leading to the 1967 war. Norman G. Finkelstein argues that the 1967 war could have been
avoided adding that Nasser never wanted to start a miscalculated war.197 Finkelstein
argues that Israel’s reasons to wage a preemptive strike could be summarized as follows:
First, the Israeli leaders argued that Syrian fighters constantly attack the Israeli northern
settlements. Second, Israel also argued that Nasser’s Egypt is preparing a massive strike
against Israel citing the large concentrations of the Egyptian army in Sinai. Third, the
closure of the Tiran Straits was presented as an act of declaring war and a violation of
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international law.198 Finkelstein argues that to counter anti-Nasser propaganda launched
by Syria and Jordan, Nasser decided to replace the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) with the Egyptian army across the borders in Sinai and Gaza. The UNEF
functioned as a peace-keeping force stationed across the Egyptian-Israeli borders to
maintain the cease-fire implemented since the Suez war 1956. Nasser’ decision resulted
from the mounting criticisms coming from Damascus and Amman accusing him of
hiding behind the UNEF and using them “as a pretext for not confronting Israel.”199
Finkelstein adds that Nasser only wanted to readjust the positions of the UNEF not their
entire withdrawal, however “[c]onfronted with an all – or – nothing ultimatum from UN
Secretary – General U Thant that left him with no ‘face – saving device’, Nasser opted
for a complete withdrawal.”200 In other words, Nasser’s decision to deploy the Egyptian
troops into Sinai on 14 May 1967 stemmed from his desire to preserve his image and
credibility in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.201 Further, Finkelstein argues that on
the Syrian front the shelling from the Golan Heights “aimed to deter the Israeli
encroachments.”202 When the 1948 war ended the Syrian – Israeli armistice agreement
stipulated the creation of Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) on the borders between the Golan
Heights and Israeli northern settlements. However, according to UN – reports Israel
repeatedly violated those DMZs and gradually took control of large portions of those
areas and forcibly evicted the Arab villagers residing there. Major – General Carl Von
Horn, who served as chief of staff of the UN forces admitted that Israel used whatever
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means available to acquire most of the land. Illegal encroachments triggered resentment
among the Syrians whose attacks on Israeli targets came as a means of defending their
properties.203
Nasser’s motivations behind the closure of the Straits of Tiran remain unclear, but
Finkelstein argues that the entire case is debatable from an international legal perspective.
Until the Suez war Israeli ships heading to Eilat were not allowed to pass through the
Straits, Nasser defended his decision to impose this blockade as a response to Israel’s
insistence on disregarding the UN – resolutions calling for the return of the Palestinian
refugees.204 However, Finkelstein argues that Israel had not used the port of Eilat in the
last two and half years prior to the war, adding that “a mere 5 per cent of Israel’s trade
passed through Eilat.”205 Furthermore, the implementation of the blockade on the
Egyptian side became less strict where “the Egyptian navy had searched a couple of ships
after the establishment of the blockade and thereafter relaxed its implementation.”206
Indeed the US envoy Charles Yost observed that the blockade “did not of itself constitute
an armed attack, and self – defense did not cover general hostilities against the UAR.”207
Nasser also expressed his willingness to go to the International Court of Justice to handle
the case where legal experts themselves admitted that the case had not been settled
legally.208
Further territories were lost to Israel along with an influx in the numbers of
Palestinian refugees. The relations between Nasser’s Egypt and Fatah also shifted in the
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post 1967 era. Following the defeat Nasser faced a series of moral and political dilemmas
both nationally and regionally. The defeat sent shock waves throughout the Arab world
and Nasser’s status as an Arab hero faced a tough challenge, this became apparent during
the Khartoum Arab Summit held during August and September 1967. During the summit
the Arab delegations outvoted both Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan rejecting his
proposal to be granted a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the states which lost territories
to Israel. The summit released its famous resolution of the “three nos” which rejected
negotiation, reconciliation, and the recognition of Israel. Nonetheless, Nasser gave
Hussein his approval to pursue direct negotiations with Israel and the United States.209
By opting for diplomacy, Nasser sought to buy enough time to rebuild his military
capabilities and restore his shattered credibility in front of a frustrated and angry
Egyptian society. Despite loud Palestinian criticisms, Nasser accepted UN Security
Council Resolution 242 issued on 22 November 1967 which called for Israel’s
withdrawal from all territories occupied on 5 June 1967. Palestinian criticisms stemmed
from the fact that the resolution implied “recognition of Israel in exchange for Israeli
withdrawal from the territories occupied during the war.”210 Further, unlike previous UN
– Resolutions the text only called for a just settlement to the refugee problem without
referring to their right of return.211 From a strategic perspective Nasser needed something
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concrete to negotiate with as a sign of good intentions. Additionally, he explained that
although Resolution 242 is a feasible way to remove the ramifications of the offence, yet
it is not enough to fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people. Adding that if the UAR had
the right to accept the resolution it is understandable that the Palestinian resistance had
the right to reject it.212 On a parallel path, Nasser decided upon an advice from Heikal to
receive the leaders of Fatah. Heikal convinced him that Fatah has no relations with the
Muslim Brotherhood and had nothing to do with the failed assassination attempt back in
1954. Nevertheless, this change of heart resulted by and large “from a strategic
standpoint, Nasser needed Fatah as a card he could play in case Israel would not agree to
a settlement based on the return of the Occupied Territories.”213
Nasser’s decision to meet with Arafat among other Fatah members was a result of
the power shift in the wake of the 1967 defeat. Fatah operations against Israel gained
wide support among the Arab masses and many Egyptians started joining their ranks. The
heroism and resilience shown by the Palestinian fedayeen in battles like Karameh in
March 1968 gave hope and pride to the reeling Arab world following the humiliation of
1967 where; “enthusiasm for the fedayeen swelled to unprecedented heights.”214 Further,
Nasser hoped that Arafat known for his sympathy to Egyptian nationalism would be a
reliable ally. Nasser envisioned that an alignment with Fatah would act as a pressure card
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in case Israel refused negotiations and the UN resolution 242’s condition of Israeli
withdrawal from the areas occupied on 5 June 1967.215 To further cement his alignment
and patronage, Nasser paved the way for Fatah to take over the PLO. Shuqayri resigned
in December 1967. Nasser had secured his departure. Fatah won a majority of the seats in
the executive committee and Arafat becoming the organization’s president in March
1969.216 Additionally, under Nasser’s patronage the PLO established a permanent
presence in southern Lebanon through the Cairo Accords, signed in November 1969.217
With this move, Nasser hoped that opening a second front against Israel would benefit
the progression of the war of attrition along the Suez Canal.218 Nonetheless, Nasser and
Fatah were at odds in July 1970 when Nasser accepted the Second Rogers Plan. The plan
introduced on 19 July 1970, which Egypt accepted on 23 July 1970, proposed peace in
exchange of an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian and Jordanian territories while
observing a cease-fire across the borders.219 Nasser anticipated that the Palestinians
would criticize the move but Egyptian national interests were his priority. However, he
did not expect Fatah’s harsh personal attacks. For instance, the central committee of the
PLO condemned the plan and attacking its signatories. The committee’s organ, Fatah
published several articles that violently attacked Nasser and accusing him of being an
agent of imperialism and Zionism. Other headlines announced that leaders no longer able
to resist, should leave office. At the same time, the Baath Party in Iraq aimed to seize the
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opportunity to outbid Nasser and his regional leadership.220 Fatah’s Sawt al-Asifa (The
Voice of the Storm) and the PLO’s Sawt Filastin (The Voice of Palestine) both stationed
in Cairo mediated the criticisms. Initially, Nasser refused to shut them down saying that
they should be given the chance to reconsider their position. He feared that closing the
stations would send the message to the Jordanian government that Egypt no longer
supported the resistance movement, and that it was vulnerable to Jordan’s whims. Nasser
also believed that it is part of Egypt’s role to bare criticisms launching from within its
territories against its official policies. Even after sending several envoys to Fatah
leadership in Amman the criticisms intensified. The Palestinian party line refused any
negotiations and insisted that the Palestinian resistance would continue the fight on their
own. Eventually, this escalation led to the decision to close the two stations on 28 July
1970.221 Nasser expressed his sadness about this decision and issued a statement
reaffirming the UAR’s support to the Palestinian resistance movement and its noble role,
hoping that all the organizations would reach a healthy relationship in order to carry-on
its role in liberating Arab land.222 It remains unclear whether the decision to close the
stations stemmed from Nasser’s fear that such criticism would lead to domestic agitation
against his policies. A breakthrough would later occur when Nasser agreed to meet
Arafat. During the meeting Nasser explained that he did not expect Israel to commit to a
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withdrawal from the West Bank. He added that accepting the Rogers Plan was a delaying
strategy to rebuild the armed forces.223
This back and forth came to a halt with the impending signs of a full-fledged
confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian army culminating with the events of
Black September 1970. The roots for those bloody confrontations go back to the 1967
defeat. Palestinian activists “decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the most
effective method of attacking and defeating Israel.”224 One of the popular organizations
endorsing this strategy was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led
by George Habash. He believed that their operations should carry a strong message to
draw the world’s attention to the Palestinian cause. Accordingly, his group adopted the
strategy of hijacking passengers’ airplanes beginning with El Al jet in 1968 and
culminating with hijacking four European planes in September 1970. 225 The guerrilla
attacks intensified across the Jordanian borders triggering major Israeli retaliatory
attacks. The situation escalated between King Hussein and the fedayeen over the control
of the country. Fearing that the fedayeen were creating a state-within-a state and posing a
challenge to his rule, the government launched a large-scale assault targeting Palestinian
civilians and fedayeen alike. The massive operations led to the destruction of the refugee
camps, whole sections of Amman, and the death and detention of thousands of
Palestinian refugees.226 Nasser swiftly intervened, sending a military envoy with a
message to King Hussein urging him to stop the fighting and to protect the Palestinian
resistance. He warned him that this tragic assault would benefit the enemy and cripple the
223. Rouleau, “Abd al-Nasser and the Palestinian National Movement: Chronicle of a Stormy Affair”, 192
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region with an internal Arab civil war. Nasser explicitly said that he would not allow for
the destruction of the Palestinian resistance movement, which he believed to be the
noblest byproduct of the 1967 defeat.227 He called for an Arab summit in Cairo on 21
September 1970 and under his patronage Arafat and Hussein signed a cease-fire
agreement on 27 September 1970.228 The agreement acknowledged the right of the
Palestinian organizations to operate, but stipulated that the fedayeen should leave the
cities and remain along the frontlines. However, after Nasser’s sudden death on 28
September 1970, the clashes resumed and culminated with the expulsion of the PLO from
Jordan by mid-1971.229
The previous sections focused on analyzing the Egyptian-Palestinian political
relations in the light of the Nasserist project, an analysis which attempted to put such
relations in their wider historical and political perspectives. The following section will
analyze the image of the Palestinians in the Egyptian press during the Nasser era.
Palestinians and the Nasserist Press
The Egyptian press underwent significant transformations during the Nasserist
era. Nasser believed in the vital role of the press in presenting and legitimizing certain
227. Heikal, “Glimpses from the Story of the Last Battle” (Lamahat min Kesat al-Ma‘rka al-Akhira), AlAhram 25/12/1970,
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massacre defying all Arab and human morals is taking place in Jordan and he warned that this cannot be
tolerated anymore, insisting that the Arab nation will remain bigger than all kinds of evil and manipulation
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policies. Nasser utilized the press in his propaganda against the Western-backed Arab
states through the writings of Heikal and other Palestinian journalists like Nasser al-Din
al-Nashashibi.230 However, the establishment of a socialist one-party regime in this case,
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) limited press freedom and marginalized the opposition.
The state consolidated its power over the press through nationalization, the firing of
prominent journalists, and their substitution with those regime loyalists: “all heads of
administration and chief editors of the nationalized press were expected to belong to the
ASU. This mandatory membership was made a prerequisite for belonging to the Press
Syndicate.”231 Nasser asserted more control over the Press Syndicate by placing his close
associate Salah Salem as its chairman. This move rendered the organization weak and
incapable of securing media and journalists’ rights.232 Therefore, despite the eloquence
and analytical approach evident in the writings of figures like Heikal and Ahmad Bahaa
al-Din among others, the press as a whole lacked diversity. It was essentially a regimedirected and government-controlled.233
The representations of the Palestine question in Egyptian press during the
Nasserist era can be divided into two phases. The first starts with the crystallization of
Nasser’s political project in 1954 and stretches till 1967. During this period the press
adopted Nasser’s vision of the Arab-Israeli conflict which could be summarized in the
following points: First, Israel was an alien body implanted by the imperial powers to
weaken the Arab nation. Thus, the struggle to liberate Palestine was an integral part of
the Arab nation’s struggle against colonialism. Second, the liberation of Palestine rested
230. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 170
231. Ibid. 171 & 201
232. Ibid. 171
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on building a solid national social and military base that would shift the balance of power
towards the Arab states. Arab unity was the most viable source to achieve this goal.
Third, the liberation of Palestine was a long and difficult task given the international
balance of power; unless Arabs drew on their national strength and resources this balance
would remain unchanged.234
The three official papers al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, and al-Jumhuriyah, began
publishing news about the guerilla activities inside Israel when they commenced in 1965.
Despite focusing on the operations and their significance, none of the papers referred to
the organization responsible that is Fatah and al-Asifa. The papers used the unspecified
term “Arab groups” in their headlines in reference to the fedayeen. 235 This pattern
reflected the Egyptian regime’s attempts to contain Palestinian politics within the
framework of the PLO and its newly formed army the PLA.236
The 1967 defeat led to a major shift in media representations. The fedayeen
operations began taking precedence in the three formal newspapers, marking the
beginning of the second phase from 1967 till 1970. The defeat caused severe frustration
and disillusionment among the Arab masses, a situation that needed a quick remedy to
restore the peoples’ self-assurance and trust. This remedy came in the form a sudden
interest in covering the news about the fedayeen and their operations in the occupied
territories. This dramatic increase in press coverage might be attributed to the regime’s
desire “to restore the spirits of the defeated Egyptian public. Much of this coverage was
aimed at demonstrating that Arab resistance did not die and that the struggle of the
234. Ibid. 166-167
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Palestinians in particular was far from over.”237 This surge in coverage on the front pages
and in bold headlines came also in accordance with Nasser’s statement referring to the
Palestinian resistance after 1967 as the noblest phenomena resulting from the defeat,
adding that the Palestinian revolution is destined to survive.238
The three papers reported extensively on the resistance operations and the fierce
Israeli retaliations.239 The press also reported in detail on the Karameh battle, which
lasted for sixteen hours on 21-22 March 1968. The battle started with an aggressive
Israeli attack aiming at destroying the Palestinian resistance in al-Aghwar area. The
Palestinian groups along with the Jordanian army waged a counter-attack which managed
to successfully force an Israeli withdrawal with significant loses on the Israeli side. The
outcome of the battle despite the causalities was paramount and proved the resilience of
the Palestinian resistance. Several writers praised the fedayeen, calling for unity and
steadfastness among the Palestinian groups. Al-Akhbar published such headlines like
“Israel launches a brutal assault in Jordan the next day the Palestinian resistance agreed to
political and military co-ordination.”240 Al-Ahram also published headlines which
emphasized the necessity of unity while recalling Nasser’s words that Israel is an alien
body created by imperialism to destroy the Arab world.241 Al-Jumhuriyah published
headlines that the Israeli assault was a preemptive strike that aimed at dismantling the
Palestinian resistance movement.242
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However, since the press during the Nasserist era was captive to the regime, it
got caught in the web of political tensions. This is illustrated in the case of the Rogers
Plan and the Egyptian-Palestinian tensions ensued following Egypt’s acceptance of the
Plan. Heikal attempted to rationalize the decision in al-Ahram. He quoted Nasser’s
declarations to a Sudanese delegation explaining that he accepted the cease-fire only to
buy more time to re-build his army and prevent Israel from Judaizing Gaza, Jerusalem,
and the Golan Heights. He added that despite knowing that Israel would not commit to
any agreements, he needed to accept the American proposals as a strategy to bring the
United States into the Arab-Israeli equation. This is due to the fact that the United States
was more capable than any other country to exert enough pressure on Israel to abide by
resolution 242. Nasser insisted that accepting the plan stemmed from his obligations
towards the Arab nation and Palestine rather than focusing solely on Egypt’s national
interests. Heikal also criticized those calling the struggle a Palestinian-Israeli struggle
rather than an Arab-Israeli one. He maintained that despite its bravery and commitment
the Palestinian resistance movement cannot win a decisive war against the enemy. He
went on to explain that the case of Palestine is different from the cases of both Vietnam
and Algeria, where the numbers, capabilities, and the geographical conditions
(mountains, caves, forests, borders) are not in favor of the resistance groups. He also
argued that only regular armies and the official backing of Arab states like Egypt are the
only viable means to liberate Palestine, insisting that Egypt will not wage a guerilla war
across its eastern borders.243
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Other writers defended Nasser’s decision, arguing that it was the leader’s support
that brought Palestinian factions international recognition. The Palestinian Marxist writer
Muein Bisseiso wrote an article in al-Ahram entitled “Despite the Noise Rising in the
Political Stock Market, I Vote with Abd al-Nasser.”244 He attacked the Palestinian groups
which rejected the plan and argued that Nasser’s Egypt supported them and the
Palestinian rights through thick and thin; disagreements between them should not turn
into an open confrontation. He went on to remind the Palestinian factions that Egypt was
not the enemy and that Nasser’s diplomacy saved them from crises in Jordan and
Lebanon and afforded them a Soviet recognition.245 Other writers like Musa Sabri harshly
attacked the anti-Nasser propaganda accusing the propagators of having “hateful voices”
that aimed to wage war at the expense of Egyptian sacrifices. Although not directly
naming the Palestinians the meaning could be easily inferred since they maintained a
hardline against the cease-fire.246 In al-Mussawar magazine, Ahmed Bahaa al-Din
expressed his anger at the out-bidding games waged against Nasser, and strongly
defended his decisions. He concluded his article by “directing severe criticism at some
Palestinian factions, accusing them of being no more than appendages of certain Arab
political parties.”247 Additionally, the press reduced its coverage of guerilla operations,
moving the news that did appear to the inside pages with limited coverage. By contrast,
the press devoted a majority of the space to pieces that supported Nasser’s decision to
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accept the plan.248 Also, al-Ahram published a caricature by Salah Jahin depicting Nasser
holding a chess-piece taking the shape of Rogers with the caption “checkmate”; Nasser
the message screamed, was in control.249 The course of the Egyptian press during that era
shows that being a captive press tied its direction with that of the regime which limited its
scope and freedom. In moments of political tensions the press became a political tool that
promoted the regime’s policies and discredited those who opposed it.
Palestinian Social Organizations in Egypt 1954-1970
Nasser incorporation of the Palestine question as one of the pillars of his political
discourse necessitated certain measures. One example is the formation of Palestinian
social unions in Egypt during the Nasserist era. The government encouraged the
formation of several unions to promote the sense of Palestinianism within the context of
Arab nationalism. The regime encouraged union activities as long as they did not
interfere in the internal affairs of the state.250 Again, here we see the dynamic of
simultaneous social support and political containment. For example, the Arab Palestine
Club was founded in 1953 in Cairo with branches in Alexandria, Al-Arish, and Port-Said.
Despite its cultural orientation the club “boasted a strong Arab nationalist line, calling on
Arab progressive forces to restore Palestine to its people.”251 The Nasserist era also
witnessed the formation of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) in 1959,
but its origins date back to the 1940 activism of Palestinian students, which raised public
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awareness on Palestine before 1948.252 GUPS, known to be the most active of Palestinian
mass

unions,

engaged

in

“overt

political

activities

and

extra-Palestinian

manifestations.”253 The GUPS acted as a “training school that produced the political
cadres in the Palestinian national movement”; when it joined PLO apparatus in 1964 it
became “the Palestinian reserve army in exile.”254 Due to its extensive political activism
GUPS faced several crises in the Egyptian regime. Again, it is clear that political
conditions affect the rights of refugee communities to express their own views and
function independently. While boosting solidarity with the Palestinians, the regime would
harshly react against any views that did not conform to its discourse. For instance, in
1961 following the collapse of the UAR the Baathists faced detention the same applied to
the Baathist students in the union who faced mass deportation. Later the union resumed
its activities in February 1964 when “the Arab nationalists (i.e. Nasserites) took over the
leadership of the union in Egypt.”255 Another confrontation occurred when GUPS
members joined Egyptian students protesting the light sentences passed against some
military officers accused of negligence during the 1967 war. GUPS participation in those
protests marked the first time a Palestinian union openly demonstrated against the
Egyptian regime, all the protestors were arrested.256 The third clash occurred in 1970
when Nasser accepted the Rogers Plan. Palestinian students in Jordan who belonged to
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) (both forming the rejectionist front which
opposed any peace settlements with Israel) organized anti-Egypt demonstrations. In
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retaliation Nasser “deported all Palestinian students affiliated to the PFLP or PDFLP, and
he arrested members of all Palestinian unions – Workers’ Union and the Women’s Union
– who did not belong to Fatah.”257 GUPS would face other major crises in the 1970s
during Sadat’s era, which culminated with its permanent ban in 1977.
The General Union of Palestinian Workers was also established in this period in
1965. The union’s origins date back to the Palestinian Arab Workers. The latter was
established in Haifa in 1925; it called for equality between Arab and Jewish workers. In
1965 the first congress of the Palestinian Trade Union Federation convened in Gaza and
announced the formation of the union.258 The union avoided involvement in political
affairs and potential clashes with the Egyptian regime. Indeed, the union’s Domestic
Charter “clearly forbade its members from intervening in the political and religious
affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt.”259 In this respect, the union acted as a syndicate
for the Palestinian labor force in Egypt. It focused on protecting workers’ rights including
wages, work-permits, and legal appeals. The union also had several social initiatives
including social welfare contributions, organizing cultural seminars, and acting as a
social link bringing the different Palestinian unions in Egypt. The cultural activities
organized by those unions helped in bringing Egyptians and Palestinians together. 260
The third organization was the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW),
established in 1965. Founded in Jerusalem in 1965, its origins date back to the Arab
Ladies Association of Jerusalem founded in 1919 as the first Palestinian women’s union.

257. Ibid. 44
258. Ibid. 47
259. Ibid. 48
260. Ibid. 48-56

79

The union had eleven branches in different host countries.261 Similar to the Workers’
Union, the GUPW avoided any political activities and its charter also forbade any
involvement in internal Egyptian affairs. Its work focused on social welfare, education,
and vocational training.
The fourth organization established in this period, was the General Union of
Palestinian Writers and Journalists in Egypt. In 1966 the first congress of the Palestinian
Writers convened in Gaza and announced the formation of the union.262 The union
focused on Palestinian public relations, it also organized several lectures to present the
Palestinian political perspective. The union would later openly criticize Sadat’s proAmerican policies and the prospect of a peace settlement with Israel. This led to its
disbandment in 1977 but it resumed its activities in 1983.263
The General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT) was founded in 1969. The
union focused on raising political awareness, improving the quality of education of
Palestinian children, and monitoring the status of Palestinian schools. The GUPT
succeeded in obtaining a permit from the Egyptian Ministry of Education allowing
“Palestinian students to obtain the Egyptian two-year Educational Diploma.”264 This
diploma improved Palestinian career, for those who could not afford the regular fees
required for university degrees.265
Lastly, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) began operating in Egypt in
1970. The PRCS began operating in Jordan in 1968. However, following Black
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September all PLO related activities including independent medical services were banned
in Jordan.266 The union established the Gawad Hosni Polyclinic in Central Cairo and a
small hospital in Heliopolis.267 The PRCS enjoyed an autonomous status within the PLO.
A resolution passed by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in 1969 defined the PRCS
as “an ‘independent’ formal organization within the PLO apparatus…capable of setting
its provisional and operational plans, recruiting its health and administrative team, and
implementing the relevant and most appropriate policies in each country in which it
functions.”268 The PRCS extended its medical services to Palestinians and Egyptians
alike without any distinctions in payment.269 Due to its medical and social services the
PRCS did not pose a threat to the Egyptian regime, thus, the government did not restrict
its expansion.270
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees in Egypt 1954-1970
This section attempts to examine the legal status of the Palestinian refugees in
Egypt during the Nasser years. During the early phases of their rule and before
introducing concrete legal changes, the Free Officers “made education, health, and other
services available to Palestinians.”271 With the consolidation of his power in 1954 Nasser
issued several laws with the aim of equating the refugees with Egyptian nationals in
several venues. The articles referring to the Palestinians “did not apply the word foreign
to Palestinians in administrative matters.”272 Further, Egypt ratified without reservations
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the Casablanca Protocol issued on 10 September 1965. The protocol stipulated that
Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries are entitled to the same rights accorded to
nationals in such fields like employment, residency, and freedom of movement.273
Despite providing a comprehensive legal framework to protect the refugees, the
provisions of the protocol remained vulnerable to the internal politics of each host state
and the course of political relations with Palestinian factions. For instance, following the
collapse of the UAR Baathist students faced detention and deportation. 274 By 1970 and
due to the Egyptian-Palestinian clash over the Rogers Plan, all non-Fatah Palestinians
were deported.275 Arbitrary deportation on the basis of political difference contradicts not
only with the provisions of the protocol but with one of Nasser’s presidential resolutions.
According to the first section of Article 18 of Presidential decree 89, 1960 Palestinian
refugees in Egypt fall under the special-residency category.276 Article 26 of the same
decree forbade the deportation of special-residency foreigners unless they prove to be a
credible threat to national security and after conducting a thorough investigation through
a special committee and providing clear evidence.277 The deportation cases cited above
are examples of political disagreement that does not mount to be a threat to national
security. This is a case when refugee communities suffer the backlash of political
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tensions. The loose term of protecting national security serves as the perfect pretext
disguising violations against refugees’ rights.
Residency and Travel Documents
Residency permits for Palestinian refugees in Egypt fell under different categories
based on the time of arrival. In most cases the issue and renewal of such permits depend
on providing a reason for staying in Egypt such as employment, marriage, or education
enrollment. A document released in 1994 by the Department of Travel, Immigration and
Nationality shows the number of travel documents issued for each category. 278 First, there
is type (A), which refers to those refugees who arrived to Egypt prior to 1948 and
includes a total number of 1,075 refugees. The permit for this category was renewable
every five years. It could also be renewed for a period of ten years if the applicant could
provide a proof of being a continuous resident in Egypt for a decade. 279 Second, type (B)
refers to the refugees who arrived after the nakba and totaled 13,032. The residency
permit for this category was renewable every five years.280 Third, type (C) refers to the
refugees entering Egypt proper during and after the Tripartite Aggression (the Suez War)
of 1956, and their total number was 142. For this category the permit is renewable every
three years.281 Fourth, type (D) related to the refugees who arrived during the Six Day
War of 1967 and totaled 6,417. The permit for this category was renewable every three
years.282 The fifth and final, type (H) was applicable to the refugees who arrived after the
1967 war and totaled 236,307. This category receives a temporarily residence permit
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renewable every three years depending on the Egyptian laws of entry. 283 According to a
report issued in 1994 the total number of Palestinian refugees in Egypt was 256,973.
However, other sources point to the fact that their actual numbers do not exceed 100,000.
The remaining number do not live in Egypt due to the restrictions imposed on their
freedom of movement and their inability to re-enter Egypt despite having an Egyptian
travel document. The Egyptian travel document for Palestinians carrying residency
permits comes with very strict regulations. To secure a valid entry the holder of this
document whether traveling or residing abroad must return to Egypt every six months.
Alternatively, the authorities will issue a one-year return visa upon receiving a proof of
work or education enrollment prior to the renewal date. Failing to meet such conditions
will result in denying entry and deportation, knowing that such document cannot be
renewed or extended from Egyptian embassies.284 Further, in 1995 the Ministry of
Interior conducted a survey calculating the number of the Palestinian Gazans living in
Egypt proper and they totaled 89,000. The report also indicated to another inconclusive
number revolving between ten to twenty thousand refugees scattered within different
governorates and villages.285
Additionally, Egypt issues another type of travel documents for Palestinian
refugees who do not have a residency permit. This document is valid only for travel
purposes and does not include any residency rights. This document is held by thousands
of Palestinians mainly from the Gaza Strip. During the Egyptian rule in Gaza this
document was issued upon request for any resident from Gaza. This document is
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renewable through Egyptian embassies and most of its holders fall under category (H)
referring to those refugees arriving after the 1967 war. However, this document does not
provide any protection for its holders. A case in point, during the Gulf War 1990-1991
the Gulf States expelled thousands of Palestinians on the grounds of political tensions
rising from Arafat’s stance on the war. The majority of the Palestinians expelled from
Kuwait held the second type of Egyptian travel documents and were refused entry in any
state. Those who managed to arrive to Egypt faced prompt deportation. Only Palestinians
carrying Israeli re-entry permit to Gaza were issued seventy-two hours transit visas.286
This in fact contradicts with the provisions of the Casablanca Protocol the second article
of which stipulated that refugees residing in signatory countries and in accordance with
their interests “have the right to leave and return to this state.”287
Residency Regulations during the Nasser Era
Law 89 of 1960 related to the entrance, residency, and departure of foreigners
from Egyptian territories divided residency permits into three categories: special,
ordinary, and temporary. This law stipulated in its third section article 18 that Palestinian
refugees residing in the “Northern Regions” which during the Egyptian-Syrian union
referred to Syria would fall under the category of foreigners with especial residency.
Members in this category are entitled to a ten-year residency permit to be renewed upon
request.288 Also, article 37 of this law gave the Minister of Interior the power to exempt
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any category of foreigners from “the application of (part of) the law.” 289 Additionally, the
Egyptian government issued decision 28 authorizing the issuing of travel documents
(TD) to Palestinians.290 In 1961 the Minister of Interior issued decision 9 of 1961 to
amend some of the legal provisions in decision 28 of 1960. The first article stipulated that
article seven from the previous resolution should be amended to be read as follows: “the
travel document is valid for two years since the issuing date. It is renewable for another
two years, then one more year making the document valid for five years.” 291 Another
resolution followed in 1964 amending some provisions in Law 89 of 1960. This came in
the form of issuing decision 180 of 1964 where its article 13 exempted Palestinian
refugees, their wives, and their underage children from paying fees to issue residency
permits, they are also entitled to one free return visa annually. The article also gave the
head of immigration, passports, and nationality the right to extend the validity of the exit
visa for more than once.292 Further, resolution 181 of 1964 related to the issue of
travelling documents provided that Palestinian refugees in Egypt are entitled to issue
temporarily travelling documents. The applicants should provide a proof of being
classified as refugees and have a valid residency card to prove their status. The fourth
article stated that the document is valid for two years, renewable for another two years
and one more year. Thus, the document is valid for a period of five years. Article five
stipulated that the travel document does not grant entrance or transit in Egypt without
securing a valid entrance, transit, or exit visas in advance. While article ten states that the
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fees required for issuing the travel documents are twenty-five Egyptian piasters and for
free for those who could prove their financial inability. The documents are also renewed
for free, and the holders of those documents are exempted from paying the fees required
for a return visa.293 Despite the fact that Egypt strictly applies the provisions of those
laws, their application was relatively relaxed during the Nasser years. 294 However, like
most foreigners residing in Egypt, Palestinian refugees with a long-term residence
“qualify only for a temporary residence permit, which is valid for one to three years.”295
The second article of the Casablanca Protocol stipulated that Palestinian refugees residing
in signatory countries have the right to leave and return to this state. Nonetheless,
Palestinian refugees whether born in Egypt or lived there for a long period “have no
automatic right to leave or reenter the country, but must renew their visas every six
months to three years, depending on the category.”296 Those who need to travel through
Egyptian territories should secure a valid transit visa prior to entry date. 297 The Egyptian
laws fell short from extending legal protection toward non-refugee Palestinians carrying
Egyptian travel documents. This document is held by a substantial number of Palestinians
from the Gaza Strip. The document is valid for five years and does not include a
residency permit. Holders of this document cannot enter Egypt without securing in
advance a valid entry, transit, or return visa and are not permitted to reside in the
country.298
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Education
In the field of education during the Nasser era, Palestinians where entitled
services as Egyptian nationals. This approach resonates with provisions of the Casablanca
Protocol and Nasser’s stance on the Palestine cause and its centrality to his pan-Arab
project. Education would nourish Palestinian nationalism while keeping it in check and in
accordance with Nasserism. Palestinian students like their Egyptian counter-parts enjoyed
free education in schools and universities. The government extended free university
education to Gazans during Egyptian rule over the Gaza Strip.299 The government also
provided financial assistance of about forty-eight Egyptian pounds (about 110 US
dollars) for 1,192 Palestinian students during the period of 1965-1966.300 In one instance
Nasser issued Presidential Decree 1223 of 1958 exempting five Palestinian students
enrolled in the Police Academy from tuition fees for their entire period of study. 301
Outstanding students received one hundred Egyptian pounds (230 US dollars). Also, the
government provided a number of scholarships to Palestinian students; these reached
about 1,030 during the 1960s. Access to education and scholarships led to an increase in
Palestinian enrollment in Egyptian schools and universities. Palestinians in universities
exceeded 20,000 students and 5,642 were from Gaza alone.302
Employment
Egypt has a highly regulated work environment where work permissions for
foreigners are difficult to obtain and depend on the terms of reciprocity treatment. The
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rationale behind those regulations “is the protection of the interest of Egyptian
nationals.”303 However, the first article of decree 21 of 1961 temporarily exempted
foreign residents with both ordinary and special residency permits from fulfilling the
condition of reciprocity treatment.304 The provisions of this decree affect Palestinian
refugees since they fall under the special-residency category as explained above. Also,
during the Nasserist era unlike the monarchal days “Palestinians were permitted to obtain
commercial registers and, unlike other Arabs, were accorded the right to import and
export.”305 By the 1960s several laws facilitated employment opportunities for
Palestinians in Egypt. However, it should be noted that “the laws were not drafted solely
for Palestinians. Rather, they were general laws promulgated to regulate professions and
in each case an article dealing with Palestinians was included.”306
Presidential decree 66 of 1962 stated in its first article that it is permitted to
appoint Arab Palestinians in state positions and the public sector on the same basis
applied in hiring the citizens of the UAR.307 Laurie A. Brand argues that the timing of
this law had a political connotation. This decree came after the collapse of the UAR and
the rapid deterioration of Egyptian-Syrian relations. Brand argues that this move may
have been “a means by which Nasser sought to boost his pan-Arab credentials. Given the
employment situation of Palestinians in other Arab countries, the move was certain to
have substantial propaganda value.”308
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Several other laws followed in the footsteps of the decree explained above. For
instance, the Minister of Labor issued Ministerial decree 39 on 10 May 1962 exempted
Palestinians from obtaining work permits.309Also, Presidential decree 46 of 1964 related
to regulating the status of civil officials in state employment stipulated that Palestinians
do not fall under the foreigners’ category.310 Further, Egyptian laws stipulated that
practicing medicine, pharmacology, and dentistry is only permitted to Egyptian nationals
and foreigners whose countries observe the principle of reciprocity treatment. However,
those laws included articles exempting Palestinian refugees from those conditions. For
instance, Article 14 of Law 537 of 1954 related to practicing dentistry stated that due to
their status as refugees, Palestinian dentists are authorized to practice dentistry in Egypt
given the fact that they have a degree in the field as required in article 2. In some cases
the applicants could also be exempted from the required examination stated in Article 3
(related to those who carry non-Egyptian degree in dentistry).311 Additionally, article 15
of Law 415 of 1954 related to the practice of medicine permitted Palestinian doctors to
practice medicine in Egypt due to their status as refugees residing in the country. The
applicants are also exempted from the required qualifying examination applicable for
those who carry non-Egyptian degree in medicine.312 Section seven of article 87 of Law
127 of 1955 related to practicing the profession of pharmacy allowed Palestinians to
practice pharmacy in Egypt, due to their status as refugees. The applicants are also
exempted from taking the qualifying examination required from those who carry non-
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Egyptian academic degree under the condition that they carry the required degree stated
in article 2.313
The Palestinian Private Sector during the Nasser Era
The 1948 refugees suffered from their inability to secure legal jobs in Egypt. This
stemmed from al-Nuqrashi’s government orders to prohibit the employment of
Palestinians.314 For al-Nuqrashi, the refugees were a threat to national security that should
be curtailed from a permanent stay in the country.315 When the Free Officers seized
power, they abolished the no-work restriction imposed on Palestinian refugees.316 Early
Palestinian businessmen faced several obstacles during their early beginnings in Egypt.
First, their numbers were relatively small and they lacked enough knowledge of the
requirements of the Egyptian market. Second, they also lacked enough capital and
expertise to match the European investors already established in Egypt for decades.
Third, they faced much opposition from “foreign establishments, especially the Jewish
ones, who fought the birth of any Palestinian business.”317 Nasser had hoped that
encouraging Palestinian investments would help in breaking the European monopoly over
Egypt’s economic sector. However, the earlier obstacles proved hard to overcome, as
many early Palestinian businesses failed and the owners either left Egypt or enrolled in
the public sector.318
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The Tripartite Aggression of 1956 created major shifts in the Egyptian economic
sector. Following the war thousands of Jews left Egypt and the state seized all their
properties. This created a new economic environment attracting Palestinian entrepreneurs
mainly from Gaza to invest in sectors previously monopolized by Egyptian Jews
including “manufacturing enterprises, wholesale and retail trade and small hotels and
restaurants.”319 Also, during the Egyptian-Syrian union many Palestinians residing in
Syria decided to invest their capital in the Egyptian commercial and industrial sectors.
This helped in generating and circulating Palestinian capital and proved beneficial to the
Egyptian economic sector. Those private projects used Egyptian raw materials to produce
export-quality products, and earned Egypt foreign currency and international reputation.
Those projects also offered jobs for both Palestinian and Egyptian workers.320 Following
the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation of Gaza, most Gazans transferred their assets to
Egypt with the aim of expanding their investments in the Egyptian markets. Between the
years 1967-1973 the Egyptian economic sector included a total of 222 different
Palestinian businesses. Their varied activities included the production of food, textiles, as
well as jewelry making in addition to, tourist agencies, contractors, leather and carpenter
workshops, and cosmetic factories.321 Palestinians could invest in and cultivate
agricultural plots. Although Law 15 of 1963 prohibited foreigners from owning
agricultural or cultivable lands, yet, its first clause granted Palestinians a temporary
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exemption. Thus, Palestinian refugees in this period could own and cultivate agricultural
plots just like Egyptian nationals.322
Nonetheless, economy and politics are mutually interrelated and political tensions
negatively affected economic relations. Two incidents during the Nasserist era illustrate
this point. First, the collapse of the UAR had its ramifications on the Palestinian private
sector in Egypt. During the union many Palestinian businessmen came to Egypt to
expand their activities, however, after the union’s collapse and the rapid deterioration in
Egyptian-Syrian relations many of them sold their businesses and returned to Syria.
Additionally, some Palestinian businessmen faced arbitrary treatment where their
properties were confiscated based on the mere suspicion of collaborating with Syrian
reactionary elements.323 The second incident occurred during the political crisis that
ensued following Nasser’s acceptance of the Roger’s Plan of 1970. The PLO pressed
Palestinian businessmen in Egypt to voice their opposition to Nasser’s decision.
However, Nasser’s strong crackdown on PLO offices and radio stations sent a decisive
message Palestinian opposition to Nasser’s decisions was no longer tolerated.
Businessmen in order to protect their capital tried to maintain a neutral stance during the
debacle, since “[t]he penalties inflicted by the Egyptian government were great: they
ranged from loss of employment to imprisonment or deportation.”324
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter examined the Nasserist era and the status of the
Palestinian refugees during that period. Nasser placed the Palestine cause at the forefront
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of his political discourse in order to build a political leadership for Egypt and rally both
domestic and regional support for his version of pan-Arabism. On a parallel line the
Egyptian government and in accordance with Nasser’s stance issued several legal
exemptions to accommodate the Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt proper. The bulk
of those laws equated Palestinians with Egyptian nationals in fields of employment,
education, and healthcare. This however, does not negate the fact that political tensions
affected segments of the refugees in the form of arbitrary detention, deportation, or the
seizing of assets as explained above in the cases of the GUPS students or Palestinian
investors. Although Egypt’s residency laws stipulated that deportation cases should
provide clear evidence of a credible threat to national security, and despite Nasser’s
rhetoric on Palestine, opposition to some of his political decisions triggered harsh
repercussions. Laws in such cases proved inefficient, and the state could easily utilize and
manipulate the loose term of national security to contain opposition, which could be little
more than the expression of political differences. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
the regulations and exemptions related to Palestinians in Egypt remained intact and fully
effective during the entire Nasserist era.
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Chapter Three
The Sadat Era 1970-1981

Historical background
This chapter will focus of the era of President Anwar Sadat, 1970-1981. Sadat
was Nasser’s vice-president and after Nasser’s sudden death on 28 September 1970 took
the position of a President. The chapter explores Sadat’s foreign policy in post-October
1973 war era and the peace process with Israel. It will particularly focus on how such
policies affected Egyptian-Palestinian relations and Egypt’s Palestinian refugees.
Sadat’s political project did not crystalize until the late 1970s after the October
War. Following Nasser’s death Sadat faced two political dilemmas. On the one hand, he
had to deal with an internal political struggle with the Nasserists mainly the top members
of the ruling party known as the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The power struggle
revolved around shaping the course of Egyptian politics after Nasser’s death. From the
outset Sadat and the newly appointed vice-president Ali Sabri subscribed to two opposing
ideologies. Sabri along with other top members of the ASU close to Nasser believed that
Sadat should consult them before passing any decisions. They assumed themselves more
qualified to fill in his position.325 Sabri stood for the pillars of Nasserism, mainly those of
socialism, militancy towards Israel and maintaining close ties with the USSR. By
contrast, Sadat had several reservations against Nasser’s policies especially in relation to
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foreign policy. He believed that Egypt’s isolation from the West had limited its foreign
policy options.326 Sabri was dismissed from his position on 2 May 1971 and imprisoned
during Sadat’s “Corrective Revolution” in early 1971. The latter targeted members of the
Nasserist camp in the government and security forces. A group of prominent figures of
the Nasser era were put either in prison or under house arrest. They were accused of
plotting to overthrow Sadat and were put on trial.327 The crack on the leftist cadres
indicated a breach with Nasser’s political circle and a sign of warning to their Soviet
allies. In another turn of events marking further departures from Nasserism, Sadat
embarked on a counter policy to gain domestic support through reconciling those who
came under fire during the Nasser years. Those included hundreds from the Muslim
Brotherhood, journalists like Ali and Mustafa Amin, members of the former royal family
who received new passports, and civil servants dismissed under Nasser. The common
thread between those beneficiaries was “the fact that they all suffered under Nasser.
Although some leftists might have benefited, the Egyptian right was the major
beneficiary.”328 Other measures included the restoration of former confiscated private
property to its original owners. A high court verdict ordered that all private property
expropriated under Nasser should be restored to the original owners, since the process of
seizing such property was deemed illegal.329 Additionally, Egyptian-Soviet relations
suffered considerably during the Sadat era. Sadat expressed his openness towards the
West in general and the United States in particular; he also expressed his preference
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towards capitalism and diversifying weaponry sources. Sadat complained that the Soviets
were reluctant in supplying Egypt with necessary arms; ultimately, he ordered the
dismissal of all Soviet experts and military advisors from Egypt. Sadat’s decision to expel
the Soviets probably stemmed from his desire to involve the United States as a mediator
with Israel. The more Egyptian-American ties improved, the more its Soviet counterpart
deteriorated. Following the October War Sadat argued that the Soviets “opposed military
action against Israel and withheld arm supplies in an attempt to influence Egyptian
policies.”330 Sadat would continue attacking the USSR on several occasions claiming that
wherever the Soviets go they spread hatred and bloody class struggles.331
On the other hand, Sadat had to deal with the Israeli occupation of Sinai and the
closure of the Suez Canal since the 1967 war. Sustaining the stationed army became a
huge economic burden. Also, public pressures calling for ending this impasse made it
clear that the state of “[n]o war – no peace was rapidly becoming more intolerable to
Egypt than the risks of war.”332
Initially Sadat showed openness towards diplomacy and negotiations to break the
deadlock with Israel. However, he soon realized that Egypt has to fight to force a change
on the ground and that is why he opted for the military option. Sadat’s war strategy
focused on waging a limited war that “would unite the Arab world behind Egypt, forcing
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use of the oil weapon; … [and] shatter the myth of Israel’s invincibility and hence her
belief in security through territorial expansion and, above all, pave the way for an
American-sponsored peace.”333 In this sense, the war was a spearhead which opened the
way for peace negotiations and gave Egypt strategic leverage to secure a better political
bargain.334 In short, Sadat’s strategy “was not to fight Israel directly, but to attack Israel’s
monopoly of support in the United States…the more Sadat tied Israel, Egypt, and the
United States together, the stronger his position would be and the weaker Israel’s.”335
During the October War, Egypt successfully crossed the Suez Canal by destroying the
Bar Lev Line which stretched for 160 km along the canal. 336 However, the war ended
with a cease-fire on 25 October 1973 after Israel regained its power and started a
counterattack aided with extensive US military support.337 Between 1974 and 1975 Egypt
signed the Sinai Accords I and II.338 The accords acted as a framework for disengagement
and effectively eliminated the military option from the equation of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The accord only exchanged a minimal Israeli withdrawal in Sinai for a nominal
Egyptian military presence and American observes stationed between them. The accord
ended the war option for Egypt and largely naturalized its role in the Arab-Israeli power
balance.339 The accords also paved the way for the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the
Egyptian – Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979. Such moves represented a glaring breach with

333. Ibid. 46
334. Ibid. 46-47
335. Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 200
336. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bar_Lev_Line
337. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#Aid_to_Israel
338. www.knesset.gov.il/process/doc/egypt-interim-eng.htm also see Laqueur and Rubin, eds. The Israel
Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, 194-200 “Egyptian-Israeli Accord on
Sinai (September 1, 1975).”
339. Hinnebusch, Jr. Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an AuthoritarianModernizing State, 56-57

98

Nasser’s pan-Arab policies; the accords seemed to be a unilateral deal which “decisively
undermined the prospects of a general Arab – Israeli settlement. The agreement was also
a first step in Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab world.”340 Egypt’s leadership in the Arab
world decreased significantly after signing the Second Sinai Accord as Arab financial aid
decreased and Egypt started relying exclusively on US financial and military aid. 341
Relations with the PLO and the rest of the Arab states further deteriorated in the wake of
the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty where “Arab sanctions were imposed:
diplomatic relations were severed, the Arab League transferred from Egypt, aid payments
and several joint enterprises suspended.”342 Further, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko referred to the agreement as anti-Arab stating that “[t]he separate deal between
Egypt and Israel resolves nothing. It is a means designed to lull the vigilance of peoples.
It is a way of piling up on a still greater scale explosive material capable of producing a
new conflagration in the Middle East.”343 Additionally, between 1977 and 1979 the Arab
League held several summits that condemned Sadat’s Jerusalem visit and later his
decision to pursue a separate peace treaty with Israel. For instance, on 5 December 1977
a summit held in Tripoli, Libya adopted a resolution to sever diplomatic, political, and
economic ties with Egypt. Subsequent summits followed and stressed the same stance
culminating with the Baghdad Summit held on 31 March 1979 which decided to
withdraw the Arab ambassadors from Egypt and to remove the Arab League’s
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headquarters from Cairo to the Tunisian capital, Tunis.344 A war of words ensued
between Sadat and the rejectionists compromising Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South
Yemen. Sadat severed diplomatic relations with those states and insisted that the Arabs
envy Egypt and conspire against its prosperity. Envy, hatred, and conspiracy persisted in
Sadat’s speeches which emphasized on Egypt’s sacrifices and the Aras’ ingratitude. Such
themes reinforced and justified Sadat’s Egypt First policy. In other words, Egypt fought
on behalf of the Arabs but they deny it prosperity, so it’s time for Egypt to focus on its
own interests. A wave of harsh criticism dominated Sadat’s speeches between the late
1970s and early 1980s. Recurrent themes included accusing the Arabs of aspiring to
replace Egypt’s leadership, hatred, and ignorance. He also claimed that Egypt does not
need the Arabs, blaming Egypt’s economic woes on its sacrifices for the Arab world. On
several occasions Sadat argued that the Arabs offered nothing to Palestine except slogans
while Egypt fought their wars and got nothing in return except ingratitude.345 This
discourse marked a glaring breach from Nasser’s pan-Arab rhetoric which stressed a
united Arab front as an essential prerequisite to confront Israel. The more Sadat’s Egypt
became isolated from the Arab world, the more dependent it became on US financial and
military aid. Such dependency marred Egyptian political decisions in the following
decades as they became closely tied to US interests.
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The shift in Egyptian policies and priorities under Sadat resulted mainly from the
change in the political leadership. Unlike Nasser, Sadat did not aspire to be a pan-Arab
leader. He believed that pan-Arabism limited Nasser’s political choices.346 Sadat also
showed more accommodation towards the West in general and the United States in
particular. His political project had an Egyptian-centric stance. “Egypt First” would later
become the emblem of Sadat’s political discourse; an early indication toward this policy
is illustrated in adjusting the state’s official title and restoring the name Egypt. According
to the Constitution of 1971, Egypt’s official title changed from the United Arab Republic
to the Arab Republic of Egypt.347 It is worthy to note that despite the collapse of the
Egyptian-Syrian union, Nasser retained the UAR as Egypt’s official name. This shift
towards a more Egyptian less Arab political order appeared since signing the Sinai
Accords. Signing the accords seemed to be a unilateral move which neutralized Egypt’s
role in the Arab-Israeli struggle and eliminated all prospects of an Egyptian military
intervention in the struggle with Israel. Later and despite Arab rejection, Sadat signed the
Camp David Accords followed by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Those moves
proved Sadat’s Egypt-oriented policies and his desire to withdraw from the Arab political
scene. He stressed that choosing war or peace is ultimately an Egyptian decision.348
Additionally, Sadat showed preference toward free market capitalism and more
integration into the world capitalist market in what became to be known as infitah (the
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open door policy). This breach with Nasser’s socialism resulted from both “domestic
demands and foreign constraints.”349 Sadat needed to attract foreign investments
especially American ones and gain the support of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to consolidate
his power. Further, since economic and political relations are interrelated, Sadat
considered infitah as an integral component of his foreign policy. He hoped that
abandoning state socialism for a neoliberal free market would win Egypt both investment
and political support from the United States.350
Egyptian – Palestinian Relations during the Sadat Era 1970-1981
Egyptian-Palestinian relations did not witness significant changes during Sadat’s
early years in office; in fact “Egypt was a cosponsor of the resolution at Rabat in October
1974 which officially proclaimed the PLO the sole, legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people.”351 Also, in an attempt to prove himself as a democratic liberal, Sadat
ordered the reopening of the PLO offices and radio stations closed by Nasser during the
Rogers Plan crisis.352 Singing the Sinai Disengagement Accords in 1975 put some strain
on Egyptian relations with the PLO but did not have any impact on the status of the
Palestinian community in Egypt. However, Egyptian-Palestinian ties started to rapidly
deteriorate when Sadat announced his intention to visit Jerusalem in a speech delivered at
the People’s Assembly in November 1977.353 The shocking announcement followed by
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the famous visit angered the PLO which responded by releasing the Six – Point Program
on 4 December 1977 condemning the visit, rejecting UN – Resolution 242 and all
international conferences based on its provisions including the Geneva Conference, and
calling for severing all ties with Sadat’s regime.354 The visit, the first of its kind by an
Arab leader and specifically an Egyptian one perplexed the entire region. Egypt had a
long history of wars against Israel since 1948. It acted as the uncontested leader of the
Arab world. But the trip signaled an Egyptian formal recognition of Israel, Sadat’s
insistence on ending the war option for Egypt, and his gradual withdrawal from the ArabIsraeli struggle.355 The visit also triggered Palestinian students in Egyptian universities,
thus, fueling several demonstrations against the regime. The government swiftly
retaliated through expelling all active students and ultimately banning the GUPS in
1977.356
As noted earlier, since its inception, GUPS became highly involved in overt
political activism leading to several clashes with the Egyptian regime during the late
1960s and throughout the 1970s. During the early 1970s GUPS organized several
demonstrations; for instance during 1970-1971 the Palestinian students demonstrated
against the Egyptian government inaction regarding the massacres of Black September.
In 1972 the GUPS joined the Egyptian masses in large demonstrations against Sadat’s
policies especially the “no-war no-peace” impasse. However, vocal opposition would no
longer be tolerated leading to the banning of other active Palestinian unions like the
General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. Only unions focusing on social
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non-political activities survived the onslaught including the unions of workers, women,
and the Red Crescent.357 In essence, the crack shows the regime’s intent to contain all
platforms that could incite opposition and rally Egyptian leftists and Islamists who
strongly opposed Sadat’s quick approach to a peace settlement without enough critical
thought or social debate. During that period the regime imposed severe restrictions on
opposition to the peace treaty, for instance, in 1979 the government passed a referendum
forbidding “the formation of a party that stood against the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.”358 The
problem with this stance is that the regime equated between opposing the treaty and
opposing peace altogether, while in fact, the opposition called for a just peace and a more
calculated approach regarding Egyptian-American relations.
The year 1978 marked a further turn for the worse for both Egyptian-Palestinian
relations and Palestinians in the country. On 18 February 1978 a Palestinian armed group
called Abu-Nidal Organization assassinated Youssef al-Sibai the Minister of Culture in
Cyprus. The Egyptian regime perceived the assassination, although promptly denounced
by the PLO, as an assault. There were severe repercussions that curtailed “many of the
privileges that Palestinians in Egypt had enjoyed since the 1950s and 1960s” and many
laws “were gradually reviewed and cancelled.”359 For instance, al-Ahram reported on 28
February 1978 that “discussions in the People’s Assembly [were] calling for the reexamination of the status of the Palestinian residents of Egypt.”360 The assassination and
the subsequent Larnaca airport debacle triggered further tensions. Following the carnage
the government (without proper prearrangements) sent Egyptian commandos to free the
357. Ibid. 47
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remaining hostages but the Cypriot soldiers fired and killed them. This fiasco enraged the
Egyptian regime and unleashed an anti-PLO press campaign where “[t]he Egyptian
media, certainly with government approval, if not encouragement, began what was to be
a three-and-a-half-year assault on the PLO in particular and Palestinians in general.” 361 In
retaliation Sadat “in major breaks with precedent, denounced fedayeen raids on Israel and
repudiated the claim of the PLO to be the legitimate representative of Palestinians.”362
The Egyptian-Palestinian relations faced further deterioration in the months
preceding signing the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978. Based on an
American initiative the accords proposed a frame-work constituting basis for negotiating
an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. However, Egypt ended up signing the accords as a
separate Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement since the PLO rejected to participate. On 23
September 1978, the PLO joined the so-called Summit of Anti-Sadat “Steadfastness and
Confrontation Front”, held in Damascus with participants from Algeria, Libya, Syria, and
South Yemen. The Summit released an agreement which called for severing political and
economic relations with Egypt and removing the headquarters of the Arab League from
Cairo, while maintaining closer ties with the Soviet Union363. Arafat stated in an
interview that the PLO along with the “Steadfastness Front” would fight in his words “the
tripartite alliance – Carter, Begin, and al-Sadat.”364 Surprisingly, Sadat’s declarations
grew obviously inconsistent. Sadat insisted on several occasions that there is no real
peace in the region without a just and meaningful solution to the Palestine question based
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on the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab land and east Jerusalem. He stressed
that Egypt never sought a separate deal and that the question of Palestine lies at the very
heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.365 However, in reality, his government nurtured an
aggressive anti-Palestinian campaign and issued a series of laws discriminating against
the refugees. Sadat also disregarded all domestic and regional opposition and preceded
with the accords dispute their flaws.
In this respect, it is important to briefly explain the reasons behind the PLO’s
decision to refuse signing the Camp David Accords. Since its inception the accords
became promoted as a frame-work setting the basis for future negotiations. However, the
clauses proposed failed to offer any tangible basis for the transition to self-governance or
self-determination. From the onset the Camp David framework included within its
clauses several terms that would eventually render autonomy and self-government
ineffective. For instance, the responsibilities of the Palestinian authority governing both
the West Bank and Gaza would later be defined through negotiations between
representatives from Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The Palestinian representation was
confined to the stance of the Arab governments participating in the talks. Thus, denying
Palestinians the right to choose their representatives. Further, this clause empowered
Israel with the right to veto certain proposals or deny the admission of specific
Palestinian representatives. Besides, the Palestinian delegation in this respect would be a
365. An interview with October Magazine on 23 April 1978,
http://sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=729, Sadat’s message to the United Nations on the
occasion of the Day of Palestine on 28 November 1978,
http://sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=774, Sadat’s speech to the Knesset on 21 November
1977, http://sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=650, al-Akhbar newspaper on 3 March 1979, alAhram newspaper on 13 March 1977 reported Sadat’s declarations during the opening session of the
Palestine National Council (PNC) where he stated that the Palestinians are never asked to give-up any of
his rights or to provide any concessions. Sadat’s interview to the Israeli television and reported in alAkhbar newspaper on 27 March 1979, al-Ahram on 11 March 1975 [Arabic sources]
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mere token representative of the Arab governments which selected its members rather
than representing the Palestinian people in general.366
In essence, the Camp David Accords became more of a framework for further
negotiations rather than providing substantial resolutions. It fell short from committing
Israel to fully withdraw its forces from the West Bank and Gaza, it did not provide for
measures to stop the expansion in building new illegal settlements. Further, the accords
overlooked the status of Jerusalem and gave Israel the right to select which Palestinians
are eligible for readmission. This clause essentially denied Palestinians the right to return
to their homeland. It contradicted with previous UN resolutions affirming the
unconditional right of return. Also the accords failed to acknowledge the status of
Palestinian refugees displaced prior to the 1967 war.367 In short “the explicit provisions
and the implicit terms of the Camp David Framework exclude, in practice, the realization
of the most fundamental Palestinian rights: to sovereignty, statehood, self-determination
and return.”368 Such shortcomings explain the reason why the PLO refused to sign the
Accords as they significantly diminished the Palestinian rights and failed to provide
concrete basis for a just solution to the Palestine question.
Regardless of Arab condemnation and vocal domestic opposition mainly from the
Leftists and Islamists, Sadat signed the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978. 369
He went on to sign the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty on 26 March 1979; the two
366. Fayez A. Sayegh, “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem,” Journal of Palestine
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countries exchanged ambassadors along with full diplomatic relations.370 EgyptianPalestinian-Arab relations remained turbulent until the early 1980s when a radical Islamic
group known as al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah assassinated Sadat on 6 October 1981.
The Press during the Sadat Era
As he consolidated his power, Sadat focused on the press establishment. Having
headed the administrative board of al-Jumhuriyah newspaper, Sadat had acquired firsthand the influence of such establishment. In fact, during his era the press became known
as “the fourth-estate.” He promised that the era of prosecuting and jailing journalists was
over, and insisted that freedom of speech would be protected. Article 47 of the 1971
constitution stipulated that “freedom of speech whether written, spoken or photographed
is guaranteed within the framework of the law and constructive criticism to safeguard the
national structure.”371 Article 48 stated that “freedom of press and printing is guaranteed,
press censorship and suspending newspapers was forbidden. Limiting those rules would
occur only during cases of national emergency and/or war where a limited form of
censorship would be enacted in matters pertaining to social safety and national security
purposes.”372 However, implementing those laws proved to be a tough challenge to Sadat
since “[h]is understanding of freedom of the press appeared to be only as a tool for
conveying the political authority’s views to the public.”373 He appeared to be less tolerant
toward criticism and implied his intentions to rid the Press Syndicate from his opponents.
The case of Haykal is an indicative illustration of Sadat’s limits tolerating criticism.
370. Ibid. 355, see also Gregory S. Mahler and Alden R.W. Mahler, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An
Introduction and Documentary Reader, (London New York: Routledge, 2010), 167-173 [ Full Text of the
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Haykal, Nasser’s closest advisor and al-Ahram editor-in-chief for seventeen years
clashed with Sadat on various issues. He repeatedly criticized Sadat’s failure to unify an
Arab front against Israel and his stance from the Soviet Union. Haykal also expressed his
concern about rushing into an alignment with the United States. He called for “a slower
and more reasoned approach to the United States” mainly because he “was not convinced
that the United States had actually shifted its policy toward more evenhandedness in the
Middle East.”374 Impatient with his criticism, Sadat issued a decree dismissing Haykal
from his position in February 1974, and appointed his rival Ali Amin as the managing
editor of al-Ahram.375 In order to justify this decision, “Haykal was accused of forming
“power centers” and of turning al-Ahram to a “state within a state”. He was further
accused of “casting doubts on the President’s intentions and of being involved in
fomenting past student riots.”376
Following the dismissal of the Nasserist figures from the press, Sadat pushed to
the forefront figures that did not flourish during the Nasserist era like Musa Sabri and
Anis Mansour, or those who suffered in Nasser’s prisons like Mustafa and Ali Amin.
Sadat had implemented his full control over the press establishment. He also aimed to
nourish a new cadre of journalists who supported his policies and framed the
dismantlement of Nasserism in a favorable light. Consequently, several writers launched
a wave of articles highly critical of the Nasserist era. Topics varied between protesting
arbitrary imprisonment, oppression, and the lack of liberty and justice. Other writings
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criticized transgressions against landowners including detention and confiscating their
properties.377
In the post October war era, Sadat approved the emergence of independent press
as a sign to win over the West prior to Camp David by posing as a liberal who tolerates
and encourages opposition. It is however important to note that despite their status as
independent, these newspapers were very much, dependent on the state owned printing
houses.378 An opposition press emerged including al-Shaab the mouthpiece of the
Socialist Work Party which appeared in May 1979, al-Ahali the voice of al-Tagamuu
Party, and al-Daawa an Islamic newspaper representing the Muslim Brotherhood. AlDaawa first appeared in January 1951 but was soon suspended in 1952. It reemerged
again in July 1976 with Omar al-Telmasani the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide as its
editor.379 The opposition press challenged the regime especially during the prelude to the
peace negotiations with Israel. Al-Ahali for instance, spearheaded the opposition press by
explicitly attacking the Camp David negotiations, the deteriorating domestic economy,
and the rise of a new class of entrepreneurs closely related to the regime.380 Due to its
outspokenness the official press took an early aim at al-Ahali dismissing it and alTagamuu Party as a corrupt and insufficiently Islamic communist party. 381 After fifteen
issues the paper was suspended in May 1978 only to be republished a month later. Before
377. Ibid. 53
378. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 228
379. Ibid. 229-231
380. The first issue published on 1 February, 1978 ran the following headlines: “There should be a firm
stand with the ‘American Friend;’ the paper explained that they do not reject peace but they are questioning
the means through which this peace could be achieved. The paper also questioned America’s real
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Participate in the Peace Process?,” in Hussein Abdel-Razeq, al-Ahali a Newspaper Under Siege, [al-Ahali
Sahifa Tahet al-Hesar], (Cairo: Dar al-Alam al-Thaleth, 1994), 35 [Arabic Source]
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suspending the sixteenth issue Sadat personally took an aim at al-Tagamuu and its
newspaper. During one of his speeches, he dismissed the opposition as agents; he
explained that while he did not oppose the Left but that it had to prove its loyalty to
Egypt. As for al-Ahali Sadat accused them of stupidity and conspiring against social
stability.382 Further, on another occasion when Sadat met with the chief-editors of the
official press he said that “al-Ahali had published about sixteen issues by now and that is
enough for them”; it is not surprising that the government seized the issue scheduled to
be published on that same day.383 Upon its resumption the paper continued to openly
attack the peace negotiations and the rising rates of corruption. By the time the paper
reached issue number twenty-three “the state’s security agency charged the paper with
such offenses as harming the interests of Arab and Islamic society, inciting hatred and
rebellion, defying the law and committing the crime of publishing and spreading false
news.”384 Issue 23 of 2 August, 1978 ran bold headlines, which attacked Camp David and
the American pressures on behalf of Israel. The initial headline questioned the fate of the
initiative, given the Israeli formula of land for peace.385 The same issue ran provocative
editorials accusing the regime of approving the disposing of nuclear and atomic wastes in
Egyptian soil. The subsequent issues faced prompt confiscating even before leaving the
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print station, the advertisements on national television were cancelled, and ultimately the
printing-house refused to print the newspaper altogether.386
Al-Daawa represented another form of opposition from an Islamic perspective.
Unlike al-Ahali, al-Daawa did not initially engage in a direct attack on Sadat’s regime.
Instead it focused on attacking “Israel, the Nasserite era, and the Soviets.”387 However,
by mid-1978 it became apparent that Sadat is going forward with the Camp David
initiative, therefore, the paper openly attacked the proposed agreement. Al-Telmasani
argued that the Zionists usurped the Arab land of Palestine and that Islam delegitimized
recognizing land usurpers. In another editorial, he claimed that the accords would fulfill
the Zionist scheme “to pursue a peaceful settlement in order to establish Israel’s control
over lands conquered by war.”388 However, with the signing of the treaty, the paper
moved toward analyzing its terms and their impact on Egypt and the Arab world. The
paper warned that the treaty would become a means by which Israel would solve its
problem of economic inflation. It explained that the treaty would open the Egyptian
markets and later the Arab ones to Israeli products. This would eventually lead to an
Israeli industrial expansion and facilitate controlling Egypt’s economic sector. 389 The
paper also stressed the fact that the treaty “left Palestine’s political future vague and
undetermined.”390 It also lamented that the annex to the treaty maintained the reference to
Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. Al-Daawa further emphasized that the treaty
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gave a permanent position to the international troops in Sinai known as the Multinational
Forces and Observers (MFO) as forces of protection since the treaty had stipulated that
“[n]o more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be
stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez
and the Suez Canal.”391 The treaty further stipulated that the Egyptian forces would be
equipped with light weapons for normal security and police purposes. This in fact gave
the international forces more precedence and a permanent presence in Sinai for protection
reasons. Unlike the cease-fire signed following the Suez War of 1956 which gave Egypt
the right to remove the international forces, this treaty stipulated that these forces “will
not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United
Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.”392 Attacks against the
treaty intensified especially from Egyptian journalists writing in papers published in the
Gulf States. In Egypt al-Daawa continued publishing intense articles warning against
normalization, which would facilitate Israeli penetration into the Egyptian and Arab
cultural fabric. Further articles criticized the trend of promoting Israel as the only
advanced country in the region and warned against the ramifications of Egypt’s isolation
from the Arab world.393 The regime first retaliated by issuing the Morality Law of 1980
that “defined certain actions as attempts to disturb the social peace and alarm public
sensitivities.”394 Law 148 of 1980 posed several restrictions on the press and eventually
facilitated the arrest and dismissal of hundreds of journalists.395 By August 1981 al-

391. Camp David Frame Works for Peace (September 17, 1978) in Laqueur and Rubin, eds. The Israel
Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, [Full Text: 222-227] 227, Article (A) of
Section (C) “Stationing Forces”
392. Ibid. Article (D) of Section (C) under the topic “Stationing of Forces”
393. Al-Daawa, May 1980
394. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 264
395. Ibid. 264

113

Daawa and al-Shaab were closed followed by the arrest of several members from alTagamuu party. The regime’s onslaught on the press known also as “Autumn of Fury”
culminated with promulgating Article 74 of the constitution concerning the state of
emergency.396 This article allowed enacting several extreme measures to protect social
security in cases of emergencies, a state that obviously did not exist during the clash with
the press during September 1981. Despite the decisive curtail of freedoms and the
imprisonment of hundreds of journalists including members of the Press Syndicate’s
executive council, the official press “applauded these measures as a “new revolution.”397
The official press on the other side firmly subscribed to the regime’s discourse
and constantly promoted its views and policies. For instance, following the Jerusalem trip
the official press ran headlines supporting the forthcoming peace talks and at the same
time attacking the rejectionist front. On 10 December 1977 Akhbar al-Youm ran several
declarations made by Sadat warning that anyone who had insulted the Egyptian people
will be forbidden from entering Egypt, adding that the rejectionists who convened in
Tripoli are searching for a fake leadership and motivated by hatred and envy. 398 On 12
December 1977 al-Ahram published another headline quoting Sadat stating that he
severed diplomatic relations with the Arab states that participated in the Tripoli summit
to prove their insignificance. He also accused the Syrian Baath of pressuring Arafat to
reject the peace initiative.399 Further the official press disregarded the voice of the
opposition whether domestically or regionally and focused instead on reporting the wide
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approval given to the initiative.400 The press coverage in this sense became onedimensional stressing all views agreeing with the regime’s discourse while belittling and
strongly attacking any opposition. For instance, Akbar al-Youm, al-Ahram and alJumhuriyah ran headlines reporting the arrival of a Palestinian delegate from Gaza
followed by other delegates from other Palestinian cities declaring their full support of
Sadat’s initiatives.401 AL-Akhbar also ran declarations made by the head of the Gaza
delegate stating that Sadat’s initiative had finally revived the hopes of the people of
Palestine. Al-Ahram ran other headings quoting declarations made by the Palestinian
delegation from Rafah and Gaza stating that the rejecting minority are puppets to the
Soviets.402 Other headings quoted Sadat’s claim that his initiative was motivated by from
ending the struggle of the Palestinians whereas the rejectionists preferred empty slogans.
He also called on the rejectionists to stop manipulating the PLO.403
In one of his articles, Youssef al-Sibai wrote that the popular reception which
greeted Sadat upon his return from his visit to the United States was the best response to
the rejectionists’ anti-Sadat propaganda. He argued that peace was the choice of the
Egyptians themselves who supported and identified with Sadat and his initiative. He
claimed that those millions sent a decisive message to the rejectionist front, stressing that
Egypt unlike them has no history of betrayal. 404 Additionally, al-Mousawar magazine ran
400. Al-Akhbar 18 June 1978: “Kissinger: Sadat’s Jerusalem trip is a historical event which shows great
courage and wisdom,” al-Akhbar 4 December 1977: “The former French Prime Minister Mendes France
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several editorials harshly attacking the rejectionist front, claiming that their conspiracy
against Egypt dates back to years prior to the Jerusalem visit. The article argues that the
conspiracy aimed at maintaining the continuity of the no-war no-peace situation so they
keep outbidding each other while the Palestinian refugees suffer in their camps. The
article claimed that the rejectionists intended to nourish the internal strife in Egypt in an
effort to abort its newly found democracy which in turn threatens the dictatorships in
Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen.405 Musa Sabri emphasized a similar argument by stressing
that the Arab states were threatened by a strong Egypt, they instead wished that Egypt
would always remain besieged by wars and internal economic troubles. He stressed that
Sadat did not seek a unilateral deal, nor forced any Arab leader to join his initiative since
he realized that the Arabs are more interested in posturing.406 Another article called on
the Arab peoples of the rejectionist states to rise and bring down their leaders who
ruthlessly rule them.407 Further, in his column entitled “Smoke in the Air” Galal al-Din
al-Hamamsy wrote that some Arab states dealt with Sadat’s peace initiative from a
narrow perspective. He emphasized that Egypt and the Egyptian people have suffered
alone and sacrificed a lot and that the time had come to focus on Egypt and solve its
chronic problems. He also insisted that Egypt was capable of overcoming present or
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future problems without relying on any external support.408 Helmi Salem wrote another
article entitled “The Warriors of Words” he questioned the motivations of the
rejectionists and their anti-Sadat campaign, and insisted that they have enough manpower, financial, and military resources to wage a war against Israel. He argued that
apparently it was Egypt’s fate to fight and sacrifice its blood and resources to fight their
wars. He also accused the Egyptian opposition of betraying their nation and selling their
conscience for worthless Iraqi and Libyan Dinars.409 Ibrahim Seada in his weekly column
“Last Column” criticized the Nasserist and leftist opposition for their anti-Sadat
declarations. He argued that their rhetoric was outdated and contradictory. He concluded
his comment by reminding the opposition that the freedom of speech they enjoyed was
the by-product of Sadat’s democracy insisting that they would have been crushed had
they dared to oppose the Nasserist regime.410 Other articles attacked the Soviet Union’s
stance on Sadat’s peace initiative. In his column “An Idea,” Mustafa Amin criticized the
Soviets as hesitant and contradictory. He explained that when Egypt decided to go to war
the Soviets advised against it, and when Egypt chose peace they asked for war. Amin
argued that the Soviets acknowledged Israel as a state five minutes after the Americans,
adding that the Soviets refused to supply Egypt with vital arms and pressured Sadat to
declare an immediate cease-fire. He stated that those same Soviets who attack Sadat now
advised Nasser following the 1967 defeat that peace is the right choice. The Soviets
argued then, that it is impossible to cross the Canal without an atomic bomb. He
408. Al-Akhbar, November 11, 1977 “Civilized Steps and Looking Forward to the Better” [Arabic Source]
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concluded his article by stressing that Egypt’s crime is that it refuses to be enslaved by
the Soviets.411
Amin’s remarks reflected the same stance adopted by the regime during that
period. For instance, al-Ahram quoted Sadat accusing Moscow of spear-heading a
manipulative campaign to raise doubts and pressure Egypt to reject the peace initiative.
He also accused the Soviets of fabricating the separate deal rumors to divide the Arab
world. He added that during Egypt’s crisis the Soviets refused to sell much needed wheat,
and they still refused to sell Egypt any arms or spare parts. 412 Al-Akhbar ran other
declarations by Sadat insisting that the Soviets supply Syria with weapons that remained
unused in storage while denying Egypt any military support. He emphasized that the
Soviets chose Syria over Egypt because they knew that Syria cannot face Israel on its
own.413 The same argument was repeated in “al-Ahram Comment” which accused the
Soviet Union of disrupting the region and spreading strife and disunity for its own
ends.414 Another article entitled “Moscow Attacks” criticized the Soviet propaganda
against the Camp David negotiations. The article warned against the Soviet conspiracy
against the Arab world calming that their sole goal is to fuel tensions across the region in
order to keep spreading communism and sell arms.415
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The official press maintained the same pattern of coverage following the signing
of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian – Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979.
Following his return from Camp David, the three official papers ran multiple headlines
reporting the massive popular reception greeting Sadat and proclaiming him the hero of
peace.416 Also, the periodicals published by the official religious establishment al-Azhar
had to follow the regime’s footsteps by devoting several issues of al-Din wa al-Hayat
(Religion and Life) to promote and justify the peace treaties. The sheikhs in all mosques
had to follow the government’s political line.417 This is due to the fact that since the
1960s, al-Azhar came under the government’s supervision to make sure that their
religious output conforms to the regime’s political and religious discourse. Further, the
press devoted much space to report on international reactions to Sadat and the peace
process.418 Additionally, the press maintained a hardline against the rejectionist front. A
repeated set of accusations dominated the official press of that era. Such accusations
included labeling the rejectionists as Soviet agents and puppets envious of Egypt. Other

Ahram on 6 December 1977 claimed that the Arabs are ignorant and unable to comprehend anything
[Arabic Source]
416. Al-Akhbar 22 September 1978: “Hundreds of Thousands Greet Sadat Upon his Return from the
Journey of Peace”, Akhbar al-Youm 23 September 1978: “ The President Arrives to Cairo Today: Egypt
Prepares a Magnificent Reception for its Hero,” al-Ahram 23 September 1978: “The People Came from all
over Egypt to Great Sadat”, al-Akhbar 24 September 1978: “International Radios Report: the Egyptian
People gave Sadat a Heroic Reception”, Akhbar al-Youm April 1, 1979: “The Entire Nation goes to Cairo,”
the editorial describes how the Egyptian people came from all over Egypt to great their leader who signed
the Peace Treaty in the name of the entire nation. [Arabic Sources]
417. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 251
418. Al-Akhbar 20 November 1979: “Top American Commentator: Sadat’s Initiative created a Deep
Change in History,” al-Ahram 18 December 1978: “The Head of the European Parliament: the Peace
Initiative deeply touched the Europeans and gained their appreciation, only peace can achieve social
advancement for all our people”, al-Akhbar 24 December 1979: “The Peace Initiative is the most important
event of the 1970s,” al-Ahram 28 March 1978: “The American public opinion supports Sadat’s policy,” alAhram 10 November 1978 quotes the French Express stating: “Sadat is a man of bravery and peace,”
Akhbar al-Youm: “in France too Sadat is the man of the year 1978,” al-Akhbar 18 January 1980 quoted an
American magazine saying: “Sadat appeared in a time where the world is in need for real leaders,” alAhram 8 October 1978 reported that a German magazine had chosen Sadat as the most important
international personality, Roz al-Yusif magazine 30 October 1978 also reported in detail the news of Sadat
winning the Nobel Prize for Peace along with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin [Arabic Sources]
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unflattering comments claimed that the Arabs want Egypt to fight till the last solider and
blamed Egypt’s dire economy on its wars on behalf of the Arabs.419 In his column “Word
from the Editor” Abdel Hamid Abdel Ghani wrote “Egypt and the Arabs after the Camp
David Conference.” He argued that the conference and the accords signed created new
realities and gained worldwide support. He then proceeded to attack the rejectionists and
their declarations dismissing them as irrelevant and unable to influence the Egyptian
people. Abdel Ghani also emphasized the sacrifices Egypt endured over the course of
four wars against Israel. Those wars resulted in the death of over hundred thousand
Egyptians along with spending millions of pounds in military purchases to defend the
Arab region ultimately crippling the Egyptian economy and burdening it with heavy
debts.420 Blaming Egypt’s economic distress on wars against Israel became a recurring
theme that the regime deployed to win over the people with the promise that peace would
bring economic prosperity. For instance, a couple of months after the signing of the 1979
peace treaty, a report described how it had revived the economic sector and attracted
investments in different economic arrays.421 By equating domestic economic prosperity
with peace, the regime sought to justify the peace settlement and allure the population.
419. Al-Ahram 5 November 1978 Sadat stated that “The Egypt of October is always capable of isolating
without being isolated” adding that “Egypt restored the Arabs their dignity and sacrificed its human and
financial resources in a time when they did nothing but outbid each other” he also accused the Soviet Union
of devoting most its efforts to destroy peace in the region, al-Ahram 6 August 1979 published headlines
quoting Sadat stating that “there must be a new policy in dealing with the Arabs without compliments,
adding that it was the Egyptian blood which doubled the prices of oil and enriched the Arabs. He insisted
that Egypt is capable of building itself depending on its own resources, civilization, and its international
status. In Akhbar al-Youm 23 September 1978, Seada wrote “Listen Arabs” where he viciously attacked the
Arab regimes attacking the Camp David Accords describing them as self-centered, delusional, and nothing
but a herd of walking corpuses who failed to liberate their land and yet proclaim that they will liberate
others’ land. He said that Egypt offered a comprehensive peace deal to the entire conflict, but since they
had rejected this offer then it is their own responsibility to restore those rights by themselves. He concluded
by stating that no one can threaten the Egyptian people who had already made up their decision and chose
peace, insisting that the Arabs are the ones who need Egypt and not the other way round whether they
accept or reject this reality [Arabic Sources]
420. Akhbar al-Youm 23 September 1978 [Arabic Source]
421. Al-Akhbar 19 November 1979: “How Peace benefited the Egyptian Economy” [Arabic Source]
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The regime orchestrated double-edge press propaganda. On one hand, official press
launched an anti-Arab campaign and dismissed them as envious and ungrateful. On the
other hand, the press repeatedly stressed Egypt’s human and financial sacrifices. The
Egyptians, were thus, made to believe that their economic distress resulted solely from
external factors (the wars against Israel). The Egyptians had also to believe that the Arabs
were not only ungrateful but they collaborated against the wellbeing of their country.
This campaign attempted to distance the Egyptians emotionally and mentally from the
Arab world and turn inward. This stance echoed Sadat’s Egypt First rhetoric, and acted as
a justification to his unwillingness to invest and lead the Arab world.
The official press coverage in the period between 1975 and 1981 witnessed
turbulent political events. The official press remained captive to the state, just as it was
under Nasser, albeit with different directions and priorities. During the Nasser era the
press adopted the regime’s anti-imperial anti-Western discourse while emphasizing Arab
nationalism and non-alignment. Further, the press mirrored the regime’s rhetoric in
moments of political tension between Egypt and other Arab regimes as for instance the
cases of the Baghdad Pact and the Rogers Plan debacle. Similarly, the official press
during the Sadat era shifted its course and adopted the new regime’s discourse. Sadat’s
regime used the press to dismantle several Nasserist foundations especially those of
socialism and foreign policy. The official press played vital role in promoting the peace
initiative with Israel. The press fully adopted the regime’s discourse, viciously attacking
all kinds of opposition and dismissed them as Soviet agents collaborating against the
wellbeing of Egypt. The press in both eras lacked freedom and diversity, and was more
repetitive propaganda than journalism. The press was confined and lacked neutrality. The
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following section will be looking at the image of the Palestinians in the official Egyptian
press during the Sadat era with special emphasis on the second half of the 1970s, which
witnessed a rapid deterioration in Egyptian-Palestinian relations in the wake of the
Jerusalem journey and the peace initiative which, soon followed.
Palestine in the Egyptian Press during the Sadat Era
The image of Palestine remained stable during the first half of the 1970s with
official statements stressing Egypt’s commitment to a just solution to the Palestine cause.
The three official papers maintained running headlines stressing that the PLO is the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, that the Palestinian cause is at the
heart of the Arab – Israeli conflict, and that peace cannot be achieved without the
complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and Jerusalem.422 Prior to the October
War the official press gave wide coverage to Palestinian guerrilla operations. For
instance, the Munich incident of 1972 when a militant group from the PLO known as
Black September organized an attack on Israeli athletes gained wide coverage and
support from the major official papers.423 Al-Ahram published the news of the attack on
its front pages; the headlines stated that the incident is not an act of murder but a result of
the Israeli pressures exerted on the people of Palestine. In a sense, the title implied that
the operation is a sign of despair rather than an act of resistance. This shift in tone tried to
downplay the futility of resistance in favor of negotiations. Other headlines argued that

422. Al-Akhbar 9 June 1971, al-Jumhuriyah 8 September 1972, al-Ahram 13 March 1977, al-Ahram 11
March, 1975, al-Ahram 21 November 1977, al-Akhbar 28 October 1975, al-Ahram 22 March 1977, alAhram 9 February 1978, al-Akhbar 10 December 1978, al-Ahram 29 November 1978, al-Akhbar 9 March
1979 [Arabic Sources]
423. The group demanded the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails in return of the
hostages. However, a secret attempt to rescue the hostages ended with their murder. “Olympics Massacre:
Munich – The Real Story,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/olympics-massacre-munich-the-real-story-524011.html#, published on 22 January, 2006
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the fedayeen were the victims of an Israeli intelligence trap and accused Germany of
giving in to American-Israeli pressures. Further articles published in both al-Ahram and
al-Akhbar defended the fedayeen arguing that the operation came as a response to Israeli
violence and transgressions; the conclusion was that a just solution to the Palestine
problem is the only way to put an end to such operations. 424 The official press also did
not refrain from covering Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets while covering news of the
October war at the same time.425
However, after the signing of the cease-fire and beginning in November 1973 the
pace of coverage decreased in the face of prospects of an impending peace conference
and a possible Palestinian delegation. During this period the official papers emphasized
the necessity of Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinian right to self-determination and an
independent state. Nonetheless, none of the papers managed to provide a clear
comprehensive idea explaining the means to achieve the desired peace plan.426 Slight
cracks in Egyptian-Palestinian relations began surfacing prior to the singing of the
Second Sinai Accord, when Sadat refused to meet with a PLO delegation in response to
Arafat’s unflattering declarations.427 In, 1975 Lebanese civil war began along with Syrian
intervention and the massacre of the Palestinian refugees in Tel al-Zaater. The Egyptian
press openly attacked the Syrian regime and accused it of coordinating attacks with
Israel. However, after settling the political differences between Sadat and Hafez al-Assad

424. Al-Ahram 7 September 1972, al-Akhbar 7-8 September 1972 [Arabic Sources]
425. Al-Ahram 19 October 1973 (news about Israel submitting a complain to the UN because of the rising
rates of guerrilla attacks), al-Akhbar published on 19 October 1973 a headline on its first page reporting
that the Palestinian fighters had managed to carry 107 operations inside Israel, on 21 October, 1973 the
paper published a report summarizing the most important Palestinian operations against Israeli targets
during the October war and the locations of each operations [Arabic Sources]
426. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 259
427. Al-Akhbar 28 February 1975 [Arabic Source]
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those accusations disappeared from the official press. Further, the Egyptian press did not
criticize the American intervention in Lebanon; it maintained a positive stance toward the
United States. The regime clearly sought to improve ties with the United States and
secure its sponsorship of the impending peace talks.428 Further, following announcing his
peace initiative, Sadat openly criticized the PLO’s stance claiming that by joining the
rejectionists whom he dismissed as terrorists the PLO thwarted all efforts to achieve
peace. The leaders of the PLO, he added, had forgotten about their prisoners in Israeli
jails, they preferred to live abroad and use terrorism in the name of being
revolutionaries.429 Accusing the PLO of terrorism marked a significant departure from the
Nasserist discourse which hailed the resistance movement as the noblest outcome of the
1967 defeat. Sadat belittled the significance of such militant operations and obviously
shifted to the Israeli-American stance regarding the PLO and its military operations.
Nonetheless, the official press continued reporting on the Palestinian military
operations, stressing that Egypt fully supports the Palestinian resistance and condemns
the violent Israeli repression and terrorism. The press also emphasized that a just and
comprehensive peace settlement was the only way to put an end to those operations.
However, a major change of tone emerged by late 1977, early 1978 in the months leading
to the Camp David Conference. The official press began turning a blind eye to most PLO
operations except for those that were impossible to ignore. For instance, the resistance
carried a major operation inside Tel Aviv in which the fedayeen hijacked three buses
killing thirty Israelis and wounding seventy others. The three official papers covered the
operation on their first pages. However, unlike the late 1960s and early 1970s when the
428. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 259-260
429. Al-Ahram 28 December 1977 [Arabic Source]
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press endorsed, justified, and fully supported the Palestinian resistance, the tone of this
coverage coincided with the regime’s “peace” discourse. For the first time the headlines
used the term “armed men” instead of the usual Palestinian fedayeen. The reports
depended on Israeli and foreign sources, while overlooking the PLO’s account. Several
editorials explained that the operation was a sign of desperation, not resistance. By
arguing that peace was the only guarantee for security, the press seemed to directly
address the Israeli public with an unusually sympathetic tone.430
Egyptian-Palestinian relations continued to deteriorate following Abu Nidal’s
assassination of Youssef al-Sibai the Minister of Culture and the head of the Board of
Directors of al-Ahram on 18 February 1978 in Cyprus. The murder resulted in a massive
attack on Palestinians who were now accused of treachery and ingratitude. The following
day al-Ahram wrote under the headline “Black Terrorism” that the perpetrators of the
crime harmed the Palestinian cause; it warned that terrorism would tarnish the nobility of
the Palestinians’ struggle to attain their national rights.431 This heading was the first of its
kind to openly utilize the term “terrorism” in reference to the Palestinian armed resistance
signaling a massive shift in the regime’s official stance and contradicting its discourse
defending and supporting the national rights of the Palestinians.432
The assassination and its aftermath trigged a massive anti-Palestine campaign. For
instance, in a letter sent to al-Ahram Sadat referred to the Palestinian factions as “paid
agents,” threatened severe repercussions, all the while stressing a firm commitment to

430. Al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriyah 12 & 13March 1978 [Arabic Sources], also see Talhami,
Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 260-261
431. Al-Ahram 19 February 1978 [Arabic Source]
432. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 261
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defend Palestinian rights.433 In his speech at the Egyptian soldiers’ funeral Sadat stressed
that Sibai’s murder was an act of treason; he proclaimed that he would go to the end of
the world to avenge Egypt’s dignity. He concluded that while Egypt fought for
Palestinian rights, their leaders acted as agents and paid murderers. Egypt would step
over the “dwarfs” and, no one would dictate or direct Egypt’s will.434 Another editorial
written by Ali Hamdi al-Gammal directly attacked the PLO and Arafat accusing the
organization of going astray and claiming that Arafat is clueless. He added that Arafat
had lost all his legitimacy as a national leader the moment he joined the rejectionist
summit in Tripoli. Gammal claimed that the PLO was lost; its leaders driven by
individual interests and subject to certain Arab regimes serving the Soviets. He concluded
by arguing that only Egypt struggled for Palestine.435 The official press disregarded
Arafat’s condemnation and his repeated declarations stressing his gratitude to all the
Egyptian efforts on behalf of the Palestine cause.436 It also overlooked the fact that “Abu
Nidal had been expelled from Fatah and the PLO with much fanfare in the early 1970s
and was widely known to be their sworn enemy.”437 In this respect al-Ahali although
clearly condemning the assassination directly criticized the regime’s reckless operation in
Larnaca Airport and held it responsible for the death of many innocent soldiers.438
On 28 February 1978 al-Ahram published a summary of the discussions in the
People’s Assembly, which called on reevaluating the status of the Palestinians residing in

433. Al-Ahram 22 February 1978 [Arabic Source]
434. Sadat’s speech during the funeral of the soldiers killed in Cyprus on 22 February, 1978,
http://Sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=709 [Arabic Source]
435. Al-Ahram February 25, 1978 [Arabic Source]
436. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 262
437. El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 56
438. Issues Nos. 4 of 28 February, 1978 and 5 of 1 March, 1978, in Abdel –Razeq, al-Ahali a Newspaper
Under Siege, [al-Ahali Sahifa Tahet al-Hesar], 40-41 [Arabic Source]
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Egypt, while disregarding other reasonable voices which rejected the onslaught on the
Palestinian resistance movement and its leaders.439 Additionally, the three official papers
printed the transcript of Sadat’s interview with an American television station in which
he held the PLO responsible for Sibai’s death despite its broad condemnation.440 Mustafa
Amin wrote that everyone at Sibai’s funeral questioned if this was what Egypt deserved
for its sacrifices. He argued that Egypt alone sacrificed its blood and money so other
Arabs could live. Like so many before him, he blamed Egypt’s poverty and economic
distress on the four wars “waged on the Arab’s behalf.” He went a step further to claim
that Egyptian students had sacrificed their places in schools and universities so that
Palestinians could enjoy free education.441 From thereafter, a new pattern appeared in the
official press that would last until the death of Sadat in 1981. This pattern revolved on the
internal conflicts between the leaders of the Palestinian factions along with promoting the
image of the “bad Palestinian.”442
The press unleashed a defamatory campaign and promoted myths. One such myth
was the claim that Palestinians sold their land to European Jews before 1948 and were
responsible for the nakba. The Arabs, for their part, were represented as ignorant, envious
of a strong and stable Egypt, and wanting to exhaust Egyptian. The leaders of the
Palestinian factions including the PLO were misguided and oblivious agents to these
hostile Arab regimes and the Soviets. Another prominent theme stressed that Palestinians

439. Al-Ahram 28 February 1978 [Arabic Source], October Magazine published an article on 5 March
1978 entitled “No More Privileges for the Palestinians in Egypt,” which basically called for cancelling all
the laws which stipulated treating Palestinians as Egyptian nationals in terms of accessing free education,
working in the public sector, access to free health care, owning agricultural land among other regulations.
440. Al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, and al-Jumhuriyah 3 March 1978 [Arabic Sources]
441. Al-Akhbar 20 February 1978 [Arabic Source]
442. Karem Yehia, “The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-85,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.
16, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), 45-63, 46
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lived abroad like millionaires and used their national cause to gain more profits.443
Indeed, Sadat stated in an interview with Monte Carlo radio that in Egypt there are tens
of thousands of Palestinians and most of them are millionaires.444 Sadat’s remark did not
go unnoticed as the official press started running articles reproducing the image of the
rich Palestinians to provoke resentment among the Egyptian population who were to
believe that while they suffered from economic distress, the Palestinians sucked Egypt’s
wealth.445 This hostile tone mirrored Sadat’s claim that Egypt’s wars on behalf of the
Palestinians destroyed its economy, whereas “peace with Israel would bring prosperity to
Egypt.”446 Besides, the under-lying tone of articles alleging that Palestinian investors are
thriving and growing within Egyptian economy appeared to be an implicit invitation to
the state in order to curb Palestinian enterprises. Surprisingly, this tone flourished at a
time when the opposition press especially al-Daawa repeatedly warned against the
flooding of Israeli products into Egyptian markets. The paper argued such economic
collaboration would eventually empower and sustain Israeli economy. In return it will
destroy the national industrial sector, increases Egypt’s isolation from its Arab
dimension, and foster its economic reliance on American aid. This trend manifested
another glaring departure from Nasserism where Nasser had encouraged Palestinian

443. Ibid. 46
444. Sadat’s interview with Monte Carlo radio on 18 November, 1979,
http://sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=906 [Arabic Source]
445. This trend appeared in two articles published in October Magazine on 13 and 20 May, 1979, the first
one entitled “All these Fortunes for Palestinians Living in Egypt!!,” the article claimed that 19 Palestinian
businessmen owned more than 62 million Egyptian Pounds, the article also alleged that 60% of shops in
Central Cairo and Port Said are owned by Palestinians as well as over 40 agricultural farms. The second
article entitled “19 Palestinians Own 62 Million Egyptian Pounds in Egypt,” the article repeated the same
idea published a week earlier in an obvious attempt to not only enrage the public opinion, but to imply that
the state should interfere against the Palestinian presence in the Egyptian economic sector, in Dajani, The
Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, 95
446. Mustapha K. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians Since 1977,” Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Summer, 1989), 37-51, 39
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investments to break the European-Jewish monopoly over the Egyptian economy during
the first half of the twentieth century till the Suez war of 1956.
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees during the Sadat Era
As explained earlier the legal status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did
not encounter any changes during the first half of the 1970s. The disengagement accords
of 1975 although raising some Egyptian-Palestinian political tensions did not affect the
community’s legal status. However, the official tone toward the Palestinians hardened
prior to Sadat’s Jerusalem trip in November 1977. Palestinian students organized several
rallies against the trip leading to the detention and deportation of hundreds of them and
the permanent ban of the GUPS in Egypt. The assassination of Sibai in February 1978
marked a tragic turn of events against the Palestinians in Egypt, since the regime used the
crime as a pretext to justify curtailing the legal exemptions accorded to the Palestinians
since the Nasser era. The entire Palestinian community faced the repercussions of the
assassination. The regime formulated the unjustified claim that since the perpetrators
were Palestinian so the entire community should be blamed. Accordingly, on 28 February
1978 a ministerial decision stipulated the reconsideration of all regulations treating
Palestinians as nationals. Sadat issued administrative regulations 47 and 48 which
annulled “all regulations treating Palestinians as nationals.”447 In deed during Sibai’s
funeral, the Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Riyad declared that, “no more Palestinians

447. “Palestinian Refugees in Egypt,” http://www.forcedmigration.org/palestinian-refugees-in-egypt.htm ,
see also Maher Bitar, “Unprotected Among Brothers: Palestinians in the Arab World,” Refugee Studies
Centre, Department of International Development (Queen Elizabeth House), University of Oxford,
Working Paper Series, RSC Working Paper No. 44, January 2008, 19-20
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after today.”448 The comment implied that Palestinians were no longer tolerated. In
essence this meant that Palestinians could no longer work in the public sector, entry to
Egyptian universities was restricted, scholarships and tuition subsidies got cancelled
along the access to free health care. Like foreigners, Palestinians had to pay in hard
currency in order to access education or medical care. The organized anti-Palestine
campaign nourished by the regime and the official press led to a decrease in the sense of
solidarity with Palestine among average Egyptians, since the press portrayed the
resistance leaders as rich and corrupt, while blaming the Palestinians for dragging Egypt
into four wars.449 This occurred at a time when Egypt had ratified on 22 May 1981 the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees issued by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).450 Egypt ratified the convention with reservations
to some of its articles. For instance, Egypt had a reservation against Article 12 (paragraph
1) which stated that the personal status of the refugee “shall be governed by the law of
the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his
residence.”451 This article contradicted Article 25 of the Egyptian civil code, which states
that in cases of aliens without a nationality or with more than one nationality “the
Egyptian law must be applied.”452 In essence, there is no contradiction between the
original article and Egyptian concerns since “it is obvious that no refugee with Egyptian

448. Aaron David Miller, Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest,
(New York: Praeger, 1986), 64
449. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State, 61
450. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [Full Text of the Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees], The Official Gazette, Issue No. 48 on 26 November, 1981, it is important to note that when
Egypt ratifies international treaties or conventions they become integrated within the Egyptian legal system
the moment they are published in the official gazette.
451. Ibid. 20
452. Ibid. 20
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citizenship would apply for refugee status from Egypt.”453 Besides, there is nothing that
could hinder applying Egyptian law in case of stateless refugees residing in Egypt.454
Egypt also had reservations regarding Articles 20, 22 (paragraph 1), 23, and 24 of the
convention. Those articles stipulated that the contracting states should accord refugees
the same treatment as nationals in terms of rationing system, elementary education,
public relief, and labor legislation and social security. 455 However, Egyptian authorities
formulated reservations regarding the aforementioned articles which consider the refugee
as equal to the national, preferring instead, to consider granting privileges to refugees on
a case-by-case basis.456
Egyptian officials argued that Egypt’s economic burdens, overpopulation, and
high rates of unemployment were the main reasons the state could not extend those
services to include refugees. Yet, several studies revealed that Egypt’s subsidy program
for instance, suffers from severe mismanagement as it is the costliest program in the
world. Rearranging this program would help integrate refugees within its parameters. 457
In terms of social security [Article 24 (b) and 24 (3)], the convention included Article 24
(b) (paragraph 1), which stipulated that each contracted state has the right to determine
the means of extending the provisions of social security to refugees. 458 The Egyptian
reservation in this sense proves the government’s detached attitude that aims to exclude
refugees from various governmental services. In the case of the right to elementary

453. Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, “Egypt: Towards a culture of Legal Integration? Cairo’s Urban refugees and
Egypt’s reservations to the 1951 Convention,” http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/frontier/storia/koehler.htm, 3
454. Ibid. 3
455. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html 24-26
456. Ibid. 26
457. Derrick, “Egypt: Towards a culture of Legal Integration? Cairo’s Urban refugees and Egypt’s
reservations to the 1951 Convention,” http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/frontier/storia/koehler.htm, 4
458. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, 25
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education [Article 22 (paragraph (1)], the government argued on one hand that public
education in Egypt suffered from grave crises and was unable to stretch its resources to
include refugees. On the other hand, the administrative documents required to apply in
public schools exhausted parents. For instance, obtaining an embassy letter is
inapplicable to stateless refugees. Besides, private schools established specifically to
serve refugees like the Sacred Heart faced several problems enrolling their students in
national exams. These schools, are not recognized by the government, had to pay high
fees for their students to sit for the exams in accredited centers.459 Egypt did not
formulate a reservation against Article 17 of the Convention related to Wage-Earning
Employment, which stipulated that the contracted state should provide refugees with “the
most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same
circumstance, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.”460 However,
the government imposes severe restrictions on hiring refugees under the pretext of
avoiding competition with national labor. Therefore, most refugees in Egypt fail to
acquire legal work permits and they earn their living in the insecure informal sector. 461
Nonetheless, those reservations proved that the Egyptian government is unwilling to
engage directly with refugees’ problems as Egyptian officials regard “refugees as not an
Egyptian problem, it is a problem that comes from abroad.”462 Placing severe legal
barriers on refugees in Egypt cripples assistance programs and refugees are dependent
solely on UNHCR and other NGOs to fulfill their basic needs. The situation of

459. Derrick, “Egypt: Towards a culture of Legal Integration? Cairo’s Urban refugees and Egypt’s
reservations to the 1951 Convention,” http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/frontier/storia/koehler.htm, 5-6
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Palestinian refugees is further complicated because the provisions of the 1951
Convention excluded them from their scope as far as they receive protection from another
UN organization. Palestinian refugees unregistered with UNWRA should fall under the
mandate of UNHCR. But the ambiguity of the text left Palestinian refugees with less
international protection and more vulnerable to host states’ maneuvers. 463 Against this
backdrop the next section will attempt to examine the ways in which political conflicts
affect refugees’ rights and render them vulnerable to the ebb and flow of political
relations.
Residency
In the wake of al-Sibai’s assassination and in a prelude to the Camp David
agreement, most of the laws pertaining to Palestinians’ residency and employment were
either reconsidered or cancelled altogether. The new administrative regulations annulled
all laws and decrees stipulating the equal treatment of Palestinian refugees as Egyptian
nationals. Consequently Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt became classified under
the foreigners’ category; they were required to pay renewal fees for their visas, and to
show a proof of spending a certain amount in hard currency or its equivalent per
month.464 Failure to comply with those regulations could potentially result in
deportation.465 Theses strict provisions were yet another indication of the breach with
Nasserist regulations, since during the 1960s Palestinian refugees did not pay renewal

463. Brenda Goddard, “UNHCR and the International Protection of Palestinian Refugees,” Refugee Survey
Quarterly (2009), 28 (2-3), 475-510
464. Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 153, see also, Asem Khalil,
“Socioeconomic Rights of Refugees: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and
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465. Abbas Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,”
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1996), 36-45, 39-40
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fees.466 Ministerial Decree 280 of 1981 stipulated in Article 3 that an amount of five
Egyptian pounds should be paid upon issuing a residency permit of three years and the
same amount upon its renewal.467 Those conditions increased the financial burdens of the
refugees; those who could not afford those expenses had to live in fear of being deported
on the grounds of being illegally residing in Egypt. 468 Besides, stipulating a threat of
deportation in case of failing to meet any of those provisions contradicts with Article 29
(paragraph 1) of the 1951 Convention, which forbids the contracting states from
imposing any charges or duties upon refugees which are “higher than those which are or
may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.”469 Further, in order to secure a
valid re-entry into Egypt, Palestinians holding Egyptian travel documents and travelled or
resided abroad had to return every six months or provide a proof of employment or
education enrollment, in which case a one-year extension would be allowed.470
Additionally, the government embarked on a policy of detaining and deporting
hundreds of Palestinians especially male young adults under the pretext of preserving
national security; the numbers of those detained or deported remain unspecified.471 The
police would raid Palestinian homes and arrest young males on the basis of mere
suspicion or even rumor. The Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti, for example, was
deported from Egypt in 1977 despite graduating from an Egyptian university, being

466. See chapter (2)
467. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya, Issue No. 26 on 24 February 1981
468. Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, www.forcedmigration.org/Palestinian-refugees-in-egypt.htm
469. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, 28
470. El-Abed, “The Invisible Community: Egypt’s Palestinians,” al-Shabaka Policy Brief (June 2011),
www.al-shabaka.org
471. El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 56
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married to an Egyptian university professor and having his only child born in Egypt. 472
Barghouti writes that he never engaged in politics and did not voice any opposition to
Sadat’s initiatives; his deportation “was a preventative deportation, the result of a false
accusation put together, as we found out after several years, by a colleague in the Union
of Palestinian Writers.”473 He describes the humiliating process: six agents from the State
Security Services arrived at his home took him to the Passport Department in the Tahrir
compound in downtown Cairo. Later the same night the officers took him back to his
home to pack his bags and accompanied him to the airport. During this whole process
Barghouti remained handcuffed until boarding the plane when the officers finally took
the handcuffs off his wrists.474 Barghouti would remain banned from entering Egypt until
the mid-1990s.
The case of Barghouti and other hundreds of Palestinians reveals the vulnerability
of refugees to political tides, arbitrary deportation, and the lack of efficient protection
frameworks. The regime would repeatedly cite preserving national security as an easy
pretext to justify cases of deportation. In this respect no clear information exist explaining
the investigation process, the validity of the charges, and whether or not the defendant
had a proper legal representation before passing the expulsion verdict. Instead all
deportation decrees follow the same identical format citing the phrase “for reasons related
to national security and public order.”475 From a legal perspective arbitrary expulsion is

472. Mourid Barghouti, I Saw Ramallah, translated by Ahdaf Soueif, (Cairo: The American University in
Cairo Press, 2000), 89
473. Ibid. 90
474. Ibid. 90
475. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya, Minister of Interior Resolution No. 827 of 1978 [the decree stipulated the
deportation of two Palestinians], Issue No. 121 on 24 May, 1978, Minister of Interior Resolution No. 845
of 1978, Issue No. 133 on 7 June, 1978 [this decree stipulated the deportation of seventeen Palestinians all
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forbidden and clearly contradicts Egyptian and international laws. In Egypt article 26 of
Law 89 of 1960 forbade the deportation of special-residency foreigners (Palestinians fall
under this category) unless a special committee had clear substantial evidence that such
person poses a credible threat to national security.476 On the international level Article 32
(paragraph 2) of the 1951 Convention stipulated that the decision to expel a refugee
should go through the appropriate legal process. The article also stipulated that in cases
where there are no compelling reasons threatening national security, the refugee “shall be
allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the
purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the
competent authority.”477
Education
During the Nasser era Palestinian students enjoyed the same treatment as
Egyptian nationals in terms of free education and scholarships. This consequently led to
an increase in Palestinian enrollment in Egyptian schools and universities since the
graduates could join the public sector without any discrimination. However, this situation
changed altogether after the assassination of Sibai. Presidential Decrees 47 and 48 of
1978 annulled all legal provisions equating Palestinian refugees with Egyptian nationals
in terms of employment, education, and health care. Consequently Palestinian students
were treated as foreigners and had to pay for their tuition in private schools in foreign
currency (an amount ranging between 600-1200 Sterling pounds). Those conditions even

of them were students], Minister of Interior Resolution No. 1312 of 1980, Issue No. 176 on 29 July, 1980
[this decree stipulated the deportation of one Palestinian] [Arabic Sources]
476. See chapter (2)
477. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, 29
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included those holding permanent residency statuses.478 Also, Palestinian students
became forbidden from enrolling in certain colleges such as medicine, pharmacology,
science, politics, economics, and journalism.479 By contrast, during the Nasser era
Palestinian students could join such faculties in the same manner as Egyptian nationals.
The only students exempted from Sadat’s restrictive laws were the ones whose parents
worked for either the ‘Ayn Jaloot Units (PLA units stationed in Egypt), or the public
sectors in Gaza.480 Further, despite the fact that newly issued laws should not be
retroactive, these particular laws included a retroactive clause. Enrolled students had to
abide by the new rates in order to receive a graduation certificate.481 Such restrictions led
to a significant drop in the numbers of Palestinian students in Egypt and threatened to
cause an increase in the rates of illiteracy since many of the families could not afford the
elevated fees.482 Palestinian males reaching the age of eighteen risk deportation if they
fail to show a proof of either employment or education enrollment.483 The following table
shows the number of Palestinian students enrolled in Egyptian universities (graduating
classes and those enrolled in post-graduate studies) during the period from 1970 till 1981
to illustrate the impact of the restrictions imposed on accessing public education.484

478. Yassin, “Palestinians in Egypt,” (Summer, 1999), www.badil.org/en/al-majdal/item/486-palestiniansin-egypt
479. Ibid.
480. Ibid. http://www.idsc.gov.ps/sites/STATE/arabic/roya/27/page11.html
481. Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” 43
482. Yassin, “The Palestinians in Egypt,” 26, also see Mohammad al-Kodosy, “The Ghost of Illiteracy
Threatens 24 thousand Palestinian Student in Egypt,” al-Saab newspaper on 4 February, 1992
483. Khaled Walid, “Palestinians in Egypt,” [al-Filastinyoun fi Misr], 11-12-2005,
http://www.alqudscenter.org/arabic/pages.php?local_type=1288&local_details=2&id1=390&menu_id=10
&cat_id=2 [Arabic Source]
484. Hassan Abu Taleb, Egypt’s Arab Relations, 1970-1981 (The Sadat Era), [Elakat Misr al-Arabiya,
1970-1981 (Marhalet al-Sadat)], (Beirut: Markaz Derasat al-Wehda al-Arabiya, February 1998), 187
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Further restrictions would later shut off Palestinian students from pursuing post-graduate
studies in public universities.485
Table (1): Palestinian students enrolled in graduating classes and post-graduate studies:
1970
3551

1971
4031

1972
3570

1973
5107

1974
5749

1975
6589

1976
7930

1977 1978 1979
11739 10601 8680

1980
7616

1981
3915

The previous numbers show a steady increase during the period from 1970 till
1977, then starting in 1978 at the peak of the Egyptian-Palestinian crisis; the numbers
began to decrease reaching their lowest in 1981. From 1979 until 1985 the rate of
education scholarships provided to Palestinian students decreased dramatically to reach
only eleven scholarships (constituting two percent of the total scholarships) compared for
instance with 312 scholarships given to the Sudanese students (fifty-one percent) or
students coming from Northern Yemen with a total of 113 scholarships (eighteen
percent).486 The following table shows the number of Palestinian students accepted in
Egyptian universities during the period from 1970 till 1981.487
Table (2): Palestinian students accepted in Egyptian universities between years 19701981:
70/71
190

71/72
221

72/73
267

73/74
1272

74/75
1335

75/76
2340

76/77
2629

77/78
1397

78/79
340

79/80
434

80/81
415

The numbers again show a steady increase in enrollment reaching its height in the
academic year 1976/1977. A noticeable decline appears in 1977/1978 and the lowest rate
occurred during the academic year 1978/1979. The numbers showed a slight increase
between 1979 and 1981 but fell far below the ratings prevailing during the 1950s, 1960s,
485. Dajani, The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, 46-47
486. Abu Taleb, Egypt’s Arab Relations, 1970-1981 (The Sadat Era), 194
487. Ibid. 192
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and the first half of the 1970s. Egypt is a signatory to the Casablanca Accords of 1965
which stipulated treating Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries in the same manner
accorded to nationals. Those provisions remained theoretical without any practical
frameworks ensuring their application regardless of any political tensions that might
occur between the host state and Palestinian factions.
Employment and Property Ownership
Following the assassination debacle and the issuing of administrative decrees 47
and 48 of 1978 annulling all regulations treating Palestinians as nationals, Palestinian
refugees faced an employment crisis. The Ministry of Labor issued a warning against
hiring foreigners including Palestinians. The Ministry also forbade them from working in
commerce and the import and export of goods with the exception for those married to
Egyptian women for more than five years.488 Further, the department of Immigration,
Passports and Nationality stamped all Palestinian travel documents or residency permits,
“forbidden from being hired whether with or without payment.”489 Additionally, Article
16 (paragraph 1) of Law 48 of 1978 related to the work in the public sector, along with
Article 26 of Labor Law 137 of 1981 stipulated that hiring foreigners should depend on
observing the condition of reciprocal treatment, which is obviously inapplicable to
stateless refugees.490 Decree 25 of 1982 relating to the conditions for issuing work
permits for aliens stipulated in Article 3 that granting work permits should not constitute
competition to national manpower. The qualifications and the professional experience of
the alien worker should conform to the requirements of the profession for which the

488. Yassin, “The Palestinians in Egypt,” 29
489. Ibid. 29
490. The Official Gazette, Issue No. 33 on 13 August, 1981 [Arabic Source]
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permit is requested. The decree also gave priority to aliens born and permanently residing
in Egypt. Article 4 stipulated that the number of alien workers in any establishment
should not exceed ten percent of the total workforce. Article 5 (sections A & B)
stipulated that the required fees to issue a work permit for the first time is one-hundred
Egyptian pounds with a renewal fee of fifty Egyptian pounds. 491 Such requirements
complicated the process of securing a legal job in Egypt; many refugees either left to the
Gulf States or joined the informal market which lacks any official protection or
supervision.
Decree 52 of 1978 related to the conditions and regulations of exempting
Palestinians from obtaining a work permit as stipulated in Article 1 that Palestinians
holding valid Egypt travel documents were exempted from acquiring a work permit.492
Nonetheless, this decree did not provide much help, since the regulations governing
obtaining travel documents and renewing residency permits became increasingly
complicated. Besides, most of the refugees in Egypt arrived after the 1967 war; thus, they
fall under category (H) which stipulates that residency permits for this category are valid
for three years depending on the prevailing Egyptian entry laws.493 This category also
required in case of residing outside Egypt to return every six months to secure a valid reentry.494 It could be concluded that the revised Egyptian labor laws did not differentiate
between foreigners and refugees. Despite being a signatory to the 1951 Convention, the
Egyptian government did not introduce any legal amendments to comply with the
491. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya, Issue No. 36 {a follow-up issue} on 13 February, 1982 [Arabic Source], also
see Decision No. 22 of 1981 relating to the fees required to issue work permits for foreigners, published in
the Official Gazette, Issue No. 127 on 31 May, 1981
492. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya, Issue No. 53 on 4 March, 1979 [Arabic Source]
493. See chapter (2)
494. El-Abed, “The Invisible Community: Egypt’s Palestinians,” al-Shabaka Policy Brief (June 2011),
www.al-shabaka.org
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provisions of the said convention. For instance, the government did not abide by the
provisions of Articles 17 and 18 related to wage-earning employment and selfemployment. The first article stipulated that the contracted state should provide refugees
with the most favorable treatment accorded to other foreign nationals in the same
circumstances in terms of engaging in wage-earning employment. The second article
stipulated that the contracted state should provide a refugee with the most favorable
treatment “as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry,
handicrafts, and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.”495 The
convention also stipulated in Article 7 that the contracted state should consider exempting
refugees from observing the condition of legislative reciprocity. 496 The Egyptian
government passed decrees prohibiting Palestinian refugees from engaging in selfemployment including commerce and import.497 Insisting on the reciprocity condition
effectively shut out Palestinian refugees from joining the official labor market.
Property ownership did not fare better. Law 81 of 1976 related to organizing
owning property by foreigners forbade in its first article any foreigners from owning both
buildings and vacant lands. The only exemptions provided in Article 2 included buildings
owned by diplomatic consulates or other cases that could qualify for an exemption
depending on the approval of the cabinet. The conditions applying for that case include:
owning one property for personal use and transferring the price of the said property into
foreign currency.498 Additionally, Law 136 of 1981 stipulated that aliens renting
properties would have their contracts revoked upon the expiration of their residency
495. www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, 22-23
496. Ibid. 17-18
497. Laws No. 120 and 121 of 1982 prohibited aliens from engaging in commerce-intermediary as well as
prohibiting them from registering in the list of importers.
498. The Official Gazette on 14 August 1976 [Arabic Source]
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permits. Article 17 stated that in case the foreigner was married to an Egyptian woman,
she and her children would retain the contract unless they have permanently left the
country.499 Those laws again did not differentiate between foreigners and refugees in
contradiction with Articles 13 and 21 of the 1951 Convention related to movable and
immovable property and housing respectively. Article 13 stipulated that the contracted
state should accord refugees the most favorable treatment regarding the acquisition “of
movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and
other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.”500 Article 21 stipulated that
the contracted state should provide the refugees residing in its territory with the most
favorable treatment accorded in matters related to housing.501 Further, Law 143 of 1981
banned foreigners from owning desert lands.502
Conclusion
To conclude, the present chapter attempted to look at the Sadat era with the
purpose of analyzing the impact of political tensions on Egypt’s Palestinian community.
The Sadat era witnessed several major political events starting with the October war of
1973 through the singing of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty of 1979 and ending with Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The first half of the
1970s did not witness any social or legal changes in the status of Palestinian refugees
residing in Egypt. The Sinai Accords of 1975 created some political tensions between
Sadat’s regime and the PLO, yet this did not affect the Palestinian community. However,

499. Abdu Allah Khalil, “The Egyptian Legislation related to the Refugees,”{The Refugees and the Law in
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rapid deteriorations occurred starting with the Jerusalem trip in 1977, which led to the
permanent ban of the GUPS and the deportation of hundreds of Palestinian students and
writers. The assassination of Sibai in early 1978 became a crisis for the Palestinian
refugees who faced the regime legal retaliation. The official press after the assassination
and in a prelude to the impending Camp David conference waged an anti-Palestinian
campaign stressing their ingratitude, blaming Egypt’s economic problems on its
sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians, and stressing that peace with Israel was the only
way to achieve the promised economic prosperity. The backlash against the Palestinian
refugees clearly illustrate the ways in which political conflicts are utilized as a pretext to
revoke whatever regulations exist and hold the state accountable to its refugee
community. The second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s witnessed the issuing of
several restrictive laws treating Palestinian refugees as any other foreigners residing in
the country regardless of their statelessness. Such laws burdened them with extra
financial duties, restricted their movement and effectively excluded them from education,
health care, and employment. Those laws also marked Egypt’s effective withdrawal from
the Casablanca Accords of 1965, as Egypt no longer treats its Palestinians as equal
nationals. Also despite ratifying the 1951 Convention in 1981, the state did not attempt to
reevaluate its legal system or introduce amendments that would comply with the
convention and extend its provisions to its refugees. This attitude shows that the
government is unwilling to engage directly with the refugees. This also shows that the
regime insists on alienating the refugees while approaching them through the security
mentality assuming that refugees are a threat to national security that should be contained
if not eliminated altogether. Indicative of this trend is the fact that the topic of the
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Palestinian refugees in Egypt is handled through the Ministry of Interior. Further, the
case of the Palestinian refugees in Egypt and the discrimination they endured during the
Sadat era show that international conventions remain by and large theoretical and lack
practical means to ensure the implementation of their provisions. It also shows that
despite being a humanitarian non-political case, refugees remain vulnerable to the whims
of the host state, its national and political priorities, and the course of its relations with
Palestinian organizations.
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Chapter Four
The Mubarak Era 1981-2011

Historical background
This chapter examines the era of President Hosni Mubarak stretching for almost
three decades. Mubarak, who commanded Egypt’s air force during the 1973 war served
as Sadat’s vice-president. He was sworn in as president following Sadat’s assassination in
1981.503 Mubarak’s era is essentially a continuation of Sadat’s political discourse. He
maintained peace with Israel, close ties to the United States, as well as strengthening
capitalism and the private sector. The chapter analyzes the regime’s political framework
and the course of Egyptian-Palestinian relations during that period. It also discusses the
legal and social status of Palestinian refugees in Egypt by investigating how fluctuations
in political relations and national priorities affect their rights.
Mubarak commenced his term by declaring a state of emergency. He tightened
surveillance over universities and the press, and arrested many Islamists. But he released
the political prisoners arrested under Sadat.504 In an attempt to gain national trust,
Mubarak promised economic and social reforms, and posed as an advocate of democracy.
He stated that democracy is the best guarantee for a better future declaring his refusal to
long-term presidential rule.505 He explained his belief that a president “should not exceed

503. Goldschmidt Jr. and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 386
504. Ibid. also see Galal Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011, (Cairo: The American
University in Cairo Press, 2011), 143
505. Public Address delivered in April, 1982, cited in Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of
Authoritarian Rule, (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004), 26
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the period of two terms in office,” adding that “I will be the first President to apply such a
rule.”506
While Mubarak’s foreign policy, and in particular with regards to the United
States and Israel, was merely a continuation of Sadat’s, he attempted to consolidate and
legitimize his position through “express[ing] his determination not to visit Israel, and he
gave the impression that he was going to be much more cautious in his relations with the
United States than his predecessor.”507 On 25 April 1982 Egypt retained the rest of Sinai
but talks with Israel stalled. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon forced Mubarak to re-call
the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, transforming ties between the two states into the
condition of so-called “cold peace.”508 Regionally there were significant changes as well,
Egypt received Arafat in 1983 for the first time since the late 1970s, and resumed its
diplomatic relations with the Arab states in 1987.509 In 1989 the Arab League reinstated
Egypt relocating its headquarters to Cairo in 1990.510
Nonetheless, Mubarak did not attempt to alter Sadat’s dependency and alignment
with the United States. Indeed, Egypt kept receiving millions of US dollars in economic
and military aid.511 Such dependency dictated Egypt’s “foreign policy, its policy toward
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the Arabs, its relations with Israel, and its economic policy.”512 This political and military
alignment did not strengthen Egypt’s position. Instead it focused on containing radical
nationalist forces in the region such as the Baathist regime in Syria and Hezbollah in
Lebanon rather than Israel.513 The Egyptian regime maintained its ties with Israel despite
the lack of any tangible progress in peace negotiations. The regime acted passively
toward Israeli aggressions, including the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in
1981, its invasion of Lebanon both in 1982 and 2006, and its bombing of the PLO
headquarters in Tunis on 1 October 1985 in “Operation Wooden Leg.” The Egyptian
regime also failed to react toward the US strike on Libya in 1986. 514 Mubarak appeared
helpless in the face of US demands on Egypt during the second Gulf war, “Operation
Desert Storm,” in 1990-1991.515 The regime dispatched a military unit along with the US
coalition in return for the exemption of some of Egypt’s previous debts and an increase in
aid packages.516 The United States, the Gulf States, and Europe “forgave Egypt around
$20 billion-worth of debt, and rescheduled nearly as much again.”517 Mubarak’s regime
acted as a US ally during the war on Iraq in 2003 known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom”
through providing logistical aid.518
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Mubarak seemed content with Sadat’s foreign policy and did not attempt to alter
its course.519 He believed that Egypt should play the role of a regional mediator
especially between the Arabs and Israel in an attempt to push forward the peace talks.520
This attitude significantly diminished Egypt’s regional status as its foreign policy “was
dependent and subservient to the US administration’s positions, and by extension, those
of Israel.”521 The result was the gradual erosion of Egypt’s influence and its impact on
decisions on the Arab, African, and international level. Cairo’s political and cultural
leadership waned; its participation and contributions in meetings and conferences were
nominal and consistently marked by innumerable abstract declarations. 522 Egypt’s foreign
policy followed a static formula based on selling out its policies in the search for
financial solvency. Egypt utilized its regional and international leverage in its attempts to
resolve its persisting financial problems. The assumption was that foreign policy was a
natural extension to the domestic one. 523
The rapid decline in Egypt’s regional and international status and its
subordination to Washington’s directives paved the way for states like Turkey, Iran, and
Qatar to achieve prominence in Arab and regional affairs. 524 The political decline
coincided with a cultural decline as well. During the first half of the twentieth century
Egypt significantly contributed to culture, literature, and political thought through the
519. Talal Salman, “Can Egypt’s Foreign Policy End its Deference to US-Israeli Goals?,”
http://assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2286&MulhakArticleId=768450&mulhakId=4688
520. “Egypt: The Development of Foreign Policy,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r4156.html , Boutros-Ghali, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post – Sadat Era,” 777-778
521. Talal Salman, “Can Egypt’s Foreign Policy End its Deference to US-Israeli Goals?,”
http://assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2286&MulhakArticleId=768450&mulhakId=4688
522. Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011, 159
523. Mustafa al-Fiki, “Notes on Egyptian Foreign Policy,” http://www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/20f91c4b-d6074489-b38b-66279b7cd0ef.aspx , published on 18 October, 2012
524. Samer Shehata, “The Decline Started with Mubarak,”
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writings of figures such as Taha Hussein, Abbas al-Aqqad, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Naguib
Mahfouz, Ahmed Bahaa al-Dine, and Yusuf Idris. This role greatly diminished during the
past two decades. Egyptian media also failed to compete with the rising Arab satellite
channels like Al-Jazeera. This cultural decline stemmed from Egypt’s mounting political
and economic predicaments including its inability to force its will or deal with political
crises. Egypt became a paralyzed “soft state,” and in turn its intellectual production
lacked both quality and creditability.525
Despite repeatedly denying normalization with Israel, the regime’s policies in
recent years proved quite the contrary. On 14 December, 2004, the Egyptian government
signed the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) treaty with Israel. The treaty stipulated the
establishment of three free-trade zones in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. The textile
products of those areas qualify for customs-duties exemption upon entering US markets
on the condition that they contain at least twelve percent Israeli raw materials. 526 The
treaty was not new; in fact the US first offered it to Egypt and Jordan in 1996. Jordan
singed immediately but Egypt at that time linked its approval to progress on the peace
talks.527 By the early 2000s the government altered its stance and finalized the agreement.
Egyptian officials argued that the treaty would open international markets for Egyptian
products, improve the derailed textile industry, increase revenues, and create new jobs.528
Many Egyptians resented this treaty. It seemed to be another manifestation of the
regime’s subordination to US demands. It also came at a time when peace talks were (as
always it seems) stalled and Israeli hostilities against Palestinians intensified. The
525. Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011, 161
526. Elias Akelah, “QIZ…An Economic Penetration” “al-kouiz…Ikhteraq Iktesady,”
http://www.alarabnews.com/alshaab/2005/07-01-2005/17.htm, [Arabic Source]
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opposition mainly the Leftist parties like al-Tagamuu and the Muslim Brotherhood
further argued that the government acted in isolation from its people by joining
American-Israeli economic alliances. They disputed the regime’s claim that the treaty is
only economic without political dimensions. Criticism against the treaty focused on its
drawbacks including, weakening the national economy and threatening its independence,
strengthening the enemy’s economy, and opening Arab markets to a flood of Israeli
products. The treaty had several economic and political implications. First, it rendered the
national economy vulnerable to Israeli political interests. Second, the treaty mistakenly
implied that the Arab world could co-exist with Israel with the Palestinian resistance as
the only obstacle against such peaceful coexistence.529
But the QIZ was not the only Egyptian-Israeli treaty. In 2005 the Egyptian
government signed a gas-export treaty with Israel. The deal again angered many
Egyptians who argued that Israel received the gas for bargain prices. Critics also
expressed their frustration that the government uses Egypt’s natural resources to sustain
the enemy’s economy.530
By 2005 opposition against Mubarak’s regime increased significantly. The regime
failed on multiple levels. The state of emergency had persisted since 1981. There were
innumerable reports of police brutality against opposition and dissent. The regime rigged
parliamentary elections and suffocated freedom of speech.531 At the onset of his reign,
Mubarak promised to protect democracy and freedom of speech. By the 1990s the regime
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had transformed into an authoritarian structure dominated by Mubarak’s ruling party, the
National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP maintained its majority in all parliamentary
elections with only some token seats for the opposition.532 Before 2005, Egypt never held
presidential elections. Instead there were referendums to approve the president chosen by
the ruling party.533 Due to the growing domestic and international pressures calling for
multi-candidate elections, a referendum to the 1971 constitution introduced article 76 of
2005.534 However, the article included several strict requirements. For instance, the
candidate should secure the approval of 250 elected members of councils and parliament,
all of which are dominated by the NDP. The candidate should also belong to a party
registered with the government for at least five years. At that time no opposition party
could meet those conditions and compete with the NDP’s candidate.535 The NDP also
included in its membership many of the wealthy tycoons who controlled most of the
national economic sector. Social and economic gaps widened significantly. Recent
reports suggested that eighteen percent of the population live under poverty line. The
number increases to forty percent in rural Upper Egypt. 536 The regime barely fought, and
indeed many argued it nourished, state corruption. In 2010 Transparency International
released its Corruption Perceptions Index report (CPI) where Egypt ranked ninety-eight
out of the 178 countries included in that report with a total score of 3.1 out of ten.537
Political, social, and economic frustrations mounted and on 25 January 2011 thousands of
protesters from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds marched to Tahrir
532. Gaëlle Le Roux, “Mubarak: From his Long Reign to his Quick Demise,” published on 25 April, 2011,
http://www.france24.com/en/20110425-mubarak-long-reign-quick-demise-profile
533. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mubarak_era
534. http://www.sis.gov.eg/ar/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=73 [Arabic Source]
535. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mubarak_era
536. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview
537. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results
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Square in Cairo demanding the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime. The protestors voiced
several grievances focusing on political and economic issues including corruption, police
brutality, the state of emergency, as well as high prices, inflation, and increasingly
soaring rates of unemployment.538 Violent clashes erupted between the protesters and the
police in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez leading to the death of over 800 and the injury of
several thousands. On 11 February 2011 Mubarak resigned from his position as a
president and turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).539
Egyptian-Palestinian Relations 1981-2011
Egyptian-Palestinian relations stalled following the signing of the Camp David
Accords and the Peace Treaty. Following Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak in an attempt to
consolidate his power and secure popular legitimacy focused on restoring Arab relations
and limiting Egyptian-Israeli affairs to the diplomatic level.540 The invasion of Lebanon
in 1982 angered Egyptians who believed that the peace treaty had neutralized Egypt and
empowered more Israeli aggression on neighboring Arab states. 541 The Egyptians’
frustration with Camp David stemmed from unmet promises that peace would bring
economic prosperity and a just solution to the Palestine question.542 The President’s
advisors grasped the genuine popular sentiments toward Arab and Palestinian causes.
They believed that extending formal support to the Palestinian cause would enhance the

538. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution
539. Ibid. also see Tignor, Egypt: A Short History, 321-328
540. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,” 40-43
541. “Egypt: The Development of Foreign Policy,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r4156.html
542. Ibid. 39, during the 1980s, Egyptian economy suffered dramatically due to the rising rate of inflation,
the growth of external debt, and the decrease in international prices of oil.
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regime’s legitimacy against the Islamist opposition.543 In December 1983, Arafat visited
Egypt amid the violence of the Lebanese civil war, 1975-1990.544 The visit provided
Mubarak with an opportunity to break the deadlock of Egypt’s isolation from the Arab
world and “assume patronage of the Palestinian resistance.”545 The Egyptian government
believed that Egypt must actively engage in Arab politics and the Palestine question to
secure a bargaining position with both the United States and Israel.546 The regime’s
approach aimed to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement by fulfilling the
prerequisite of Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders on all fronts. 547 In 1984 the NDP
broke its complete silence on the PLO since 1980 and addressed it as the “legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.”548 While the party’s initial program stressed its
full support and commitment to the Camp David Accords, by 1984 the party erased all
reference to that matter from its electoral platform.549
On the public level, the opposition, silenced during the Sadat era, openly
condemned Israeli aggression and expressed solidarity with the Palestinian resistance.
During the summer of 1982 representatives of various opposition parties, the Muslim

543. Ibid. 43
544. During the Lebanese civil war the PLO and the Palestinian refugees were caught-up between the
various quarrelling factions. The clashes engulfed various Lebanese ethnic and social segments including
the PLO which started shelling northern Israel. The Syrian army interfered along with As-Sa’iqa brigade (a
Syrian-controlled wing of the PLA) on the side of the Christian Phalangist forces and imposed a blockade
on Western Beirut which housed most of the Lebanese Muslim population and the Palestinian refugees.
Violent clashes erupted and led to the death of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Tel al-Zaatar massacre
in 1976. The subsequent American-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon destroyed the PLO and forced its
withdrawal from Beirut following the massacre of Sabra and Shatila. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tel_alZaatar_massacre, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabra_and_Shatila_massacre , Goldschmidt Jr. and
Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 389-392, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PLO_in_Lebanon
545. “Egypt: The Development of Foreign Policy,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r4156.html
546. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,”49
547. Hassan A. Barari, “The Al-Aqsa Intifada as seen in Egypt,” Civil Wars, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 2003),
86-106, 88-89
548. Yehia, “The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-85,” 51
549. Ibid. 52
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Brotherhood, trade unions, professional associations, and university professors formed
the National Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian and Lebanese People.550 The
NDP declined to join this committee due to the sensitivity of its position as the ruling
party and its commitment to peace with Israel.551 The committee held several political
meetings discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict, it also tried to raise some funds to help the
victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. However, the committee’s attempts to reach
the masses failed. Fearing that the committee’s activities might unleash social unrest, the
government quickly thwarted their efforts to organize public demonstrations.552
Egyptian popular support increased significantly during the first intifada
(uprising,) of 1987-1993. The uprising against the Israeli occupation began in Jabalya
refugee camp and swiftly spread to include Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.553
Several intertwined factors fueled the Palestinian uprising. These included the persistence
of the Israeli occupation, its systematic brutality and oppression (including mass killing,
detention, and deportation), and the failure of the PLO and the Arab states to achieve any
meaningful progress to alleviate Palestinian suffering.554 The immediate incident serving
as a catalyst for the intifada occurred on 8 December 1987, when an Israeli army tank
transporter ran into a group of Palestinians from Jabalya refugee camp. The incident led
to the death of four and injured others. Subsequently, demonstrations against Israeli
occupation broke in the camp and quickly spread throughout the occupied territories.555

550. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,” 40
551. Ibid. 42
552. Ibid. 41-42
553. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada
554. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, (New York:
Vintage Books, 2001), 341, 568
555. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada
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In Egypt the uprising inspired a wave of solidarity and admiration and led to the
establishment of the Egyptian National Committee in Support of the Palestinian Uprising.
The committee focused on mobilizing support for Palestinians through raising awareness
about the uprising, collecting funds, and organizing solidarity activities across the Arab
world.556 The committee succeeded in bringing together a myriad of political parties
including the NDP, unions, professional syndicates, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and non-political unions. The committee also opened branches in different
governorates.557 In order to spread knowledge about the uprising, the committee edited
and published a newsletter entitled al-Intifada, to document the developments in the
occupied territories. Nonetheless, the committee’s contributions in raising funds
remained modest, as it succeeded in collecting only one hundred thousand US dollars
compared to three million US dollars that the Republic of Yemen had raise. 558 The
committee’s call for an Arab peace march towards the Israeli borders did not materialize,
since the governor of North Sinai declared his inability to guarantee the march’s
security.559 The most remarkable achievement credited to the committee occurred on 11
October 1988 on the occasion of celebrating the birthday of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad).
The celebration took place at the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo, and held the title of the
Day of Abu Jihad, the Day of Palestinian Independence. Abu Jihad’s widow and Arafat
were in attendance. The occasion succeeded in bringing together representatives of
almost all active political and social forces in Egypt whether recognized by the

556. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,”46-47
557. Ibid. 47
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559. Al-Intifada, issues No. 4-6, April and June 1988
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government or not in order to show “support of the national rights of the Palestinian
people.”560
The regime’s official response to the uprising was more cautious. Mubarak
seemed to prefer mediation to confrontation. During the spring of 1988 he proposed
suspending the intifada temporarily in return of an Israeli promise to improve living
conditions in the occupied territories. This proposal came at a time when the intifada had
gained both regional and international momentum as well as wide domestic solidarity.561
The Egyptian public opinion however, rejected and criticized the content and timing of
the proposal. Ultimately Mubarak abandoned his proposal and declared that Egypt will
not pressure the Palestinians to accept the terms of the Camp David Accords that
concerned them.562
Following the second Gulf War, the PLO suffered diplomatic isolation resulting
from the PLO’s opposition to the US intervention in the Gulf crisis.563 In essence, the
PLO did not endorse the annexation of Kuwait, but saw Saddam Hussein’s challenge to
the United States and the Gulf states as a means of shifting regional balance toward more
focus on the Palestine question. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia responded by suspending their
financial aid to the PLO.564 Palestinians in Kuwait faced systematic violence and mass
deportation diminishing the population from 400,000 to less than 30,000 by 1998. 565 By
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564. Ibid.
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156

the end of the war the United States sought to stabilize its position in the region by
promoting a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.566 Consequently, the United States
and the Soviet Union jointly issued an invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference on 30
October 1991.567 The co-sponsors of the conference explained that the objective was to
achieve through direct negotiations a comprehensive and real peace between the Arabs
and Israel based on UN-Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.568 The governments
invited included those of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Palestinians attended as part
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, while Egypt attended the conference as a
participant. The framework proposed negotiating over a period of one year for setting an
interim self-government. Once an agreement was reached the interim self-government
arrangements would in turn last for five years. Negotiating the permanent status based on
Resolutions 242 and 338 would commence during the third year of interim selfgovernment.569
To a certain extent the Oslo Agreement signed on 13 September 1993 resembled
the Camp David Accords of 1978. Both offered loose frame-works for further
negotiations without any specific outcome. Both delayed vital issues like the refugees’
problem, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of the Israeli settlements until the never
realized negotiation of permanent status.570 Lacking substantial Arab and international

566. “The Madrid Conference,” http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/madrid-conf-pal-isrprimer.html, published in January 2001
567. S. Mahler and R. W. Mahler, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader,
193-194 [Full Text]
568. Ibid. UN-Security Council Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973 called for an immediate cease-fire and
the termination of all military activities. It also called for an immediate implementation of Resolution 242
of 1967, 140 [Full Text]
569. Ibid.
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diplomatic support, the PLO signed the accords despite their critical flaws.571 Israel and
the PLO signed the agreement and exchanged mutual recognition, while the United States
and the Russian Federation acted as witnesses.572 The agreement stipulated the creation
of a five-year interim government and electing a council representing the Palestinians in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Declaration of Principles established an Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho; further withdrawals from unspecified areas
of the West Bank were supposed to occur over the course of the five-year interim
government.573 The PLO formed a Palestinian Authority (PA) to rule the areas from
which the Israeli forces had redeployed. In 1996 the PLO held elections for the
Palestinian Legislative Council, and Arafat conveniently won the Presidency of the
PA.574
Progression in the negotiations stalled during subsequent years. The various
Labor and Likud governments showed obvious reluctance to commit to serious
negotiations. Both governments permitted the construction of many new settlements,
expanding existing ones, and establishing networks of roads to connect the settlements
with Israel proper. The Oslo accords in this respect failed to develop any mechanism to
halt Israeli unilateral violations.575 The PLO also faced an internal challenge in the form
of the rising Islamic movements like the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance
571. “The Oslo Accords,” http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/oslo-accords-pal-isr-prime.html,
published in January 2001
572. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ARAB,,,3de5e96e4,0.html [Full Text of the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Oslo Agreement") (13 September 1993)], see also,
“Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,” (4 May 1994), “Israeli – Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” (Oslo 2) (September 28, 1995), in S. Mahler and R.W. Mahler, The
Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader, 204-209 & 233-239 [Full Texts]
573. http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/oslo-accords-pal-isr-prime.html
574. “The Oslo Accords,” http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/oslo-accords-pal-isr-prime.html,
published in January 2001
575. Ibid.
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Movement (Hamas). Both groups preached armed struggle against Israel and rejected
negotiations.576
The case of the Oslo Accords witnessed an obvious decline in the role of
Egyptian diplomacy. The PLO accepted the accords at a time when it suffered from the
lack of sufficient Arab political and economic support. Egypt joined as a participant,
while the United States controlled the negotiations process. Despite its flaws, during the
Camp David negotiations, Sadat stressed that regional peace is unachievable without
restoring all Palestinian national rights.577 By contrast, during the Oslo negotiations
Egypt did not attempt to provide a counter-balance against US bias toward Israel. The
Oslo accords failed to commit Israel to any measure until the final stages of negotiations.
Egyptian diplomacy shaped its course to conform to US interests. This resonated with
Mubarak’s understanding of the role of Egyptian diplomacy in the post-Sadat era. He
based his foreign policy on shifting Egypt’s role from a key negotiator to a mere mediator
between the Arabs, Israel, and the United States.578 This shift in political attitude
weakened the Palestinian position which needed a persistent negotiator rather than a
weak mediator.

576. “The Madrid Conference,”http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/madrid-conf-pal-isrprimer.html, published in January 2001
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The regime did not attempt to alter its political stance through the 2000s. Oslo
stalled, and several conferences convened in attempts to revive the waning peace
process.579 The United States posed as the key player in peace negotiations, whereas
Egypt settled for such roles including being a witness, a mediator, or hosting a summit.
The peace process faced further setbacks by the early 2000s. On 28 September
2000 the second intifada also known as al-Aqsa Intifada erupted. The ongoing grievances
of Palestinians under occupation, an occupation that Oslo had heightened rather than
addressed, were the causes of the uprising. The trigger occurred when Likud leader Ariel
Sharon staged a visit to the Temple Mount / al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem during
Friday prayers.580 The way Sharon entered the holy site accompanied by nearly one
thousand police officers and media personnel angered Palestinians. Violent clashes
erupted protesting the visit. Between 28 September 2000 and the year’s end, more than
three hundred Palestinians were killed and thousands wounded.581
The intifada revealed the condition of the Arab world generally and the Egyptian
regime particularly. It exposed Arab diplomacy’s failure to pressure Israel or alleviate
579. “Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum,” (4 September 1999), this memorandum was signed by Israel and
the PLO with Egypt, the United States and Jordan as witnesses. Its main clauses reaffirmed the
commitment to the Oslo accords and all subsequent agreements. It proposed a time-frame for further Israeli
redeployments and the release of Palestinian prisoners. The memorandum also promised the resumption of
Permanent Status negotiations with the aim of reaching a comprehensive agreement within a year. S.
Mahler and R.W. Mahler, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader, 252-254.
By 2000, the two sides could not achieve tangible progression especially regarding such decisive issues like
Jerusalem, the refugees, and the settlements. The United States called for a Peace Summit at Camp David
during the period between 11 and 24 July 2000. The summit, attended and supervised by the US President
released its resolutions on 25 July 2000. The summit failed to address the persisting key issues and its
resolution contained vague statements about commitment to peace, further negotiations, and reaffirming the
role of the United States as the vital partner in the peace process. In S. Mahler and Alden R.W. Mahler,
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader, 261
580. The date of the visit seemed to be carefully calculated. The date coincided with the fifth anniversary of
signing Oslo II and during the ongoing negotiations at Camp David. The visit signaled Sharon’s intentions
to undermine the peace process, destroy the PLO, and reoccupy the West Bank, in Smith, Palestine and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 492-493
581. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 492-493
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Palestinians’ ongoing political oppression. The Egyptian regime faced an awkward
dilemma. Since signing the Camp David accords, Egypt posed as the regional peace
broker and key player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.582 The eruption of the uprising
and Israel’s brutal retaliation proved the impotence of negotiations and highlighted the
limitations of Egypt’s influence.
The Egyptian regime had always been keen on preserving regional stability. The
eruption of Palestinian-Israeli clashes threatened this proclaimed stability and perplexed
the regime. Mubarak quickly warned that escalation would lead to disastrous
consequences. He swiftly acted with the aim of defusing the tension, restoring regional
stability, and resuming peace negotiations. Mubarak resorted to diplomacy as the only
viable path; he stressed that war was an outdated idea and no longer an option.583 In order
to bridge the gap between the regime’s preserved rhetoric and the enraged popular
sentiments; Mubarak verbally attacked Israeli brutality but maintained diplomatic
channels.584 He also had to ward off radical Arab outbidding especially the Baathist
regime in Syria, so he hosted a meeting on 17 October 2000 in Sharm el-Sheikh.585
However, Egypt withdrew its ambassador in Israel in November 2000 due to Israel’s

582. Barari, “The Al-Aqsa Intifada as seen in Egypt,” 86
583. Press declarations published in al-Akhbar on 20 October, 2002 [Arabic Source]
584. Mubarak declarations published in al-Akhbar on 30 January, 2001. Mubarak recalled Sharon’s history
at Sabra and Shattila. In another interview published in al-Akhbar on 19 February, 2001, Mubarak
condemned Israeli brutality and stressed that violence only breeds counter-violence. He added that
Palestinian fedayeen do not fear death because they had a long history of suffering and had many of their
relatives either detained or killed by Israeli forces. [Arabic sources]
585. Barari, “The Al-Aqsa Intifada as seen in Egypt,” 91. The meeting sought to ease the escalating
tensions. It was attended by Ehud Barak, Yasser Arafat, Bill Clinton, and King Abdullah II. Barak and
Arafat singed a fragile agreement to contain the military confrontations.
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excessive use of force. This decision marked Egypt’s frustration with Israel but was also
a maneuver that intended to deflate domestic and Arab criticisms.586
During its first year, the intifada gained international momentum. However, the
tragic attacks of 11 September 2001, the rise of the war on terrorism, and the election of
Sharon as prime minster forced new realities and weakened support for military
resistance. Mubarak realized that the prospects of US military operations in the Gulf were
looming. As a US ally he aimed to assist in this effort by reducing Palestinian-Israeli
tensions. He extended an invitation to Sharon to come to Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss the
possibilities of resuming negotiations. On a parallel path, the Egyptian intelligence
managed to get the Palestinian factions to sign a unilateral ceasefire within both the
Occupied Territories and Israel proper.587 In April 2002 Israel led a brutal assault on the
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town of Jenin in response to a Palestinian suicide bombing of a Passover celebration. The
massacre leveled most of the refugee camp; thousands were killed and injured while
more than four thousand Palestinians became homeless. The Israeli army blocked
medical and humanitarian aid from accessing the camp.588 In Egypt huge demonstrations
erupted denouncing Israel and calling on the government to take serious action and
protect the Palestinians only to be confronted with the anti-riots police. The official
Egyptian response however, did not deviate from cliché condemnations of Israeli
brutality and empty warning against the ramifications of violence and counter-violence.
Mubarak stated in a televised speech that Israel had gone too far and its attempts to
undermine the PA and Palestinian rights will never be fulfilled. He explained his firm
belief that negotiations were the only means to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He
also added that Palestinian attacks stemmed from “the sense of despair, frustration, and
hopelessness.”589 The choice of the words such as despair and hopelessness echoes the
same themes used in Egyptian press and official statements during the post Camp David
era. Prior to signing the accords the press praised Palestinian operations as acts of brave
national resistance. Later the press changed its tone, and adopted the regime’s rhetoric
that the operations were signs of despair. Mubarak expressed his understanding of

a message that Israel was unable to find a reliable peace partner, thus evading pressures to resume
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popular anger but reminded his people that they should be wise and rational so as not to
jeopardize Egypt’s political and economic interests.590 The underlying message
reaffirmed the regime’s stance as a peace broker while eliminating any prospects for
military options.
Arafat died on 11 November 2004 of an unidentified illness.591 In January 2005
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as the President of the PA, Abu Mazen
served as a Prime Minister between March and September 2003. With the advent of the
Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas decided to participate. Hamas was founded in
February 1988 during the peak of the first intifada, 1987-1993. Its founders including
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and adopted its
ideologies. Like the Islamic Jihad, Hamas called for a holy war to liberate all of Palestine,
refused Israeli negotiations, and posed as an alternative to the PLO. Hamas called for
establishing a Palestinian state based on religious principles instead of the PLO’s semisecularism.592
Hamas gained popularity among Palestinians due to their commitment to national
resistance to liberate Palestine. They rejected the PLO’s negotiations path. Hamas gained
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Palestinians’ respect for their strength and the free-social services they provide during
increasingly oppressive conditions. Palestinians identified more with Hamas than the PA
which they perceived at best as “a corrupt and failing organization and at worst as a
subcontractor for the bureaucracy of the occupation.”593 Hamas also established a
military wing known as Ezz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, named after the shaykh who led
a group of fighters resisting the British occupation during the early 1930s. The brigades’
operations against Israeli targets garnered Hamas some momentum and revived the hopes
of liberating Palestine.
Hamas decided to run for the Palestinian Parliamentary elections of 2005. Hamas
won with a landslide much to the shock of Israel, the PA, and the George W. Bush
administration. The United States had been backing the PLO since Oslo; it contributed
with a total of two million US dollars to assist Fatah during the elections.594 The United
States however, did not show much tolerance to other Palestinian factions. During the era
of war on terrorism the Bush administration dismissed armed resistance as acts of
terrorism. Following Hamas’ victory the United States rejected the results and pressured
the European community to cut-off funding to the PA.595 This decision led to an
economic crisis in Gaza which hosts a population estimated at 1.5 million depending
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primarily on UN and non-UN donor aid. It is also estimated that sixty-five to seventy
percent of Gazans are considered impoverished.596
Gaza faced a serious economic crisis. Hamas also had its doubts about the loyalty
of the Presidential Guards.597 It was reported that the United States channeled an amount
of eighty-four million US dollars in aid packages to enhance the fighting capabilities of
the Presidential Guards loyal to Fatah.598 Additionally, the United States asked the
governments of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to aid Fatah
financially and logistically.599 Tensions emerged between Abbas and the newly appointed
Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the Hamas
government. Fatah also launched a series of operations targeting Hamas cadres.600 The
first round of clashes occurred during December 2006 when Palestinian National Security
Forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah following Hamas accusation that Fatah
conspired to assassinate Haniya. Several Palestinians were wounded during those
clashes.601 During March 2007 Fatah and Hamas agreed in Mecca to form a unity
government.602 However, tensions escalated and more than one hundred Palestinians
were killed. Confrontations grew lethal between May and June 2007 with both sides
596. Conal Urquhart, “Gaza on brink of Implosion as Aid Cut-off Starts to Bite,” The Observer on 16 April
2006 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/16/israel
597. For a detailed analysis of the Fatah – Hamas conflict and the role of the United States see David Rose,
“The Gaza Bombshell,” [April 2008] http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804
598. Ibid. see also
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/14/international/middleeast/14mideast.html?_r=2&ei=5094&en=d28cff5
caa1702fa&hp=&ex=1139979600&partner=homepage&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin&
599. The Christian Monitor, “Israel, US, and Egypt back Fatah's fight against Hamas,”
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0525/p07s02-wome.html , also see http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/US-training-Fatah-in-anti-terror-tactics-2465370.php / “Hamas Seizes U.S.-Financed Weapons,
Equipment,”
http://web.archive.org/web/20070616141623/http://menewsline.com/stories/2007/june/06_15_1.html
600. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza_documents200804
601. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/793DD747-A1B7-4BE3-B120-0CF17161249
602. http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-13-2007/volume-13-issue5/hamas-coup-in-gaza/
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committing atrocities. It is estimated that at least 118 Palestinians were killed and more
than 550 wounded in the week leading to June 15.603 On June 14, 2007 Abbas dissolved
the unity government, declared a state of emergency, and dismissed Haniya as prime
minister.604 On June 15, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as a new Prime Minister. Hamas
dismissed Abbas’ actions as an attempt to overrule the results of a democratically elected
Legislative Council. Hamas thwarted a CIA designed coup, took-over the Gaza Strip and
removed Fatah officials.605 Since 2007 a tragic internal split persisted with the PA ruling
the West Bank and a Hamas-led government ruling over the Gaza Strip. During the past
years several reconciliation initiatives were initiated, but a comprehensive settlement
remains elusive.606
The internal Palestinian chasm disturbed the Egyptian regime. As an American
ally, the regime believed that it had to preserve regional peace and thwart the rise of
militant radicalism. The Egyptian regime was always keen on preserving the PA as it
represented Oslo and the preference of negotiations over militancy. The victory of Hamas
in 2005 troubled the regime on several levels. First, the results of the elections positioned
Hamas as a viable political alternative to Fatah. The results also brought Fatah’s
weaknesses to the surface where Palestinians expressed their frustration with the impasse
603. http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/israel-palestine-news150607.htm / http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/palestine-israelnews-080207.htm / Alison Caldwell, “Hospitals offer no safety in Gaza strip,” on 13 June 2007,
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1950580.htm
604. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,282195,00.html /
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6754499.stm
605. Conal Urquart, Ian Black and Mark Tran, “Hamas takes control of Gaza,” The Guardian on 15 June
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/15/israel4 , for a detailed analysis of the US scheme to
topple Hamas refer to David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” [April 2008]
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804
606. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/03/23/uk-palestinians-yemen-deal-idUKL23831120080323 /
http://en.rian.ru/world/20091002/156322997.html / http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/palestinianfactions-formally-sign-unity-accord/2011/05/04/AFD89MmF_story.html?hpid=z6 /
http://www.haaretz.com/news/egypt-fatah-hamas-deal-deferred-due-to-inappropriate-conditions-1.5962
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of their cause, economic woes, and corruption allegations within the PA. The tide of
change annoyed the regime, since many of the Palestinians’ grievances especially those
having to do with economic distress and state corruption echoed the complaints of the
Egyptian middle and working classes. Second, Hamas with its Islamist doctrine and ties
to the Muslim Brotherhood represented another vital concern. The Brotherhood was
banned in Egypt since 1954 and the Mubarak regime had exerted much effort to suppress
them. The regime feared that the rise of Hamas across the border would empower the
Brotherhood and elevate the group’s popularity (The Brotherhood has been sympathetic
to the Palestinian cause since the 1930s and its fighters participated in the 1948 war).607
Third, Hamas made it clear that militancy not negotiations was their ideology and
stressed their refusal to acknowledge the existence of Israel. On the one hand, their
philosophy challenged the post Camp David discourse which stressed that negotiations
were the only feasible way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Hamas
attacks against Israeli targets appealed to the Egyptian masses that never really adhered to
peace with Israel and rejected all forms of normalization. For the Egyptian regime, the
rise of Hamas to power meant that the envisioned US peace was waning against the
Egyptian popular desire for a more firm stand against Israeli transgressions. It also
exposed the impotence of the Arab regimes dependent on the United States.
The news of Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip startled the Egyptian regime,
which was quick to denounce Hamas. It also expressed its unequivocal support to Abu
Mazen and the PLO as the legitimate Palestinian leadership.608 The regime issued a

607. Tally Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall with Gaza & the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment,”
www.fpri.org/orbis/5403/helfont.egyptandgaza.pdf, Summer 2010, 433-434
608. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/egypt250607_e.htm
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statement expressing its deep concern over the prospect of establishing a Hamas-led
radical “Islamic emirate” supported by Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. The statement
claimed that the creation of such an entity on Egypt’s eastern borders was a clear threat to
national security. Mubarak referred to the situation in Gaza as a coup against the
legitimate Palestinian leadership and warned against its negative consequences for
Palestinians.609 The Egyptian government took several measures to regionally isolate
Hamas and strengthen Abu Mazen. On 19 June 2007 the Egyptian Foreign Minister
Ahmed Abu al-Gheit ordered the transfer of the Egyptian diplomatic mission from Gaza
to Ramallah in the West Bank. The move reflected Egypt’s official recognition of
Ramallah as the seat of the legitimate Palestinian authority. Egypt also recalled its
security delegation which was stationed in Gaza on permanent basis. The government
fearing from militancy flooding into Egyptian territories closed the crucial Rafah crossing
between Egypt and Gaza without credible evidence of any imminent threats. Sealing the
borders intensified the harsh Israeli blockade imposed on the strip since the advent of
Hamas.610 In an attempt to justify its decision, the government argued that the crossing
operated and monitored by the PA under the supervision of the European Union (EU)
monitors. The government further explained that the process was regulated in accordance
with the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) of 2005 to which Egypt is not a
signatory.611

609. Press declarations published in Al-Jumhuriyah and Al-Wafd newspapers on 24 June 2007 [Arabic
Sources]
610. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/egypt250607_e.htm
611. “The Agreement on Movement and Access One Year On,” UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. November, 2006.
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/AMA_One_Year_On_Nov06_final.pdf
The Agreement was signed on 15 November 2005; the signatory parties included the PA, the Israeli
government, and the European Union. Egypt is not a signatory to this agreement.
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Deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza intensified combined with several
Israeli deadly raids. On 22 and 23 January 2008, thousands of Palestinians marched
towards the Rafah Border crossing destroying parts of the barrier. Palestinians flooded
into Egyptian territories seeking food and supplies.612 Egyptian troops allowed the
crossing, but Palestinians were not allowed to go beyond El-Arish. Further infiltrations
occurred and the Egyptian police began repairing the breaches and closed the border on
February 3, 2008.
Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel launched a lethal
operation against Hamas in Gaza known as Operation Cast Lead.613 Palestinians suffered
high rates of causalities and the sealed borders added intense complications where
paramedics and hospitals suffered from power cuts and the scarcity of medical supplies.
Doctors and humanitarian groups lined up on the Egyptian side of the border but “despite
the severity of the situation Egypt maintained access to Gaza tightly restricted.”614
Mubarak explained in a televised address on 30 December 2008 that Egypt cannot open
the border crossing with Gaza without the presence of both the PA and EU. He added that
Egypt is not a signatory to the AMA and opening the border without resolving the
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+documents+on+movement+an
d+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm [Full Text of the agreement]
612. “Gazans clash with Egyptian Police at Rafah, 22 January 2008,” Al-Jazeera English
“Gazans make new border wall hole: Palestinians have bulldozed don part of the Gaza-Egypt border wall
again, hours after Egyptian troops blocked holes recently made by militants,” BBC News, 25 January 2008.
“Clashes between Egyptian forces and Palestinians across the borders,”
http://today.almasryalyoum.com/arcle2.aspx?ArcleID=92571&IssueID=941 / “Breaching the Rafah Border
Crossing,” http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=16243&SecID=12&IssueID=168 [Arabic
Sources]. “Factsheet: Egyptian Role in the Siege of Gaza,” Factsheet Series No. 62, April 2009, Canadians
for Justice and Peace in the Middle East {CJPME},
http://www.cjpme.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=387&SaveMode=0
613. The operation destroyed most of Gaza’s homes and infrastructure. It also led to the killing of over
1,417 Palestinians, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cast_Lead
614. “Factsheet: Egyptian Role in the Siege of Gaza,” Factsheet Series No. 62, April 2009, Canadians for
Justice and Peace in the Middle East {CJPME},
http://www.cjpme.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=387&SaveMode=0
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Hamas-Fatah conflict would deepen the internal rift. He further argued that opening the
crossing was an Israeli trap that intended to put Egypt in charge of the Strip. He held
Hamas responsible for the Israeli attack claiming that their refusal to renew the cease-fire
incited the aggression.615 Various top Egyptian officials echoed Mubarak’s rhetoric, they
stressed that any Hamas presence across the border was rejected altogether. The officials
added that this decision is final as Egypt only acknowledged the legitimacy of Abu
Mazen and the PA and rejected any other alternative.616
By December 2009, the Egyptian government embarked on erecting a huge
underground steel barrier to prevent smuggling across the tunnels between Sinai and
Gaza. News about the barrier raised harsh criticism against the Egyptian government
both domestically and regionally, since its creation frames Egypt as a complicit with
Israel in strangling Gaza. Egypt’s Foreign Minister defended the decision by claiming
that the constructions across the border aim to protect Egypt’s national security. 617 The
regime in an effort to thwart opposition and legitimatize its wall instructed Al-Azhar to
release a fatwa (Islamic decision) “declaring that it was permissible in matters of Sharia
law for Egypt to build the barrier.”618 The late Sheikh of Al-Azhar declared that Egypt
has the right to defend its territories against uncontrolled smuggling across the tunnels.
He added that those opposing the barrier were violating the commands of Islamic law.619

615. http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/9205fad6-7fa5-4acf-84d4-279535c457fb [Arabic Source]
616. http://www.alhayat.com
617. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/12/20091222134531894506.html, also see, “Amid
Protests, Egypt Defends Right to Build Gaza Wall,” Haaretz, 30 December 2009 www.haaretz.com
618. Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall with Gaza & the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment,”
www.fpri.org/orbis/5403/helfont.egyptandgaza.pdf, 434, also see, “Egypt Fatwa on Gaza Wall Stirs
Controversy,” Al-Arabiya News Channel, 3 January 2010 www.alarabiya.net It is important to note that AlAzhar a renowned religious institution has lost its independency since the Nasser nationalization era. The
institution once known for its influence on the population became by and large a state-owned institution
utilized mainly to provide a religious legitimacy to state policies.
619. Ibid. 437
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The fatwa triggered wide condemnation from the opposition, Hamas, and various Arab
states. Hamas argued that it never attempted to threaten the stability of Egypt and
questioned the logic behind the barrier. Hamas condemned the fatwa reminding Al-Azhar
that the barrier does not protect Egypt from the Zionists but it shuts-off food and medical
supplies urgently needed by children and patients entrapped in Gaza.620 The aggressive
blockade forced the Gazans to dig hundreds of tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border in an
attempt to secure their basic needs.621
In yet another televised speech Mubarak defended the steel barrier arguing that he
would stop at nothing to maintain national security. He added that the construction is an
act of sovereignty on Egyptian territories. Echoing Sadat’s “Egypt First” discourse,
Mubarak explicitly declared that Egypt will never abandon the Palestine cause, but
Egypt’s national interests come first and foremost. He referred to the death of an
Egyptian solider across the border and criticized Hamas accusing them of being evasive
and contradictory. He added that although Hamas pledges resistance and opposes peace,
they neither resisted nor achieved peace.622 In return Hamas expressed its disappointment
explaining that they would never threaten Egypt and that their sole aim is to end the Gaza
blockade.623 Mubarak’s speech raised domestic criticism as well. Several legal and
diplomatic experts explained that Mubarak’s rhetoric was based on a political stance and
620. “Press Release: We Disapprove of the Al-Azhar Fatwa Legalizing the Steel Wall, Which is Strangling
Gaza,” The Islamic Resistance Movement- Hamas, 2 January 2010. www.palestine-info.info/ar, also see
“The Steel Wall Kills the Last Life Vessel Sustaining the Gazans,” 25 January 2010.
http://www.alarab.net/Article/244781 [Arabic Source]
621. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_tunnels
622. A speech delivered on the occasion of Police Day on 24 January 2010.
http://arabic.cnn.com/2010/middle_east/1/24/mubarak.policeday/index.html also see the full text of the
speech at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=181361 [Arabic Sources]
623. “Hamas Criticizes Mubarak’s Declarations and Considers them Contradictory to his Promises,” on 26
January 2010. http://arabic.cnn.com/2010/middle_east/1/26/hamas-criticize_mubarak/index.html [Arabic
Source]
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not a legal one. Judge Ahmed Mekki explained that Mubarak’s stance stemmed primarily
from Egypt’s inability to confront Israel as well as the strength of external and mainly US
pressures. Mekki also explained that according to international law and the Geneva
Conventions Egypt had to open the border crossing for humanitarian reasons since the
gates are located on Egyptian territories and operate under Egyptian sovereignty. He
explained that Egypt’s actions legitimize the Israeli blockade and shift the blame from
Israel. In other words, international condemnation toward Israel decreases since another
Arab country contributes to the inhuman blockade of the Gaza Strip.624 By the second
half of 2010, Egypt partially opened the Rafah border crossing but mainly for people and
not aid. The manager of the border crossing explained that the gates were open for
patients, holders of foreign passports, students, and those who have a proof of residency
in other countries. Nonetheless, Egyptian authorities denied the passage of much-needed
aid supplies including food, medicine, electric generators for hospitals, and construction
materials.625
It is however important to examine the Egyptian regime’s stance on the border
issue. Egypt’s troubled relation with Hamas and its insistence on sealing the border
despite domestic and regional condemnations stemmed from both internal and external
pressures. Domestically, the regime had been engaged in a long battle to suppress the
Muslim Brotherhood and curtail its power as an organized opposition with a sizeable

624. http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/f8035341-09b4-4b82-a849-86b4ecf66bfd [Arabic Source] also
see Abdu Allah al-Ashaal, “Egypt Breaches International Law by Sealing the Rafah Border,”
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/459b590a-eeff-48dc-92af-5f8ff2ca3d28 [Arabic Source], also see
Paul Reynolds, “Gaza Sanctions: The Legal Argument,” Associated Press, BBC on 30 October 2007. Egypt
is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions in 1952 and its first and second protocols in 1992, but did not sign
the third protocol. For the full text of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its subsequent Protocols see:
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp
625. “Rafah Crossing Open for Third Consecutive Day,” Ma‘an News Agency on 3 June 2010
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popularity. The rise of Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, immediately next to the
Egyptian border signaled a threat to the regime. Mubarak feared that the Hamas takeover
might empower the Brotherhood and increase their popularity among the masses.
However, the Brotherhood was only one among several external pressures exerted upon
the Mubarak regime. On one hand, Abu Mazen urged Mubarak to seal the border so as
not to strengthen Hamas and undermine Fatah. On the other hand, Israel initiated a
campaign accusing Egypt of being passive regarding the smuggling of weapons through
the tunnels, thus, contributing to threatening Israeli security. For several years the regime
adopted a blind-eye policy toward the tunnels. However, the regime’s lax attitude
changed when Hamas started to use the tunnels to smuggle heavy weapons into the strip.
In 2009 the Egyptian government discovered an elaborate multi-national plot linked to
Hezbollah that involved smuggling weapons, and planned ultimately to target Israeli
tourists in Sinai and to fire at ships in the Suez Canal.626 The regime perceived such
developments as a direct violation to Egypt’s sovereignty, a credible threat to national
security, and potentially jeopardizing its turbulent relations with Israel. More importantly,
the United States pressured Egypt to keep the border closed and end the smuggling. Israel
demanded that the United States make its annual 1.3 billion US dollars in military
assistance to Egypt conditional on Mubarak’s efforts to halt smuggling. 627 In return, the

626. Michael Slackman, “Egypt Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks and Arms Smuggling to Gaza,” The
New York Times, 13 April 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html?_r=0
627. For a detailed analysis of this topic see Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on
Israeli-Egyptian Relations.” Congressional Research Service, 1 February 2008.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34346.pdf
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Egyptian regime deeply depended on US aid since Camp David, unable to face Israel,
and battling wide domestic challenges had to bow and contribute to the Gaza crisis.628
The previous section attempted to analyze the Egyptian-Palestinian relations
during the Mubarak years. It traced Egyptian official discourse regarding the Palestine
cause in the post Camp David era. It also discussed the ramifications of the Hamas
takeover, the internal strife with Fatah, and the Egyptian-Hamas conflict over the Rafah
border. The next section will address the press during the Mubarak era and its attitude
toward Palestine with a special emphasis on moments of political conflict.
The Press during the Mubarak Era
Mubarak started his presidency by attempting to downplay the ramifications of
Sadat’s “Autumn of Fury." He released all politicians and journalists detained under
Sadat, and promised to respect the role of the press and freedom of speech. By the mid1990s, the regime grew less tolerant to rising criticism, issuing Law 96 of 1996, which
posed several restrictions on issuing new papers.629 For instance, article 50 banned those
who are deprived from practicing their political rights from publishing papers. This
article targeted mainly the Islamic opposition since most of its members faced
imprisonment more than once in a variety of cases. Article 52 stipulated that privateowned papers must deposit a huge sum of money in an Egyptian bank prior to

628. Ibid. also see Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall with Gaza & the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment,”
www.fpri.org/orbis/5403/helfont.egyptandgaza.pdf, 432-434. Also, Abigail Hauslohner, “In the Siege of
Gaza, Egypt Walks a Delicate Line,” 11 January 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953015,00.html. “Factsheet: Egyptian Role in the Siege of
Gaza,” Factsheet Series No. 62, April 2009, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East {CJPME},
http://www.cjpme.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=387&SaveMode=0
“Egypt: Navigating the Gaza Crisis,” http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/egypt-navigating-gaza-crisis
629. Law No. 96 of 1996 issued in the Official Gazette on 30 June 1996 [Arabic Source]
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publication.630 The law also expanded the role of the Higher Press Council headed by the
President of the Shura Council.631 The law stated that freedom of speech and the
exchange of information were protected as far as nothing threatens national security or
social peace.632 Article 5 stated that seizing papers or canceling their licenses was
forbidden. Nonetheless, the Labor’s Party (Hizb al-Amal) mouthpiece al-Shaab was
ordered to shut-down following the People’s Assembly’s Committee on Political Parties
decision to freeze the party in May 2000.633 Additionally, the law stipulated several
penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment in matters related to criticizing the
president, the government, or heads of foreign states.634 However, private and party
papers remained mostly depended on state-owned publishing houses for circulation. They
also did not attract lucrative advertisements compared to those advertised in the official
papers. Party journals exhibited the same weaknesses suffered by opposition parties.
During the Mubarak era the few existing opposition parties (including al-Wafd, alTagamuu, and the Nasserite Party) suffered from internal conflicts, weak leadership and a
shrinking popular base. Set against the NDP hegemony, opposition parties and papers
suffered from systematic weakening and marginalization.635
Although Law 96 of 1996 expanded journalists’ rights and protected their
freedom of speech, Mubarak did not refrain from criticizing opposition press accusing
630. A daily paper should be financially backed with one million Egyptian pounds; weekly journals had to
pay 250,000 pounds, while monthly publications were required to pay an amount of 100,000 pounds.
631. Articles No. 67 to 79 of Law No. 96 of 1996. The Council acts as an independent organization dealing
with all issues pertaining press and journalism. It also oversees the finances of all issued papers. The Shura
Council (mainly dominated by the NDP and half of its members appointed by the President) chooses the
head of the Syndicate of Journalism along with chief editors and executives of official and party
newspapers. The president appoints the heads of the three official papers, and the state holds a significant
amount of shares in their capital.
632. Article No. 4 of Law No. 96 of 1996
633. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 301
634. “Egypt: Freedom of the Press, 2002,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/egypt
635. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 296 & 301
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them of lacking enough knowledge about the priorities of the population.636 Further,
unlike his predecessors (Nasser and Sadat), Mubarak did not establish any special
relations with particular journalists. He maintained normal relationships with chiefeditors and met them during office hours only. He communicated with the press through
telephones regarding official matters. He also opposed any negative press relating to both
Nasser and Sadat.637
By mid-2000s and in response to pressures for more freedoms several independent
newspapers appeared including: al-Masry al-Youm (The Egyptian Today), al-Youm alSabi’ (The Seventh Day), and Sawt al-Umma (The Voice of the Nation). However,
several reports surfaced documenting physical violence and harassment targeting
opposition journalists.638 Opposition papers focused on criticizing the regime’s
corruption, the impotence of the government, and Egypt’s failing regional diplomacy.
The official press however remained attached to the regime and largely adopted its
discourse.
The previous survey examined the conditions of the press during the Mubarak
years in light of Press Law 96 of 1996. The next section investigates how the Egyptian
press handled the Palestinian cause and the image of the PLO in the post Camp David
era. It also analyzes how the press reacts toward Egyptian-Palestinian political tensions.

636. Ibid. 301
637. Ibid. 301-302
638. “Egypt: Freedom of the Press, 2005,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2005/egypt,
this report details the case of opposition journalist Abdel Halim Qandil the editor of the Arab Nationalist
Weekly Al-Arabi. Qandil known for his outspokenness against the regime corruption and its dependency on
the US was abducted and brutally beaten-up by unidentified assailants in November, 2004.
Further attacks, abductions, illegal detentions, and confiscating of equipment are detailed in: “Egypt:
Freedom of the Press, 2010,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2010/egypt

177

From the onset of his presidency, Mubarak was determined to achieve full
reconciliation with the Arab states and regionally reintegrate Egypt. In this respect he
explicitly criticized the vilification campaigns initiated by the Sadatist press. He believed
that such abusive campaigns had destructive ramifications and urged journalists to halt all
anti-Arab propaganda.639 Further, by early 1982 Egyptian press regained some interest in
the Palestine cause after years of marginalization following the signing of the Camp
David Accords. Al-Ahram published several editorials tackling the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The editorials attacked Israeli systematic aggression and invoked the image of the
oppressed Palestinian who resists with whatever means available.640 However, the official
press showed a preference toward the image of the “victimized” Palestinian over that of
the “resisting” one. In resonance with the discourse in place since the late 1970s, the
press stressed that peace was the most viable path to resolve the conflict.641 The brutal
invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 gained wide and detailed coverage in
Egyptian press. The press revived the term “Palestinian resistance” that had been out of
use since Camp David. The press gave more emphasis to the image of the Palestinian
fighter rather than the victimized one. Many editorials attacked the betrayal of the Soviets
and the Syrian regime. The press praised Palestinian heroism and criticized the labeling
of their courage in fighting as “acts of terrorism.”642 More significantly, al-Ahram made
numerous references to the PLO stating that the organization was the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.643 The paper also praised the organization’s

639. Ghali, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post – Sadat Era,”781
640. Al-Ahram on 14 and 30 April, 23 May, 1982 [Arabic Sources]
641. Al-Ahram on 23 May, 1982
642. Al-Ahram on 14 July, 8 August, 11, and 13, 30 September, 1982 [Arabic Source]
643. Al-Ahram on 9 and 14 February, 1985 [Arabic Source]
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strength against Israeli attempts to liquidate it.644 This attitude represented a significant
departure from Sadatist press which dismissed PLO leaders as paid agents to the Soviets
and reactionary Arab regimes. Nonetheless, the bulk of editorials gave precedence to
images of “victimization” and “betrayal” over those of “resistance” or “fedayeen
action.”645 This approach reinforced “the dominant line in the Egyptian media, which
favors a peaceful solution over the military option.”646
The eruption of the first intifada gained extensive coverage in Egyptian press as
opposed to the rather limited analysis on national television.647 Al-Ahram led Egyptian
newspapers in providing extensive coverage of all developments in the occupied
territories through dispatching its own correspondents. Opposition press mainly al-Wafd
and al-Ahali reported extensively on the uprising. Al-Ahali famous for its rejection of
Camp David as well as US hegemony more broadly praised the Palestinians and urged
them to continue their armed struggle and capitalize on their gains.648 The Islamist press
represented in the Brotherhood’s mouthpiece al-Liwaa al-Islami, praised the intifada and
expressed its support of the PLO. However, unlike the official and opposition press, the
Islamist coverage depicted the uprising as a holy war referring to it as the “revolt of the
mosques” instead of the more common “revolt of the stones.”649 Further, Arafat’s stance
during the Gulf War, 1990-1991 led to some anti-Palestine editorials. For instance,

644. Al-Ahram on 30 June, 1982 [Arabic Source]
645. Al-Ahram on 3 and 16 October, 9 and 11November, 1985 [Arabic Sources]
646. Yehia, “The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-85,”62
647. El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,” 44
648. Abd al-Basit Abd al-Mu‘ti, “A Content Analysis of the Egyptian Press,” [Tahlil Mohtawah al-Sehafa
al-Masriya] published in al-Ahram on 12 October, 1988 in El-Sayed, “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward
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Ibrahim Seada wrote an open letter to Mubarak calling upon him to not trust Palestinians
calling them “killers” and “ungrateful cowards.” He also advised against allowing them
to study or work in Egypt, and to prevent them from seeking refuge in it.650
Al-Aqsa intifada gained wide coverage in Egyptian media and initiated large
demonstrations calling on Mubarak to sever all ties with Israel and protect Palestinians.
The official press quickly ran several editorials reminding readers that Mubarak was a
wise calm man and would not be dragged to a state of war. National press in this respect
glorified Mubarak as the advocate of peace and the defender of Palestinian and Arab
causes.651 Mohammad Abdel Moneim explained that Mubarak had steel nerves and
would protect peace at all costs.652 The underlying message of this editorial and several
others was to remind the people of Egypt’s ties with Israel and to reaffirm that declaring a
state of war is out of question.653
The issue of Palestinian suicide bombers raised another concern for the regime.
Although the national press reported extensively on the uprising, there was an obvious
stance against glorifying suicide bombings. The official press, crippled within the
regime’s parameters, repeatedly warned against the futility of the cycle of violence and
counter violence. The government papers persistently praised Mubarak policies. The
650. Akhbar al-Youm on 22 September, 1990 [Arabic Source]
651. Rajab al-Banna explaining the significance of Mubarak’s trip to Italy during October 2003, October
Magazine on 14 September 2003, also see, Ibrahim Saadeh column in Akhbar al-Youm on 13 September,
2003 [Arabic Sources]
652. Ruz al-Yusif Magazine on 19-24 October, 2003 [Arabic Source]
653. Several writers ran editorials stressed that Mubarak’s wisdom and commitment to peace have spared
Egypt several political crises. The editorials explained that Mubarak never posed as a hero and never
bought into vague slogans like other Arab leaders. Writings of this nature include: Rajab al-Banna, “Rihlat
Mubarak wa Tabiaat al-dawr al-Masri” [Mubarak’s Journey and the Nature of the Egyptian Role] in
October Magazine on 14 September, 2003 [Arabic Source]. Hamdi Abdel Aziz and Samia Sadeq, “The
Region Awaits Some Calm Following the Storm,” Ruz al-Yusif on 27 December, 2003- 2 January, 2004
[Arabic Source]. Karam Jaber, “Suqut al-Shiarat wa Suud al-Waqiiyah” [The Downfall of Slogans and the
Rise of Realism] Ruz al-Yusif on 27 December, 2003- 2 January, 2004 [Arabic Source]
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press repeated its clichéd condemnations of Israel and demanded that the United States
and Europe pressure Israel to end its aggression and resume peace negotiations.654 By
contrast, the opposition and religious press praised the heroism of Palestinian fighters as
sacrificing their lives to resist occupation. The Egyptian Mufti Dr. Ali Jumaa explained
that Palestinian resistance is religiously legitimate and in defense of truth and justice. It
was a form of jihad (holy war) against terrorism and was condoned by the sharia.655 AlAhali took the intifada as an opportunity to attack the regime’s passivity and question the
legitimacy of the Camp David Accords. Nabil Zaki explained that on signing the
agreements, Egyptians were promised peace and prosperity. Twenty-five years later none
of those promises was fulfilled, and the region’s reality remained lamentable.656
In another editorial, Mustafa Bakri attacked the regime’s silence and lack of
action toward Israeli aggression. He complained that the Arab rulers wasted Arab dignity
by passively watching the growing line of Palestinian martyrs. 657 Further, Abdel Halim
Qandil wrote several harsh articles criticizing the regime’s passivity and its utter
surrender to Washington. He attacked Mubarak’s relentless attempts to put an end to the
uprising and force a US-sponsored peace settlement. Qandil explained that the intifada
inspired the oppressed Arab masses to rise against oppression and injustice; therefore, it
threatened the US-backed Arab dictatorships. He added that the United States wanted to

654. Editorials in Akhbar al-Youm and al-Ahram on 13 September, 2003. Al-Ahram on 25October and 24
December, 2003 [Arabic Sources]
655. Ali Jumaa, “Palestinians who Commit Suicide Bombings are Martyrs, not Suicide Cases,” AlTassawuf al-Islami, Vol. 25, No. 297 (November, 2003), 6-8 [Arabic Source]
656. Nabil Zaki, “Ya Jabal ma Yihizak Reeh,” [O, Mountain No Wind will Shake you], and “Camp David:
25 Years Hence,” al-Ahali on 24 September, 2003. Also see Hassan Fath al-Bab, “Mata Nusghi li-hathihi
al-Surkhat?” [When Do We Listen to those Cries?]. Al-Bab criticized the Arab leaders for their passivity
toward Palestinian sufferings and Israeli terrorism. Al-Ahali on December 24, 2003 [Arabic Sources]
657. Mustafa Bakri, “Lematha al-Samt?” [Why the Silence?], al-Usbuu newspaper on September 15, 2003
[Arabic Source]
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end the intifada, and Mubarak as a US ally had to follow those orders despite Palestinian
pain and blood.658
The Fatah – Hamas clash and the subsequent Gaza takeover initiated an organized
condemnation campaign from official and non-official papers alike. The campaign
reflected Egypt’s both uneasiness toward and suspicion of Hamas. This attitude stemmed
from the historical ties between Hamas and the Brotherhood. Reports also stated that
Gaza housed radical groups, which might infiltrate Egyptian territories through the
tunnels and threaten national security. Other reasons encouraging negative press
campaigns included the Egyptian-Fatah relations and Egypt’s perception that Fatah stood
for Oslo and the peace option instead of Hamas militant strategy. Further, the reported
ties between Hamas and Iran represented yet another challenge to the Egyptian regime.
Egypt severed its diplomatic relations with Iran following the Islamic Revolution of
1979. Egypt feared that Hamas with its alleged Iranian ties across the borders would
disturb regional power-order, compete with Egypt’s Arab leadership, and jeopardize
Egypt’s national security. Indeed, several editorials appeared in the official paper, alJumhuriyah bitterly attacking Hamas and dismissing it as an Iranian proxy. The paper’s
editor Muhammad Ali Ibrahim argued that Hamas’ ultimate goals were to fulfill Iran’s
orders, harm Egypt’s political and economic interests, and threaten its national security.
He called for an “Iron Fist” policy against Hamas whom he accused of being criminals
aiming to stab Egypt in the back. In other editorials Ibrahim stated that Iran had been
spying on Egypt and the Arab world through financing Hamas and Hezbollah with the
658. Al-Arabi newspaper on 11 March, 2001 / 20 May, 2001 / 7 October, 2001 / 9 June, 2002 / 26 January,
2003 / 19 October, 2003 /18 and 25 April, 2004 / 21 November, 2004 [Arabic Sources]. Also see Fahmy
Huwaydi, “Misr fi al-Asel wa al-Sourah,” [Egypt in Reality and Image], in Kheulana alati la Tashal [Our
Horses that Don not Neigh], (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 2006), 28-34 [Arabic Source]
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sole aim of controlling the Arab world and spreading its “culture of violence and
terrorism” camouflaged as resistance.659
The press campaigns adopted a one-sided anti-Hamas approach which maintained
that Hamas had defied the legitimate authority. The coverage seemed to intentionally
overlook the fact that Hamas won a democratic election and constitutionally had the right
to form a cabinet. During June 2007 several editorials denounced the Gaza takeover and
warned that Hamas threatened both Palestinian and Egyptian interests and national
security. For instance, Makram Muhammad Ahmed argued that Hamas took the Gazans
as hostages to serve its own ends. He added that Hamas was an Iranian protégée and they
serve Iranian interests in regional expansionism.660 Tareq Hassan warned that Hamas was
the by-product of the Muslim Brotherhood and their rise would empower the
Brotherhood to challenge the regime and threaten national security. 661 Al-Akhbar’s
Editor-in-chief Muhammad Barakat echoed similar themes arguing that Hamas militancy
would damage the Palestinian cause and endanger Egyptian and Palestinian security.662
Karam Jaber and Abdallah Kamal of Ruz al-Yusif newspaper went a step further,
claiming that Gaza under Hamas was in fact controlled by al-Qaeda radical terrorists.
Kamal argued that the presence of Hamas in Gaza meant a full-fledged Taliban state
across the Egyptian border.663 Lutfi Nassef chose a different angle. He accused both

659. Al-Jumhuriyah on 5, 7, and 8 August, 2010 [Arabic Sources]
660. Al-Ahram on 24 June, 2007 [Arabic Source]. The same idea was repeated by Abdallah Kamal where
he deemed Hamas as a strategic threat to Egypt’s national interests. He also argued that Hamas damages
the Palestine problem because it acts as a proxy to other regimes especially the Iranian one, its acts per their
orders and serves their own ends regardless of Palestinian national interests. In Rose al-Youssef newspaper
on 8 August, 2010 [Arabic Source]
661. Al-Ahram on 23 June, 2007 [Arabic Source]
662. Al-Akhbar on 20 June, 2007 [Arabic Source]
663. Ruz al-Yusif newspaper on 19 June, 2007. Al-Jumhuriyah ran another editorial written by its Editorin-chief warning the Hamas takeover serves the interests of the Brotherhood and radical Islamists who want
to establish an Islamic emirate on the ruins of any given state. Al-Jumhuriyah on 23 June, 2007. The same
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Fatah and Hamas of destroying the Palestinian cause and fulfilling Israel’s desire to
eliminate Palestinians. He added that the long awaited dream of liberating Palestine was
shattered when both parties decided to destroy each other for power instead of uniting
against their common enemy.664
The breach of the Rafah border in January 2008 added further complications to
the deteriorated relations between Egypt and Hamas. The press waged another attack
condemning the incidents at Rafah and blaming Hamas for Gazans’ suffering. Makram
Muhammad Ahmed held Hamas responsible for the chaos across the border. He
explained that Hamas used the humanitarian situation in Gaza to blackmail Egypt and
force a change in Egypt’s policies toward Gaza. He added that Egypt condemned the
Israeli blockade but refused to jeopardize its national security. He also attacked Hamas
and dismissed their resistance as nothing but vague slogans. He added that instead of
fighting the Israeli occupation, Hamas turned its weapons against members of Fatah and
committed atrocities in the Gaza Strip.665 Other editorials echoed the same themes
condemning the border breach as a threat to Egyptian national security, which they
repeated was nonnegotiable. Karam Jaber explained that Mubarak would protect
Egyptian national security against all internal and external threats and at all costs.666 A
similar argument appeared in Muhammad Ali Ibrahim’s column in al-Jumhuriyah. He

theme was echoed in Magdy Muhanna’s article in al-Masry al-Youm newspaper on 24 June, 2007 [Arabic
Sources]
664. Al-Jumhuriyah on 23 June, 2007 [Arabic Source]
665. Al-Ahram on 28 January and 4 February, 2008 [Arabic Sources]. Muhammad Ahmed repeated the
same argument and accused Hamas of adopting an anti-Egypt agenda and that it has to either change its
attitude or endure the ramifications of its actions. He reminded Hamas that for Egypt they are nothing but a
mere Palestinian faction that does not represent all Palestinians. He added that Hamas leaders were
mistaken to believe that they can force their will on the Egyptian regime. Al-Ahram on 11 January, 2010
[Arabic Source]
666. Ruz al-Yusif newspaper on 25 January, 2008 [Arabic Source]
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praised Mubarak’s speech on the occasion of Police Day. He warned against conspiracies
targeting Egypt’s stability and accused those who criticized Mubarak’s stance on Gaza of
being paid agents.667 Abdallah Kamal explained that the border incident was a direct
outcome of the harsh Israeli blockade. However, he stressed that no matter how much
Egyptians may sympathize with the Palestine cause, they rejected the idea of threatening
their own security to solve the Gaza problem. He added that Egyptian national security
could not be subject to blackmail under any pretext.668 Ibrahim Nafaa of al-Ahram and
Muhammad Barakat of al-Akhbar chose to praise Mubarak’s “considerate” and
“humanitarian” decision to open the Rafah cross border for Gazans to buy food supplies.
They did not attack Hamas but called for an unconditional Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.
Barakat also blamed Israel and the West for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Egypt, he
argued, had a historical role as a secure haven for the distressed Palestinians. It is
interesting to note that Barakat chose to criticize the lack of a Western conscience, while
overlooked the Egyptian regime’s insistence on participating in the Gaza blockade.669
Usama Sarayia argued that the term “human rights” was more than often
misinterpreted. He attacked the European Union (EU) and the international organizations
calling for protecting human rights while ignoring the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Sarayia explained that the Gazans were the victims of both the Israeli occupation and
Hamas’ recklessness; it was only Mubarak who effectively responded to the Gaza crisis
by opening the border.670 Sarayia failed to mention that Gazans had forced their way
through the closed gates and Mubarak had to allow them into Sinai to avoid domestic
667.
668.
669.
670.
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Ruz al-Yusif newspaper on 25 January, 2008 [Arabic Source]
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agitation. Ibrahim Seada argued in his daily column that the internal Palestinian conflict
gave Israel the opportunity to freeze peace negotiations under the pretext that it cannot
negotiate peace while Hamas shells Israeli settlements. Seada blamed Hamas for
escalating the situation to serve its own ends and drag the Arab world into a web of
violence. He accused Hamas of using the humanitarian crisis of over a million and a half
Palestinians trapped in Gaza to achieve any political win regardless of price.671
Fahmy Huwaydi however, adopted a rare opposing argument. In a series of
articles Huwaydi criticized the Egyptian regime’s intolerant policy against Hamas and the
Gaza Strip. In one of his articles, Huwaydi warned against the loose use of the term
“national security.” He argued that this term needed redefinition within a specified
parameter. The regime had repeatedly utilized the term “protecting national security”
beyond its original scope. He added that the Mubarak regime used this term to protect its
own interests and silence the opposition.672 In another article, Huwaydi criticized the
government and its press for exaggerating the Rafah border incidents. He explained that a
national security threat is defined as an imminent danger that jeopardizes the state’s
ability to protect its national interests. He added that the border breach cannot be defined
under that rubric as the Gazans acted out of desperation and their urgent need for basic
supplies. For Huwaydi, the Rafah incident did not mount to any threat to national
security. He reminded the regime that the Gazans were Arab neighbors in need and not

671. Al-Akhbar, “Akher Amoud” [The Last Column] on 25 January, 2008 [Arabic Source]
672. Fahmy Huwaydi, “Redefining National Security,” in al-Dostour newspaper on 11August, 2008
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enemies. The real threat to national security, Huwaydi maintained, was the Israeli
occupation, its nuclear stations, and its numerous attempts to weaken Egypt.673
The previous section attempted to analyze the press during the Mubarak years.
Like the Nasserist and Sadatist eras, the official press under Mubarak maintained its
intimated attachment to the regime and adopted its discourse. The newly established
independent newspapers provided an alternative venue to discuss crucial topics like state
corruption and the decline of Egypt’s regional role. Nonetheless, the opposition press
suffered from various obstacles including lawsuits, intimidations, as well as organized
campaigns questioning their credibility, and accusing them of bias and suspicious
financing. On the Palestine question, the press maintained the regime’s course. By the
early 1980s Mubarak focused on regaining Egypt’s regional status, the press started to
report on the PLO and referred to it as the legitimate representative of all Palestinians.
The two uprisings gained wide coverage in Egyptian press. Nonetheless, the official
papers focused on the image of the victimized Palestinian rather than that of the fighter.
This approach resonated with the regime’s stance and its insistence on peace negotiations
as the only viable path to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its dismissal of armed
resistance as futile. Egyptian-Palestinian tensions occurred following the Gaza takeover
in 2007. The regime sided with Fatah and the press waged an anti-Hamas campaign
accusing them of being Iranian proxies plotting against Egyptian national security. The
breach of the Rafah border in early 2008 raised more tensions. Egyptian officials made
673. Fahmy Huwaydi, “Hakawa al-Amen al-Qawmy,” [The Stories of National Security], in al-Ahram on
19 February, 2008. In another article Huwaydi criticized the Egyptian Foreign Minister for his aggressive
declarations against the Palestinians and his threat that any attempt to breach the border will not be
tolerated and would lead to severe repercussions. Huwaydi explained that Israel had repeatedly fired at the
Egyptian borders and killed Egyptian soldiers but the regime maintained utter silence, while getting
aggressive toward the helpless besieged Gazans. “Arrogant Diplomacy and Suspicious Media,” in alDostour newspaper on 4 July, 2008 [Arabic Sources]
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several hostile declarations and the government press initiated further campaigns blaming
Hamas for the Gaza crisis and warning that Egypt would not tolerate their schemes. The
independent papers showed more, running several editorials criticizing the regime’s
stance which aided Israel and defied international humanitarian ethics.
The following section will explore the legal status of Palestinian refugees in
Egypt during the Mubarak era. It will attempt to investigate whether or not their
conditions witnessed any improvement over the course of three decades.
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees during the Mubarak Era
The legal status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did not witness
improvements during Mubarak’s era. Most of Sadat’s harsh laws of the late 1970s
remained intact. Palestinian refugees remained legally defined as foreigners and never
reverted to their status during the Nasser era as equal nationals. Although Mubarak
repeatedly stressed his commitment to the Palestine cause, his declarations remained
confined to the realm of rhetoric and did not aim to improve the status of the Palestinian
community.
Residency laws for Palestinian refugees did not witness amendments. Palestinian
refugees are granted either a special residency permit or a temporary one depending on
the date of arrival.674 Most Palestinians residing in Egypt arrived after the war of 1967
and fall under the temporary residence category. The permit in this case is valid for one

674. For a detailed analysis of this point refer to chapter (2), 38-40. In 2011 the Minister of Interior issued
Decree No. 1248 of 2011 related to the rates for renewing Traveling Documents (TD) for Palestinian
refugees. The first article stipulated that the fees for issuing a TD are one-hundred and ten Egyptian
pounds. The second article explained that there are two types of the TD. One is the ordinary type, valid for
five years and could be extended for two more years only once. The second type is the mechanized TD; it is
valid for a period of five years and cannot be extended. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 178 (Supplement)
on August 3, 2011 [Arabic Source]
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to three years depending on Egyptian laws of entry. 675 Residency permits also depend on
providing a valid reason for staying in the country, such as, education enrollment, valid
work permit, or marriage. Those who fail to provide a reason for their stay risk
imprisonment or deportation. Palestinian business-men who have enterprises operating in
Egypt for over twenty years face difficulty in renewing their residency permits. They
explained that during the eighties and nineties the Egyptian government provided several
incentives to encourage Palestinian investment in Egypt’s economic sector. Among those
initiatives was providing the Palestinian investor and his family a residency permit valid
for five years. However, in 2008 a new rule stipulated that Palestinian investors have to
renew their residency permit every year and the permit is valid for one year only. In a
recent press report, Palestinian businessman Fayek Belal explained that the government
informed them that this regulation was temporarily and meant to ensure the authenticity
of the projects, however, the situation remained unchanged. Belal added that the process
of renewing residency permits takes from three to six months to fulfill all the required
documentation. The prolonged processes hinder the investors from properly running or
promoting their projects. They also face other difficulties including their inability to drive
their own cars as the driving licenses expire with the residency permit. Their children
also cannot enroll in schools as education administrations require valid residency permits
to accept enrollment applications.676 Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention
since 1981, yet very few Palestinians are registered with UNHCR. In fact Palestinians in

675. Khalil, “Socioeconomic Rights of Refugees: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria,” 18-19
676. Al-Ahram on 18 October 2011, and 14 October 2012 [Arabic Source]. It is important to note that this
regulation targeted Palestinian investors only and they ask for being equated in treatment with other foreign
investors in Egypt. However, till now nothing has changed regarding this issue.
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Egypt fall under the category of “others” in UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheets. 677 Those few
registered with UNHCR and recognized as refugees receive six-month renewable
residency permits.678 Palestinian refugees with residency permit receive a five-year travel
document. Whereas those registered with UNHCR should apply for Convention Travel
documents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the 1954 agreement between
UNHCR and the Egyptian government, such refugees should receive a travel document
with a return visa valid for a limited but sufficient duration, except for matters related to
public security. In reality, however, the government does not automatically issue the said
documents, but grants them occasionally and on a case-by-case basis.679 In addition,
UNHCR hardly offers assistance or protection to Palestinian refugees who fall under
Egyptian mandate.680
Thousands of Palestinians originally from the Gaza Strip hold Egyptian travel
documents without residency permits. Those documents were issued during the period of
Egyptian rule in Gaza and are used for traveling purposes.681 During the crisis of the Gulf
war and the expulsion of Palestinians from Libya in 1995, Egyptian authorities denied

677. UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, December 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4d2ec46b9.html UNCHR Egypt
Fact Sheet, September 2011, www.unhcr.org/4e9c46999.html, UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, December 2011,
http://www.unhcr.org/4f2a89fe9.html UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, January 2012,
http://www.unhcr.org/4f4c956c9.html
678. Khalil, “Socioeconomic Rights of Refugees: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria,” 19
679. Sherifa Shafie, “Egypt,” http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expertguides/egypt/fmo029.pdf , 10
680. Ibid. 11,There are about 200 Palestinians registered with UNHCR. Documentation processes for
Palestinian refugees in Egypt go through the Palestinian refugees section in the Department of Migration
and Citizenship and the Ministry of Interior and not through UNHCR. In fact referring Palestinian refugees
to the Ministry of Interior indicates that the government approach the refugees file from a security
mentality and not from a social and humanitarian perspective. This attitude shows the state’s detached
approach toward refugee communities and its unwillingness to integrate them.
681. For further explanation see chapter (2)
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holders of such documents from entering Egyptian territories.682 Residency permits
renewal regulations did not change from the Sadat era. Further, in 1984 the government
issued the Law of Developing State’s Resources. This law stipulated that all foreigners
residing in Egypt including Palestinians had to pay forty-two and a half Egyptian pounds
in residence fees. This newly added fee increased the financial burden on Palestinian
refugees who were required to pay for renewing their residency permits, education, health
care, and show a monthly proof of spending an equivalent of a hundred and eighty US
dollars. It also should be noted that only two percent of Palestinian refugees in Egypt are
considered financially able. The majority of face tremendous difficulties in obtaining
formal jobs and had to depend on the less-secure informal market.683 This law also
contradicted with the provisions of the 1951 Convention. Article 29 stipulated that
signatory states shall not impose upon refugees charges, duties, or taxes of any
description higher than those levied on their nationals.684 It is important to note that the
second paragraph of article 1D of the 1951 Convention should be applicable to the case
of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt. This article stipulated that those refugees, who
do not receive protection or assistance from any UN organs, should directly fall under the
mandate of UNHCR.685 Since Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt do not receive
assistance from UNRWA, accordingly they are “ipso facto entitled to the benefits of the

682. The Libyan regime took the Oslo Accords and the PLO agreements with Israel as a pretext to expel
thousands of Palestinians working in Libya. Egypt: Human Rights Watch World Report 1992,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/MEW1-01.htm#P89_40926 , also see Abbas Shiblak, “Residency
Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee
Center (SHAML), 1996, 14
683. Yassin, “The Palestinians in Egypt,” 32
684. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [Full
Text] , 28
685. The Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4add77d42.pdf [Full Text]
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[1951] Convention.”686 As a signatory of the Convention, Egyptian constitution stipulated
that all UN-conventions signed by Egypt and published in the Official Gazette become
part of its national legislative system.687 Nonetheless, the government overlooked those
provisions and seems unwilling to co-operate with UNHCR in the process of
documenting and extending international protection to refugees.688 In fact the state
maintains the case-by-case method when approaching refugees’ needs. This method
violates equality principles and renders refugees vulnerable to arbitrary decisions.
In 1996 the state issued Law 99 which amended some provisions in Law 89 of
1960 related to the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territories of the United Arab
Republic. Article 8 stipulated that nationals from certain countries have to report
personally within seven days of their arrival to the police station in their residency
district. They have to explain the purpose of their arrival, the duration of their stay, and
present all necessary documentation. Such nationals also have to notify the Aliens
Registration Office or the police station in their residing area in case they change their
residency address or move to another city.689 Following this amendment the Minister of
Interior issued Decree 7067 of 1996. The first article stipulated that Palestinians entering
Egypt fall under the regulations introduced in Article 8 of Law 89 of 1960 as amended by
Law 99 of 1996.690 By including Palestinians in this decree, the state proved its
securitization approach toward refugees. Palestinians pose a special situation where their
686. Ibid.
687. Article No. 151 of the 1971 Constitution, http://www.sis.gov.eg/ar/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=73
[Full Text, Arabic Source]
Article No. 145 of the 2012 Constitution, http://egelections2011.appspot.com/Referendum2012/dostor_masr_final.pdf [Full Text, Arabic Source]
688. “Egypt: A Quarter-Century after Camp David, Palestinians Face Discrimination, Says Experts,”
http://reliefweb.int/node/211832 on 21 June 2006
689. The Official Gazette: Issue No. 71, 24 March 1960 [Arabic Source]
690. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 231, 13 October 1996 [Arabic Source]
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statelessness should provoke reliability instead of legal rigidity. Article 26 of the 1951
Convention called for granting freedom of movement to refugees within the territory of
the contracting state. The article however, left the application of this condition depending
on the regulations generally applied by each state regarding its alien communities. This
leaves refugees vulnerable to the state’s arbitrary laws and regulations.
Further, until 2004 Palestinian children born to Palestinian fathers and Egyptian
mother were not entitled to Egyptian citizenship, as the Egyptian civil code did not grant
the mothers the right to pass her nationality to the offspring. In this case those children do
not fall under Egyptian laws as they are defined as foreigners despite having Egyptian
mothers. Therefore, they would suffer from several difficulties including being deprived
of the right to free education and health care. In the future they would also be deprived of
their political rights; facing difficulty in obtaining residency permits, and securing a
stable job.691 In 2004 the government issued Law 154 of 2004 to amend certain
provisions of Law 26 of 1975 on Egyptian nationality. Accordingly the Minister of
Interior issued Ministerial Decree 12025 of the year 2004. The first article stipulated that
Egyptian mothers can now pass their nationality to their offspring born to non-Egyptian
fathers.692
The law did not name any exceptions and its provisions should have been
applicable to all Egyptian women married to foreigners. Nonetheless, the government
decided to exclude Egyptian women married to Palestinians from benefiting from this

691. Safaa Essam al-Din, “Bureaucracy, Fees, and Palestinian Citizenship are Obstacles Facing Children of
Egyptian Women,” al-Shorouk newspaper on August 27, 2009 [Arabic Source]
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12025 of the year 2004 Concerning Certain Provisions Enforcing Law No. 154 of the year 2004 on
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law. The government argued that as a member in the Arab League, Egypt abides by its
resolution of the year 1959 which stated: “Palestinians must not be granted any other
nationality in order to preserve the Palestinian identity.”693 However, this decision
became in fact obsolete following a report submitted by the permanent Palestinian
delegation to the Arab League on 30 September 2003. The delegation stressed that given
Egypt’s historical role in supporting the Palestine cause, there is no danger in passing
Egyptian citizenship to children born to Egyptian mothers and Palestinian fathers.694
Therefore, the Ministry of Interior’s insistence on rejecting all requests submitted by
Egyptian women married to Palestinians is in fact illegal. It also reveals an underlying
political will that opposes the integration of half-Palestinian half-Egyptian into Egyptian
society. The roots for this attitude date back to the Sadat era which fostered a series of
misperceptions and dismissed most Palestinians as an untrustworthy security threat.
Following the January 25 revolution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
Ministerial Decree 1231 on 2 May 2011. It permitted children born to Egyptian mothers
and Palestinian fathers to acquire Egyptian citizenship and directed the Ministry of
Interior to take all the necessary steps.695 However, the process did not progress
smoothly. Several applications faced unexplained delays and the Ministry of Interior

693. “Children without Identity: the Consequences of Egyptian Nationality Law.” A joint report between
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seemed to prioritize the applications of those who hold court orders entitling them to
acquire the citizenship.696 Other complications stemmed from the rejection of many
applications without clear legal explanation except for citing the vague phrase of
“rejected due to security concerns.”697
Palestinian refugees in Egypt have been subject to extensive arbitrary deportation
since the Sadat era. Despite the fact that both Egyptian legislation and the 1951
Convention stipulate certain legal measurements before issuing a deportation verdict, the
Ministry of Interior maintained deporting Palestinians based on the ambiguous phrase:
“due to security concerns”. None of the deportation decrees explained the charges, nor
did they indicate that the deported person got the right for legal representation or
appeal.698 The case of Tamim Barghouti is an example of many arbitrary deportation
incidents. Barghouti was born in Egypt to an Egyptian mother and a Palestinian father. 699
He also finished his education in Egypt. Barghouti used to go to the American University
in Cairo (AUC) located in Tahrir Square to study at its library for his post graduate
studies. On 20 March 2003 news spread that the United States had started its war on Iraq.
The opposition, students of the AUC, and Cairo University poured into Tahrir Square to
protest the war and the regime’s passivity. Like most of the students, Barghouti
participated in the peaceful protests. Two days later and after midnight, security forces

696. Essam Hashish, “An Egyptian Mother’s Cry to the Minister of Interior,” al-Akhbar on 20 March 2011
[Arabic Source]
697. Sample Cases: Ministry of Interior Resolutions No. 1292 of 9 August 2011, 1368 of 22 August 2011,
and 1441 of 7 September 2011. All the previous resolutions rejected applications submitted from
Palestinians born to Egyptian mother to acquire Egyptian citizenship. All resolutions cited “security
concerns” and “protecting general wellbeing” as reasons for rejecting the previous applications. Published
in al-Waqa‘e al-Masriya: Issues: 202 on 4 September 2011, 215 on 19 September 2011, and 225 on 1
October 2011 respectively [Arabic Sources]
698. Refer to chapter (2), and chapter (3)
699. Refer to chapter (3), for the background on Mourid Barghouti
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arrived at his home. They arrested him and searched the house without presenting a clear
legal warrant. They took Barghouti to an unspecified location. A couple of days later he
was forced to leave the country based on the claim that he was a security threat. Like the
case of his father Mourid Barghouti who was deported in the late 1970s, Tamim went
through the entire humiliating process. It took his father more than twenty years to return
to Egypt, but in the son’s case the persistence of Egyptian and international activists led
to his return a month later.700 Barghouti’s case exemplifies the ruthlessness of arbitrary
deportation. More crucially, it shows the ramifications of Sadat’s backlash, which
transformed Palestinians to foreigners and left them vulnerable to the regime’s whims. In
this case Barghouti was treated as a foreigner despite being born in Egypt to an Egyptian
mother. In similar cases when Egyptian students are arrested in protests, they are released
within weeks or months at most. As a foreigner, Barghouti was harshly forced to leave
the only country he knew. The following tables show samples of the numbers of deported
Palestinians during the Mubarak era.
Table (1): Palestinians deported from Egypt between years 1982 to 1990:
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700. Mourid Barghouti, “The Dawn Visitor,” in I was Born There, I was Born Here, translated from Arabic
by Humphrey Davies. The American University in Cairo Press, 2011, 195-210
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Table (2): Palestinians deported from Egypt between years 1991-1998:701
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The previous tables show that Palestinians faced arbitrary deportation on regular
bases. All the cases cited “preserving social wellbeing” as the common reason for all
deportation cases. All the ministerial decrees followed the same format with no legal
information explaining the case or justifying the verdict. The tables also show that the
period during the Second Gulf war between the years 1991 to 1994 witnessed a surge in
the number of deported Palestinians. This might have resulted from the PLO’s stance on
the war. Arafat denounced the US intervention, a rhetoric shared by many Egyptians
especially the students and the opposition. The regime by contrast, supported the US
operation and dispatched units from the Egyptian army to participate in liberating
Kuwait. Deporting many Palestinians during that period reflected the regime’s frustration
with the Palestinian stance, and its intolerance toward sources that might trigger mass
opposition to its policies. This proves that refugees’ status remains highly dependent on
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political relations and national interests. Deportation cases continued throughout the
Mubarak era till after the revolution.702
Arbitrary deportation is not the only case of violating refugees’ rights. Palestinian
refugees since the late 1970s experienced systematic marginalization mounting to a state
of invisibility. However, the case of Palestinian refugees in Canada camp in Rafah shows
that the government intentionally ignored the presence of an entire community residing
on its territories.
Canada Camp
The Canada refugee camp is the only Palestinian refugee camp in Egypt. Its
history dates back to the year 1973. Israeli forces decided to establish routes within
Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza for security reasons. About five hundred Palestinians
had to relocate to another spot in Rafah; a plot previously used by the UN that held
Canadian forces. Following the signing of the Camp David Accords of 1978, the city of
Rafah was divided into two halves on 25 April 1982. The area hosting the Canada camp
came under Egyptian sovereignty. This split had major effects on the Palestinian refugees
inhabiting the camp. Thousands of them were cut off from their families and their sources
of income. In fact, the early wave of Gaza tunnels appeared during that era. Palestinians
in Egyptian Rafah dug some tunnels to maintain ties with their relatives and help smuggle
some goods. The tunnels came under attack in the Egyptian parliament since the

702. Ministry of Interior: Decree No. 13485 of 1999, al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 267 on 24
November 1999/ Decree No. 958 of 2009, al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 130 on 6 June 2009/ Decree
No. 1119 of 2009, al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 149 on 28 June 2009/ Decree No. 815 of 2010, alWaqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 103 on 6 May 2010/ Decree No. 1129 of 2010, al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue
No. 138 on 16 June 2010/ Decrees No. 406-407 of 2011, al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 73 on 29 March
2011 [Arabic Sources]
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1990s.703 The expansion of the tunnel networks and their impact on Egypt’s national
security remain highly debatable till the present. After exhaustive negotiations, Egypt
agreed to acknowledge the residents of the camp as temporary refugees. The government
issued them Egyptian travel documents renewable every six month without a work
permit.704 Residents of the camp depended mainly on assistance provided by UNWRA,
and engaged in small-scale agriculture and commerce activities. UNWRA fully financed
primary education. Preparatory and secondary education depended on limited Egyptian
aid of nearly twenty thousand Egyptian pounds equivalent to six thousand US dollars.
Students seeking university degrees had to travel to al-Arish, Ismailia, or Cairo.
However, when the camp’s youth attempted to engage in the first intifada through
Egyptian territories, the regime retaliated by limiting their numbers in Egyptian
universities to a maximum of fifty students.705
The governments of Egypt and Israel agreed that the camp existed on a temporary
basis and that Israel was committed to relocate the refugees into another area in Gaza.
Between 1989 and 1991 Israel approved the relocation of one hundred and fifty
Palestinian families in Tal al-Sultan area in the Gaza Strip. The PLO financed the
relocation process but following its financial crisis during the Gulf war the process
stopped. Further relocations occurred in 1994 after the formation of the PA. The process
however, was interrupted following the second uprising of 2000, the peace impasse, and
repeated Israeli raids on Gaza. The camp received newcomers fleeing Israeli raids on
Gaza. Recent reports indicate that the camp holds about four thousand Palestinians who
703. Al-Ahram on 2 March 1995 [Arabic Source]
704. Sari Hanafi and Olivier Saint-Martin, “The Palestinians in North Sinai,” Palestinian Diaspora and
Refugee Center (SHAML), (Ramallah: Palestine, 1996), 55 [Arabic Source]
705. Ibid. 56
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live in impoverished conditions. Following the Gaza takeover and sealing the border, the
refugees lost UNWRA assistance and are completely ignored by the Egyptian
government. They live on whatever assistance available through the residents of Rafah
and al-Arish or their relatives who have a permanent residence permit. 706 Recent reports
indicate that their living conditions are rapidly deteriorating. They are cut-off from their
relatives in Gaza and unable to obtain any jobs in Egypt. Although residing in Egypt for
years, the government never acknowledged their status and did not propose any
initiatives to improve their living conditions.707
Since the Sadat years Palestinians like other foreigners had to pay to access
education and healthcare services. Egypt had also made reservations regarding Article 22
[paragraph (1)] of the 1951 Convention regarding equating refugee children with
nationals in term of accessing elementary education.708 Palestinian children could only
apply to private schools and pay their tuition in foreign currency. Ministerial Decree 162
of 1989 stipulated that each Palestinian student should pay what is equivalent to one
hundred and twenty Egyptian pounds to enroll in primary schools. The amount increased
to one hundred and sixty pounds for preparatory schools and reached two hundred and
fifty pounds for secondary ones. Students also had to pay an equivalent of one hundred
and fifty US dollars to receive their certificates. In 1991, the government increased
university fees by twenty percent. Students in colleges had to pay an equivalent of two
thousand Sterling pounds for their first year, and an equivalent of one thousand Sterling
pounds for subsequent years. In scientific colleges, students in their first year had to pay
706. Ahmed Farahat, “Palestinian Refugees in Egypt: The History and the Call to Support Them,”
http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/articles/2011/03/04/221929.html [Arabic Source]
707. Ibid. also see Abbas Shiblak, “Living in Limbo: Preliminary Observations on Canada Refugee
Camp,” 1 January 1992 http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:2148
708. See chapter (3)
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an equivalent of three thousand Sterling pounds and an equivalent of a thousand and fivehundred Sterling pounds in subsequent years. Fees for post graduate studies required
more than double the previous fees. Those rates complicated accessing education and
burdened the already struggling Palestinian families, resulting in an increase in illiteracy
rates.709
Refugee children unable to financially enroll in private schools access education
through centers holding partnerships with UNHCR along with assistance from some
church groups. For instance, the Catholic Relief Services implemented a partnership with
UNHCR in 2002. It provides educational grants for school children and illiterate adults.
St. Andrews Refugee Ministry, founded in 1979, provides educational programs for
children including classes in English, Math, and Science and information technology.
There also classes for adults in English, Business, Drama, and Computers. The Sacred
Heart Church in Sakakini, Cairo runs five schools for educating refugee children.710
However, those centers have limited spaces and resources. The government rarely
acknowledges the centers’ degrees. In order to get official certificates, the centers had to
pay high fees to allow their students to sit for exams in officially accredited centers. 711
In 1992, the Minister of Education issued Decree 24 related to procedures
governing foreign children’s access to Egyptian schools. Article 5 of the decree gave
Sudanese, Jordanian, and Libyan children the right to access free primary education in
state-owned schools just as Egyptian students. The same article extended its provisions to
Palestinian students provided that their parents work for the Egyptian government, the
709. Yassin, “The Palestinians in Egypt,” 26
710. Shafie, “Egypt,” http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/egypt/fmo029.pdf
711. See chapter (3)
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public sector, the military in Egypt, or if the parents are retired. 712 Nonetheless, the
decree stipulated certain conditions to enroll Palestinian students in public schools. This
in fact contradicted principles of equality and deprived children who do not meet those
conditions from accessing free primary education. Further, issuing ministerial decrees
instead of formal laws creates much confusion in interpretation. Formal laws become
effective the moment they are published in the Official Gazette, while decrees go through
a prolonged cycle from the ministerial level to school administration level. Abiding by
the laws is mandatory, while decrees occasionally remain ineffective. Additional
complications arise in case laws get amended; decrees in in this case become obsolete. 713
Besides, the overall education system in Egypt suffers from several strains. The
overcrowded Egyptian public schools, as well as high rates of drop-out and illiteracy
show the government’s inability to extend access to education to every Egyptian child
which in return further minimalizes chances for refugees.
Following Sadat’s regulations of the late 1970s that classified Palestinians as
foreigners, they automatically lost eligibility to receive free healthcare in state-owned
hospitals. Refugees recognized by UNHCR receive medical treatment through Caritas
Egypt, UNHCR’s main implementing partner. Caritas covers fifty percent of total
medical expenses, twenty-five percent of doctors’ fees, and in impoverished cases
provides all costs of hospitalization.714 In 2005, the Minister of Health issued a new
regulation allowing all foreigners residing in Egypt to access primary and preventive

712. Decree No. 24 of 1992. The Official Gazette: Vol. No. 54 on 3 March 1992 [Arabic Source]
713. Katarzyna Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in
Egypt,” Development Research Center on Migration, Globalization, and Poverty. University of Sussex,
July, 2006, 19-20
714. Shafie, “Egypt,” http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/egypt/fmo029.pdf
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healthcare.715 However, the deteriorating conditions of Egyptian public hospitals push
refugees registered with UNHCR to wait for better care with Caritas. Those unrecognized
by UNHCR like the majority of Palestinian refugees have to either seek low-quality
public hospitals or charitable independent clinics.
Employment is another sensitive topic in Egypt. Egypt suffers from high rates of
unemployment and hiring foreigners is a sensitive matter. Egypt did not formulate a
reservation to Article 17 of the 1951 Convention related to wage-labor. However,
Egyptian legislation set many conditions to restrict hiring foreigners. Many Egyptian
officials hold negative perceptions of refugees including that they are “unskilled,
uneducated, and illiterate” and, “compete for jobs with poor Egyptians.”716 Until 2003,
refugee identity card issued through UNHCR (also known as the blue card), carried the
stamp “Not permitted to work.” Negotiations between UNHCR and the Egyptian
government failed to lift this limitation. UNHCR approached the case thorough stressing
the refugees’ right to work, while the Egyptian government argued that refugees are only
prohibited from working in the public sector. Taking into account that the private sector
is highly competitive and requires certain qualifications, refugees remain dependent on
the insecure and unstable informal market.
Labor Law 12 of 2003, articles 27 to 30 explained regulations concerning hiring
foreigners. Article 27 stipulated that hiring foreigners in any Egyptian economic sector
must depend on observing reciprocity conditions. The regulations issued during the
Nasser era included clauses clearly exempting Palestinians from meeting reciprocity

715. Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt,” 22-23
716. Ibid. 22
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conditions due to their statelessness. But since Palestinians became defined as foreigners,
the article left it to the competent minister to determine which nationals qualify for
exemption from this condition. Articles 28 and 29 stipulated that obtaining work permits
and valid residency was mandatory. Article 29 stated that the fees to be collected for
issuing a new work permit would not be less than one thousand Egyptian pounds. Article
30 stipulated that aliens should not compete with the local workforce or exceed a total of
ten percent of the total number of workers. The article also stated that the concerned
minister should issue a decree determining which professions aliens are prohibited from
practicing.717 However, Article 6 of Resolution 136 of 2003 related to the procedures and
conditions of work permits for foreigners exempted some foreigners including
Palestinians from paying the high fees for work permits.718 Since most Palestinian
refugees in Egypt suffer from low-living standards and inability to access enough
education, they lack sufficient skills to compete with other well-trained foreigners.
Accordingly, Palestinians fall prey to the informal market, which fails to provide a stable
job and adequate insurance.
The right to ownership did not fare better. Many Palestinians who settled in Egypt
descended from a peasant background. When they arrived in Egypt, they bought small
plots for cultivation purposes. Although Egyptian laws prohibit foreigners from owning
agricultural lands, during the Nasser years Palestinians were exempted from this law.719
However, in 1985 and despite the improvement in Egyptian-Palestinian relations, the
government issued Law 104 of 1985. This law canceled the exception granted to
717. Labor Law No. 12 of 2003 http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/labour/default.aspx [Full Text]
718. This exemption is applicable also to Greeks, Sudanese, and Italians based on bilateral agreements and
special relations and not because of the special conditions of Palestinians as refugees, in Grabska, “Who
Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt,” 21
719. First clause of Law No. 15 of 1963, refer to chapter (2), 47
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Palestinians in Law 15 of 1963 related to land ownership. Despite the fact that new laws
should not apply to preceding cases, this law contained a retroactive clause. In other
words, it annulled all previous Palestinian ownership. It also prohibited Palestinian
owners from selling their lands to their Egyptian wives and stipulated that they sell to
unrelated Egyptian buyers. Those who failed to comply with this law faced the
confiscation of their property and imprisonment.720 This left refugees without any
income, the law did not offer any compensation for the loss of property. Article 13 of the
1951 Convention stipulates that the contracting state should afford the most favorable
treatment to refugees in terms of acquiring movable and unmovable property. Article 18
stipulated that the contracting states should allow refugees the right to engage in selfemployment including agriculture, industry, commerce and handicrafts. The Egyptian
government violates these articles although it did not formulate any official reservations
on signing the Convention in 1981.
Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the Mubarak era, which in essence represented a
continuation to that of Sadat. Mubarak made relations with the United States a strategic
cornerstone of his foreign and economic policies. He was adamant that peace
negotiations were the only viable way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. He dismissed
the option of war and always warned that armed struggle increases violence. EgyptianPalestinian relations did not experience tough political tensions especially when Arafat
opted for the negotiations path beginning with the Oslo Accords. Tensions did however
occur, following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007. The Egyptian regime sided with

720. Yassin, “The Palestinians in Egypt,” 32
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Fatah and attempted to isolate Hamas through sealing the Rafah border, which was the
only viable vein sustaining the already entrapped Gazans.
Domestically, the status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did not change
since the Sadat era. They remained classified as foreigners and struggled to provide for
the costs of living, residency permits renewals, education enrollment, and the scarcity of
secure jobs. The regime did not show any willingness to engage positively in improving
the conditions of the refugees. Rather the regime approached the refugee issue with a
sense of alienation and securitization. Palestinian refugees faced arbitrary deportations
without clear legal procedures. It however remains to be investigated whether or not
Palestinians residing in Egypt had experienced further complications in treatment
following the Egyptian intense clash with Hamas between 2007 and 2010.
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Conclusion

The Egyptian revolution of 2011 stemmed largely from mounting domestic
grievances including poverty, oppression, and the lack of social justice. However,
Mubarak’s foreign policies and Egypt’s declining regional status added more fuel to the
growing dissatisfaction with his regime. Some observers argue that early manifestations
of popular anti-regime agitation appeared during the mass protests of the early 2000s.
During the brutal Israeli invasion of Jenin in 2002 and the war on Iraq in 2003, hundreds
of thousands of Egyptians organized demonstrations protesting the regime’s passivity
toward the massacres in both Palestine and Iraq. Solidarity with Palestinian and Arab
grievances acted as a catalyst unifying Egyptian opposition from different trends
including Leftists, Nasserists, Liberals, and the Muslim Brotherhood. This unified
collaboration galvanized the opposition, culminating with the eruption of the
revolution.721 Mubarak stepped-down as a president on 11 February 2011 leaving the
SCAF in charge of the transitional period which lasted till 30 June 2012. During this
interim period, many Egyptians sought significant political changes that would restore
Egypt’s Arab leadership. The demands mainly called for a firmer stance toward Israel
including ending all trade agreements such as QIZ and gas sales. Further calls demanded
expelling the Israeli ambassador, opening the Rafah cross border, and reevaluating the

721. For a detailed analysis on this topic see Reem Abou-El-Fadl, “The Road to Jerusalem through Tahrir
Square: Anti-Zionism and Palestine in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.
41, No. 2 (Winter 2012), 6-26
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terms of the Camp David Accords of 1978 which pose several restrictions on Egyptian
military presence in Sinai.722
On 9 September 2011 hundreds of protesters stormed the Israeli embassy in Giza.
They threw many documents and one protester managed to remove the Israeli flag and
replace it with an Egyptian one.723 The act came after months of Egyptian anger toward
Israel in the wake of the death of five Egyptian border guards in July 2011 by Israeli
forces. Israel stated that they did not target the Egyptian forces across the border but in
fact were chasing militants smuggling weapons into Gaza. However, Egyptians
demanded a firm stance to avenge the slayed soldiers and marched toward the embassy to
evict it themselves.724 Following the incident Israel recalled its diplomatic convoy and the
United States expressed its deep concern and called upon the Egyptian authorities to take
all measures necessary to maintain order.725 The authorities in return, declared a state of
emergency and dispatched thousands of police and military units to protect the embassy.
However, the act itself remained significant as the first bold statement expressing
Egyptian sentiments regarding diplomatic relations with Israel. During the Mubarak era,
university students used to demonstrate against Israeli presence in Egypt and called for
serving all ties with it in response to the mounting Israeli aggressions on Palestinians.
However, the regime maintained a strict order and the anti-riot police always succeeded
722. Refer to chapter (3), 20. Notes No. 67-68
723. “Egyptian Authorities Declare a State of Emergency to Maintain Security,”
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/10/166157.html [Arabic Source] also see
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/09/110909_israel_embassy_cairo.shtml?print=1 and
http://arabic.cnn.com/2011/egypt.2011/9/10/cairo.israel_embassy/index.html [Arabic Sources]
724. Michael Sharnoff, “Middle East Media Monitor:
Post-Mubarak Egyptian Attitudes Toward Israel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2011,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201110.sharnoff.egyptandisrael.html
725. “The Remaining Members of the Israeli Embassy in
Cairo Leave to Tel Aviv,” http://www.ahram.org.eg/Egypt/News/101265.aspx, 15 September 2011 [Arabic
Source] also see http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/09/110909_obama_concern_cairo.shtml and
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/113854.aspx [Arabic Sources]
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in containing the protesters and confined them within campus gates. Through attacking
the embassy, Egyptian protesters wanted to send a message that as a population they
never really adhered to peace with Israel and still perceive it as their true enemy.
The attack on the embassy stirred a controversy. Although applauded by many
Egyptians and Islamic-oriented groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, many secularists
and political activists condemned it. They argued that storming the embassy is not the
solution and does not benefit Egypt’s interests, since it rendered the state chaotic and
incapable of protecting foreign establishments.726
Additionally, the gas pipes transferring Egyptian gas to Israel faced a series of
anonymous attacks which left the lines inoperable. Talks between Israeli officials and the
head of the Egyptian Company for National Gases (EGAS) regarding modifying sales
prices have stalled since 15 September 2011. Egypt stopped supplying its gas to Israel
indefinitely since early 2012.727
Despite visible Egyptian-Israeli tensions and the surge in popular anti-Israel
sentiments, the Egyptian government asserted its commitment to its treaties with Israel.
With an economy highly dependent on Western financial aid and a turbulent transitional
period, the government could not afford a confrontation with Israel and the West. The
government in an attempt to engage more effectively in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

726. Amer Hamzawy, “Storming the
Embassy is not the Key to Change and Parliament will Amend the Peace Agreement,” al-Dostour on 10
September 2011,
http://www.dostor.org/politics/egypt/11/september/10/53887, also see Nora Fakhry, “Egypt Freedom Party
Condemns the Attack on the Homeland and the Israeli Embassy,” on 11 September 2011
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=490463&SecID=97&IssueID=0 [Arabic Sources].
727. Sharnoff, “Middle East Media Monitor:
Post-Mubarak Egyptian Attitudes Toward Israel,”
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201110.sharnoff.egyptandisrael.html
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revived the prisoners exchange negotiations. On 11 October 2011 Egyptian officials
declared that a prisoner exchange deal had been finalized between Israel and Hamas.728
On 18 October 2011 Hamas exchanged Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (captured in Gaza on
25 June 2006) for 1,027 Palestinian security prisoners.729 However, Israeli prisons still
hold thousands of Palestinian prisoners who suffer from inhuman treatment.730
On 30 June 2012, the transitional period in Egypt officially ended when
Mohammad Mursi won the presidential elections. Mursi, a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood declared that the “new Egypt” will regain its Arab leadership and play a fair
role to reconcile Hamas and Fatah. He also stressed that he would end the Gaza blockade.
On 28 July 2012 Egyptian officials stated that the Rafah cross border will resume
operating on daily basis from nine o’clock in the morning till five in the afternoon except
for weekends and official holidays where the gates shall remain closed.731 Further, the
government allowed the passage of construction materials to help rebuild Gaza after
successive Israeli raids.732 It is important to note that under Mubarak construction
materials were prohibited from passing into Gaza through Rafah under the pretext that
the cross border is designed for the passage of people only.
Nonetheless, the tunnels spreading across the border remained a highly contested
issue. The tunnels increased rapidly since 2007 with the intensification of the Gaza

728. “Israel, Hamas reach Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal, officials say,” on 11 October 2011,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-hamas-reach-gilad-shalit-prisoner-exchange-dealofficials-say-1.389404
729. “ Gilad Shalit Returns to Israel,” on 18 October 2011,
http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000690916 For further background, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilad_Shalit
730. http://www2.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=958499& [Arabic Source]
731. http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=976635&eid=1761 [Arabic Source]
732. http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=956181&SecID=65&IssueID=0 on February 23, 2013
and http://akhbarelyom.org.eg/news136567_12.aspx on February 24, 2013 [Arabic Sources]
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blockade. Despite the reopening of the Rafah border cross, thousands of tunnels still
operate under the ground. Following the revolution, Sinai suffered from a state of
lawlessness, and several reports warned that the tunnels are being used to smuggle heavy
weapons and transfer radical Islamists between Sinai and Gaza.733 On 5 August 2012 and
during the holy month of Ramadan, a terrorist attack occurred in Sinai and resulted in the
death of sixteen Egyptian soldiers and the injury of seven others. The perpetrators stole
Egyptian military vehicles and drove them into the Gaza strip but Israeli forces managed
to kill them.734 Mursi vowed a strong retaliation and declared that he would lead the
military operations in Sinai to arrest suspected radical elements.735 However,
investigations dragged and the attackers remain unidentified. The Egyptian army in return
embarked on destroying the tunnels in an effort to contain suspicious activities.736
Recently an Egyptian court ruled in favor of destroying all the tunnels to protect national
security.737
During early November, 2012 Israeli forces assassinated a leader in al-Qassam
brigades, Hamas military wing. Consequently, Hamas retaliated by shelling Israeli
settlements triggering Israel to launch on 14 November 2012 a wide military operation in
Gaza known as “Operation Pillar of Cloud.” The operation resulted in the death of over a

733. http://anbamoscow.com/opinions/20130216/380183237.html on 16 February 2013 [Arabic Source]
also see “Why Egypt Is Flooding the Gaza Strip's Tunnels,” http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201302-13/why-the-egyptians-are-flooding-the-tunnels-of-gaza on 13 February 2013
734. http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=05082012&id=e37d1461-9810-4b4c-88a4e407862ce2c0 and http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/238078.aspx [Arabic Sources]
735. http://almesryoon.com/permalink/19684.html#.USo7FVcXX8c [Arabic Source]
736. http://www.alamalyawm.com/ArticleDetail.aspx?artid=250549 on 18 February 2013 [Arabic Source]
also see http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/101012/ on 19 February 2013 [Arabic Source] also see
“Egypt forces say 225 Gaza tunnels found under border,”
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=565928 on 17 February 2013
737. http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=960950& on 27 February 2013 [Arabic Source] also see
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/26/world/meast/egypt-gaza-tunnels
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hundred Palestinians and the injury of another eight hundred.738 The Egyptian regime
rushed to contain the escalation. Mursi recalled the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, and
called for an action from both the UN Security Council and the Arab League to pressure
Israel to halt its aggression.739 Mursi also dispatched the Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham
Qandil to Gaza to stress both Egypt’s solidarity with Gazans and its desire to restore its
regional leadership.740 Mursi’s diplomatic actions seemed speedy when compared to
those of Mubarak. During “Operation Cast Lead” of 2008-2009, Egyptian diplomacy was
criticized for being too slow to respond to the human crisis in Gaza. This attitude
stemmed largely from Mubarak’s mounting dissatisfaction with Hamas and his desire to
weaken their presence on Egypt’s eastern border. Also, Mubarak’s diplomacy had to
follow the lead of its US counterpart which explicitly adopts an anti-Hamas stance.741
Mursi’s initiative succeeded in finalizing an Israeli-Palestinian cease fire on 21
November 2012. The agreement stipulated an immediate cease fire on both sides (Israel
and Hamas) and opening crossing gates to facilitate the passage of people and goods. The
agreement placed Egypt as a witness to observe the implementation of the cease fire by
both parties.742
The Egyptian government also pushes toward finalizing the long-awaited HamasFatah reconciliation. By early 2013 Egyptian officials invited representatives of both
738. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillar_of_Defence also see “Gaza Braces for Invasion as Death Toll
Mounts,” The Observer on 18 November 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/18/israel-gazabraces-for-invasion
739. http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Egypt-recalls-Israel-ambassador-after-Gaza-raid//1066/1620468/-/duoj9kz/-/index.html
740. Kevin Connolly, “Conflict Test for post-Mubarak Egypt,” on 15 November 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20343183
741. Ibid. also refer to chapter (4), 28. Notes No. 109-110
742. http://www.dostor.org on 21 November 2012 [Arabic Source] also see “Israel and Hamas Agree to a
Cease-Fire, After a U.S.-Egypt Push,” The New York Times on 21 November 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?hp&_r=0

213

organizations to settle their differences and draft a tentative timeline to finalize the
reconciliation, set a date for new legislative elections, and form a unity government. 743
However, talks kept dragging and a concrete achievement remains elusive.744 Further,
Egypt’s mounting political turmoil with Mursi struggling with social unrest and
unprecedented economic decline enforce the state to turn inward. Egypt’s domestic
dilemmas pose a serious challenge to its ambitions in restoring its Arab leadership. It
remains to be seen when and how will Egypt overcome its turmoil and head toward
achieving the prominence envisioned by the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square.
Despite Egypt’s diplomatic initiatives, the core of Mursi’s political approach did
not significantly differ from that of his predecessor. In other words, the government’s
stance focuses on the Palestine cause but not the Palestinians. Ever since the demise of
Nasserism, Palestinians in Egypt faced systematic marginalization resulting in them
being an invisible community. Much has been said about solidarity and commitment to
the Palestine issue and Palestinians in the occupied territories. By contrast, neither the
successive Egyptian governments, nor the media attempted to adopt any initiatives to
improve the social and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt. The
only progression came in the form of issuing Law 154 of 2004 related to granting
Egyptian citizenship to children born to Egyptian women and foreign fathers. During the
revolution, Palestinian refugees mostly refrained from participating fearing that they

743. “Egypt Pushes toward Achieving a Palestinian Reconciliation,” on 10 January 2013
http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/31662/8086769.html# also see “Fatah Appreciates Egypt’s Role in
Backing the Reconciliation,” on 18 January 2013 http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=913085
[Arabic Sources]
744. “Egyptian Correspondences with Hamas to Save the Palestinian Reconciliation,” on 25 February 2013
http://www2.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=958488& [Arabic Source]
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would be targeted by security forces.745 The success of the revolution and the initial wave
of popular solidarity with the Palestine cause revived hopes that the years of
marginalization are about to end. Starting from May 2011 Palestinians born to Egyptian
mothers could finally apply for their Egyptian citizenship. However, this was the only
tangible improvement achieved while all the regulations defining Palestinians as
foreigners remained intact. With Egypt’s mounting internal crisis, it becomes rather
difficult to predict when or how would the government address its responsibilities toward
its refugee communities.

745. Bisan Udwan, “Egypt’s Palestinians and the Uprising,” http://english.alakhbar.com/content/egypt%E2%80%99s-palestinians-and-uprising on 13 October 2011, also see Sarah elRashidi, “Refugees Remain Invisible in post-Revolutionary Egypt,” on 6 April 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/38224.aspx
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